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CHAPTER I 
Overview 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Will globalism bring shared prosperity, or make the desperate o/the world even 
more desperate? Will we use science and technology to grow the economy and 
protect the environment, or put it to risk--put it all at risk in a world dominated by 
a struggle over natural resources?] 
Natural resources' development scenarios involving indigenous peoples and other 
minority stakeholders, foreign investors (private and public), and considerable 
environmental and social impacts are increasingly frequent, particularly in South 
America and other developing regions. Balancing development's impacts and benefits 
and looking after a country's balance of payments while taking into account, among other 
things, minority rights, respect for cultural identities, the need for widespread poverty 
alleviation and environmental stewardship is proving an extremely delicate task and one 
that increasingly requires thoughtful consideration of extraneous limitations, both factual 
and legal. 
Whilst a few decades ago the international law principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources provided countries with a considerable measure of independence in the 
management of their natural resources, it may no longer be so. Current international and 
I 
US President Clinton's address to the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 
21, 1999 cited in I. Simonovic, "State Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal?" 
(Summer 2000) 28 Ga. 1. Int'l & Compo L. 381. 
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transnational legal developments and practice are having a tremendous impact on the way 
a country deals with complex domestic issues of resource allocation, development and 
management. 2 Erosion of the principle is due to the enhanced exposure and to the 
proliferation of transnational networks3 that results from an increasingly interconnected 
global community characterized, among other things, by an open global economy, the 
proliferation of international trade and investment, the mega growth of multi-national 
corporations, real-time communication technologies, deepening environmental and 
human rights' awareness, and a growing number of Non Governmental Organizations 
(NOOs) and civil society activism. International legal imperatives, practices and precepts, 
as well as principles developed in foreign municipal jurisdictions and by a new set of 
global actors, are making increasingly frequent inroads into the management of domestic 
affairs4 and there is a heightened expectation both locally and globally that those precepts 
and practices will be followed in every country's natural resources' development and 
management decisions. 
As the gap between the haves and the have-nots of the world continues to widen at an 
alarming rate,5 this re-alignment of natural resources law and management practices to 
2 This work generally refers to natural resources allocation, exploitation, decision-making and management 
operations under the general terms of "management" and/or "development." 
3 S. Picciotto defines transnational networks as "new forms of transnational politics, based on the growth of 
"principled issue networks" involving non-governmental organizations and others operating on the basis of 
shared ideals on global issues." S. Picciotto, "Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented 
States and the Dilemmas ofNeo-Liberalism" (1996-1997) 17 Nw. 1. Int'1. L. & Bus. 1014 at 49. See also: 
J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
: I. Simonovic, supra, note 1. 
For some poignant examples see: D.A. Kysar, "Sustainable Development and Private Global 
Governance" (June 2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 2109. For an account of how the gap between rich and poor has 
spread more than 30 times over the last years in Argentina, see: Arg., La Nacion, "Hay menos gasto social 
que en los 90" 19 Feb. 2006, available at: . 
<WWW.lanacion.com.ar/economiainota.asp?nota _ id=781952&origen=premium>. 
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respond to emerging global forces could be of significance to the future of humanity as a 
whole. The following chapters describe the forces currently driving that change and the 
successes and failures encountered in its wake; they also provide a glimpse of what could 
lie ahead and advance some ideas aimed at contributing to the achievement of equitable 
development and management of natural resources. 
A. Natural Resources: What They Are and Why They Are Important 
Before going on to discuss the legal and factual underpinnings of natural 
resources management, it is important to clarify what is meant by the reference to 
"natural resources" and why natural resources are key to community and individual 
development. 
Several definitions of natural resources have been attempted in the legal as well as the 
non-legal fields. Regardless of whether the definition comes from the natural or the social 
sciences, central to the concept is the idea of value: utilitarian (anthropocentric) value or 
intrinsic value, but value nonetheless. 
In international law, Schrijver chooses Cano's definition of physical natural goods, as 
opposed to those made by man, that are a constitutional element of the human 
environment, as the most complete.6 Professor Weintraub offers a definition of natural 
resources that is particularly useful in that it ties it to human aspirations and needs that 
are specific to a community of individuals, making it easy to link natural resources with 
6 
N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over natural resources (Cambridge, u.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
at 15. 
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the idea of development as understood by a variety of peoples. He refers to a natural 
resource as "a portion of the Earth that contributes to the continued existence of a 
community. [Or J Earth-derived substances from which many aspects of a community's 
identity are distilled,,7 Accordingly, Prof. Weintraub characterizes a substance as natural 
resource "based on the community's desire to tie its identity to reliance on that 
substance."s In tum, the concept of "environment" is dynamic and community specific. It 
designates the totality of natural resources that a community deems necessary for its 
continuity and development. As community needs and values change over time, so will 
the environment and its natural resource components. 
Although some draw a distinction between natural resources and "natural wealth" 
arguing that natural wealth has a broader meaning comparable to that of environment, 
international instruments tend to refer to natural resources and natural wealth 
interchangeably. 9 
In sum, natural resources are valuable earth-derived physical substances, that grouped 
together make up the environment, and that are necessary for a community's 
development. But what exactly is development? 
7 B.A. Weintraub, "Environmental Security, Environmental Management, and Environmental Justice" 
~Spring 1995) 12 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 533, at 538. 
Id at 540. 
9 Schrijver distinguishes natural resources from natural wealth in that natural wealth is a more 
comprehensive term comprising alI the components of nature from which natural resources can be 
extracted or which can serve as the basis for economic activities. Schrijver, supra, note 6 at 19. 
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B. Human Development and Well Being 
"Development" is not a straightforward concept. In its most basic definition 
"develop" means to "unfold, bring or come from latent to visible or active."JO Per se, the 
term development conjures the idea of change, but says nothing about the content or 
direction of that change. However, at least in the western mind and especially when 
thought of in the sense of "human development," forward seems the only possible 
direction that development can point at. Forward is equivalent to progress and growth; 
what is left behind is backward and inadequate. In this light, "[dJevelopment is a set of 
practices and beliefs that are part of the Western political and cultural imagination, 
despite being presented as universal, natural and inevitable. ( .. .) It presumes a 
universal and superior way of ordering society, and that all societies are to advance 
toward the same goal." II 
Despite the reductionist approach that equates development with monetary wealth and 
with growth in per capita income or national economic indicators, development means 
different things to different peoples. Even the idea of change, so closely tied to the 
western notion of development, is misplaced. To a person in a big metropolis like San 
Francisco, USA, or the Argentine capital of Buenos Aires development may be 
equivalent to improved highways, increasing access to communication technologies and 
well stocked super-markets and stores that are relatively close by. To the rural and 
indigenous communities of southern Chile, it may mean stability and the ability to 
10 
11 Oxford Dictionary, 4th. Edition (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
R.E. Gordon and J.H. Sylvester, "De constructing Development" (Winter 2004) 22 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1, at 4. 
5 
continue to lead pastoral or subsistence life-styles without fear from encroachment by 
competing uses of the land and resources that those livelihoods depend upon. 
Human development is, "above all else a question o/human values and attitudes, goals 
self-defined by societies.,,12 Just as societies and communities differ, so will the notion of 
development. The ultimate goal is individual and community (i.e. human) well being 
understood as the minimum acceptable level of spiritual and material satisfaction 13 that 
individuals and communities aspire to attain and that derives from their relationship with 
natural resources. Thus, development in this study refers to a process: the quest for 
human well being, whichever direction that quest might take. 
So defined, development is still a controversial notion. It brings to the fore the tension 
between conflicting views of well being and the difficulties that are intrinsic to defining 
the "common good" or the "public interest." The larger and more diverse the community, 
the harder it will be to define what are tolerable costs and acceptable benefits to be borne 
and distributed amongst its members. 14 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the right to 
development is amongst the most elusive of human rights. 15 
~2 D. Goulet, "Changing Development Debates Under Globalization: The Evolving Nature of Development 
:~ the Light of Globalization" (Fall 2004) 6 J. L. & Soc. Challenges 1, at 2. 
Goulet refers to these as "needs of the first order" which are followed in ascending order by enhancement 
~eeds and lUXUry needs. Goulet, id. 
15 For a practical illustration of these tensions see case studies below. 
In fact, some authors, including Judge R. Higgins of the International Court of Justice, question its status 
as human right. R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (New York: 
OUP, 1996). See also: J. Donnelly, "In Search of the Unicorn" in Law and Development, A. Carthy, ed. 
(NYU Press: New York, 1992). 
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C. Sovereignty, Natural Resources and Development in a Globalized World 
When development is intrinsically tied to natural resources as in the definition 
above, the issue of access to, and management of, natural resources becomes central to its 
realization. 
Traditionally, the notion of sovereignty drew a bright line parceling out the world into 
states with their own territory and exclusive access to the resources within. Indeed, access 
to, and management of, natural resources are central to the economic dimension of 
sovereignty manifest in the international law principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, proclaimed in 1962 under UN Resolution 1803.16 The principle is an 
exclusionary one as it was devised as a tool to allow (mostly) newly formed states to cut 
off access to their valuable natural resources to outside interests. International law 
mediated between state actors and served to assert a state's rights to its natural resources 
vis a vis other states and their powerful constituents avid for natural resources, wherever 
located. At the time of its inception, internal allocation and management issues were not a 
primary concern as long as foreign detrimental access could be kept at bay. 
The world that delivered Resolution 1803 was different from the world we know today. It 
was a world in expansion with states striving to shake off the North's political and 
economic domination of the pre-World War II era. The goal was redistribution of wealth 
and power amongst states. Monolithic, controlling states, self-determination 17 and the 
16 
UN G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December of 1962: Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources. 
17 
. Contrary to what may be generally thought, the right to self-determination does not equate to a right to 
Independence. States have been very vocal in their defense of territorial integrity. Self-determination 
7 
idea of "one people, one state" were essential to the consolidation of the new world 
order. 18 Well being and development could only be conceived in terms of the state as a 
whole. It was not time to slice up the pie, but to make and consolidate it. 
As events unfolded and the Cold War signaled to the Western powers the need to secure 
allies in the Third World, focus started to shift to the plight of the individual and to 
personal well being. 19 International Financial Institutions (IFIs), specifically the Bretton 
Woods Institutions or World Bank Group, added a social dimension to their mandate20 
and work began on indigenous and other minority issues. In 1986, the UN adopted the 
Declaration on the Right to Development whereby states recognize that "the human 
person is the central subject ofthe development process and that development policy 
should therefore make the human being the main participant and beneficiary of 
development.,,21 Particularly regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
several UN Resolutions following Resolution 1803, including the 1969 Declaration on 
Social Progress and Developmenr2and the 1974 UN Charter of Economic Rights and 
exists in two inter-related fonns: 1) the right of peoples within a state as a whole to have equal access to 
and participation in the political, economic and cultural life of the state as expressed, for example in the 
UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; and, 2) the right of peoples to choose their own international status. R. Higgins, supra, note 15. 
See also: C.N. Okeke, "A Note on the Right of Secession as a Human Right" (1996) 3 Ann. Surv. Int'l & 
Compo L. 27; and, A. Huff, "Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Detennination" (Spring 2005) 16 
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 295. 
18 S hr" 
19 C IJver, supra, note 6. 
L. Henkin, "Sibley Lecture, March 1994, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty" (1995/1996) 25 Ga. J. 
~~t'l & ~omp. L. 31. 
B. RaJagopal, 'From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of 
~?temational Institutions' (Spring 2000) 41 Harv. Int'I L.J. 529 . 
. G A Res. 411128 of 4 December 1986. 1966 had already seen the emergence of two foundational human 
nghts' instruments: the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Covenant on Economic, 
~ocial and Cultural Rights. Similar developments also took place in the Americas. 
GA Res. 2542 (XXIV). 
8 
Duties ofStates,23 though upholding the states' maximum discretion in the management 
of their natural resources, also represented a push to "put the exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources firmly in an economic and social-development 
context,,24 focusing on the centrality of human development as the duty that inevitably 
accompanies a state's right to resources. 
Despite a proliferation of international declarations and the considerable time that has 
gone by, the impact of this shift of emphasis from state-centred development to 
individual well being is yet to be felt in many locations across the world. As will be 
illustrated with reference to South America in the case studies below, at least in some 
parts of the world, the individual well being that was supposed to derive from the states' 
exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has failed to materialize. 
Inequalities continue to grow. 
While developing countries and their rulers continue to struggle to deliver the well being 
that their populace is entitled to, the world continues to transform. New forces have 
emerged that require a fresh look at the law and practice of access to, and management 
of, natural resources. These new forces are generally referred to under the umbrella term 
of globalization. Globalization promises to take natural resources law and management in 
a whole new direction. 
23 
24 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX). See especially art. 7. 
Schrijver, supra, note 6 at 88. 
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D. Globalization 
As with the other concepts tackled in this section, no single, universal definition 
can be found for "globalization." Authors, however, coincide in characterizing 
globalization as a dynamic and complex phenomenon, involving a multitude of issues 
and processes and connecting societies and individuals at unprecedented levels.25 Among 
its features are the proliferation of transnational networks, liberalized trade, increasing 
market integration, access to real-time communication and information technology, and 
an unprecedented growth oftransnational corporations' wealth and power. According to 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a "key characteristic of 
globalization is that the actors involved are not only states but non-state actors, 
particularly multinational or trans-national corporations.,,26 
This globalized scenario has an inevitable impact on the law?7 Despite some resistance to 
discarding the traditional classification of the law between public and private, national 
and international,28 legal "cross-fertilization" is now increasingly common and a new, 
overarching global normative system seems to be taking shape. 29 This seems to be 
particularly true with regards to natural resources management. 
25 D. Goulet, supra, note 12. See also: Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Globalization 
<www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalizationl>. Globalization entails an acknowledgement of the world as 
pluriform. On the subject of the world as pluriform see e.g.: S. Sucharitkul, "International Law and 
International Relations in a Pluriform World" Cleveringa Inaugural Lecture, Rijksuniversiteit Te Leiden, 
~eiden 24 November 1989. 
6 Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Globalization - Business and Human Rights, 
~www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalizationlbusiness/index.htm> . 
See e.g. the discussion of the impact of globalization on sovereignty and on US policy and law in: H. 
~tacy, "Relational Sovereignty" (May 2003) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2029. 
For an account of the negative effects of continued reliance on the traditional divide see: R. Dufresne, 
"The Opacity of Oil: Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law" (Winter-Spring 2004) 36 
~.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 331. 
Prof. H.J. Berman uses "world law" to denote the combination of inter-state law with the common law of 
humanity and the common law of numerous existing world communities (communities of traders, 
10 
2. METHODOLOGY 
After having set the conceptual basis for discussion above, the following chapters 
of the present study undertake a survey and analysis of some of the current international 
practices and normative developments that help shape natural resources management 
today. Specifically, the following chapters deal with the increased attention being given 
today to the link between natural resources and human rights and the activism displayed 
by some international human rights tribunals, the impact of environmental protection 
imperatives and recent developments in international economic law. 
A review of policies and practices of the international institutions that play an important 
role in shaping resource management approaches and in lending visibility to minority, 
indigenous and environmental protection issues, such as the International Labour 
Organization, the World Bank Group, the World Trade Organization and the Inter-
American System for the Protection of Human Rights, will be undertaken. 
References to and sections on domestic law are based on the author's prior research on 
the subject and professional experience in South America. On that basis, the author 
provides an assessment of the effectiveness of domestic legal tools currently in use in 
South America to address natural resources management issues and the impact of outside 
gnancers, environmentalists, etc.). H,J. Berman, "The Role oflntemational Law in the Twenty-First 
thentury: WORLD LAW" (May 1995) 18 Fordham Int'I L,J. 1617. See also: E. Brown Weiss, "The Rise or 
e FalJ ofIntemational Law?" (November 2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 345. 
11 
influences. The analysis and findings are centred on specific case studies in selected 
countries of South America. 
The study attempts to answer the question of whether current institutions and practices as 
applied to and in developing countries are conducive to achieving a balanced and 
equitable natural resources development outcome ''for the improvement a/the well- being 
of the entire population and of all individuals.,,3o The concluding sections contain the 
author's final remarks about the status of natural resources law and some suggestions for 
improvement. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The information collected in the following chapters points at the existence of a 
global normative system that applies to natural resources management across the world. 
It also looks at the requirements of the global system through the lens of current law and 
policy as applied in some South American countries. 
This study is not the first one to call the reader's attention to the fact that the classical 
divisions of the law into municipal and international, public and private, no longer 
reflects the type of normative interaction that is common in the world today.31 Indeed, 
30 
3) Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 2.3. UN, G. A. Res. 411128 of 4 December 1986. 
In.1956 P. Jessup coined the term "transnational law" to designate an amalgam of principles of domestic ~d mternationallaw regulating actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Prof. S. Sucharitkul uses 
e term "community law" to designate a system that is international as well as domestic. S. Sucharitkul, 
12 
echoing prior academic work in that regard, one may say that a ''fluid model 0/ multiple 
affiliations, multiple jurisdictional assertions, and multiple normative statements 
captures more accurately than the classical model o/territoriality and sovereignty the 
way legal rules are beingformed and applied in today's world.,,32 
What this study attempts to do is to shine some light onto the manner in which the 
transformation of the law and normative relations under the phenomenon of globalization 
affects natural resources management regardless of where those resources are placed: 
inside or outside traditional state boundaries or somewhere in between. It points at the 
inadequacy of current institutions and norms to advance well being in the developing 
world and at developing states' relative powerlessness to correct and address the resulting 
situation. 
The author finishes by contributing some ideas on legal tools that could be implemented 
to assist the developing world in its struggle to advance well being in the course of 
developing and managing its natural resources. 
s(?ra, note 25, at 25. See also: P. Schiff Berman, "From International Law to Law and Globalization" 
32 005)43 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 485. 
P. Schiff Berman, id at 537. 
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CHAPTER II 
Natural Resources and the Evolution of Law 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is obvious that states are no longer free to simply pursue whatever policy they 
wish within their borders. (. . .) We may well be witnessing the formation of a new 
"social contract, " one that not only regulates relations between individuals and a 
state but also between individuals, states, and international organizations. 1 
This Chapter discusses some of the core concepts of international and economic 
law.2 It traces their evolution and focuses on the development of the right to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and its meaning in a globalized world. It lays down 
the basis for analyzing the evolution of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
understanding the emerging legal landscape or, as in the quote above, the new "social 
contract" and its implications. 
I I. Simonovic, "State Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal?" (Summer 2000) 28 
?a. J. Int'l & Compo L. 381, at 384 and 403. 
International economic law is hereby considered a subset of international public law concerning economic 
exchanges between the subjects of international law. Conf.: I. Sidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic 
Law.(The Netherlands: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1992). International development law concepts, 
~elatmg to the rights and responsibilities of states in the development process, are also discussed within the 
roader framework of international law. 
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2. SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. Sovereignty 
Traditionally, the concept of sovereignty has provided the legal basis to a state's 
power to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of the natural resources situated 
within its territory. In principle, what took place within a state's boundaries, including the 
fate of its natural resources, was no one's business except the state's own. 3 What 
happened outside state lines was subject to such rules as the community of equally 
sovereign states agreed to through their express consent or as a result of their consistent 
practice.4 Thus conceived, sovereignty has been fundamental to the development of the 
modem state as well as the cornerstone of international law. Sovereignty is also central to 
the link between natural resources management and international law as can be deduced 
from tracing its evolution and its connection with other important international law 
concepts like self-determination and the right to development. Today, as suggested in the 
opening quote, sovereignty, though still key, has shed some of its exclusionary traits and 
no longer shields states entirely against third party intervention. 5 This permeability is of 
particular importance in connection with natural resources management issues. 
The following sections will trace the modem evolution of sovereignty vis a vis natural 
resources development and management. 
3 ~la~sic international law subjects domestic powers to the primacy of international law (pre-NIEO) 
prmclples 4 • 
EJ. Cardenas, "The Notion of Sovereignty Confronts a New Era" in R. Pritchard, ed., Economic 
pevelopment, Foreign Investment and the Law (London, U.K.: Kluwer Law International, 1996) Ch 1. 
H. Stacy, "Relational Sovereignty" (May 2003) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2029. Stacy refers to sovereignty today 
as a "multi-directional contract." See also: E. Engle, "The Failure of the Nation State and the New 
Inte,,?ational Economic Order: Multiple Converging Crises Present Opportunity to Elaborate a New Jus 
GentIUm" available at <lexnet.bravepages.comINIEO.htm>. 
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B. Sovereignty and Self-Determination 
The right to self-determination can be found in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rightl and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.7 Common Article 1, Paragraph 1, of these Covenants provides that: 
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status andfreely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 8 
At its inception, the concept operated as the working principle behind the decolonization 
process that began after WWII. It applied between an emerging state and its colonial 
master. For a people to gain independent status as a state, some premises had to be 
present: a history of independence or self-rule in an identifiable territory, a distinct 
culture, and a will and capability to regain self-governance. Though controversial,9 in 
contemporary international law self-determination is found to be operative beyond de-
colonization to apply between a state and its own population. It is often referred to as 
"internal self-determination"IO and implies the "existence of a plurality of relatively 
~ Ava~lable at: <www.ohchr.org/englishllaw/index.htm>. 
~vallable at: <www.ohchr.org/englishllaw/index.htm>. Although self-determination is mentioned under 
artIcle 55, there is no consensus on whether self-determination as a right is provided for in the UN Charter. 
R. Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How to Use It (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
rress, 1996) Ch. 7. 
ICCPR and ICESCR, art 1, available at: <www.ohchr.org/englishllaw/index.htm>. It has also been 
defined by the International Court of Justice in the West-Saharan case as: "The need to pay regard to the 
~eely expressed will of peoples." 
L
Eg.: C.N. Okeke, "A Note on the Right to Secession as a Human Right" 1996,3 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Compo 
.27. 
lOR H' 
. Iggins, supra, note 7. 
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autonomous sub-systems within the domain of a single state. "II Territorial integrity is 
d 12 preserve. 
In all cases, the significance of the right to self-determination lies in the right-holders' 
entitlement to choose between political and economic systems through free and equal 
participation in the political process. 13 In the words of Australia's Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner: "Essential to the exercise of the right to self 
determination is choice, participation and control. ,,14 
Based on the Australian definition, it is easy to find a link between self-determination and 
the general theme of this study: natural resources management, insofar as choice and 
participation refers to lifestyle, and lifestyles, in our definition, are distilled from and 
identified with the natural resources a community controls. IS Control over natural 
resources is therefore key to self-determination, both internal and external. 
C. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
That the right to self-determination would raise significant issues of economic 
relations and struggles over natural resources, between and within nations, is self-evident. 
II 
12 Cardenas, supra, note 4, at 19. 
See also: Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, 25 
UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 (1970), reaffinning the right to self-detennination in 
f30nnection with territorial integrity and sovereign unity. 
A. Huff, "Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Detennination" (Spring 2005) 16 ColoJ.Int'l Envtl. 
L.& POi'y 295 14 • 
N Dr. B. Jonas and M. Donaldson, "Human Rights Based Approach to Mining in Aboriginal Lands" 
ovember 2003, p. 8; available at 
~WWw.minerals.csiro.aulsd/Certification/DonaldsonHumanRightsAndMiningNov03.pdt>. 
See Chapter I. 
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In international law, it was for the first time linked explicitly to sovereignty over natural 
resources when Chile proposed the inclusion of the right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources as inherent to the right to self-determination in the draft Covenants on 
human rights. Chile explained its proposal as "a practical way of giving moral support to 
a country's democratic struggle for the control of its own means of subsistence." I 6 
After its introduction in the international arena by Chile in 1952, and while states 
continued to discuss and negotiate the exact content of the Covenants, self-determination 
provided the basis for addressing the right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources in other United Nations' activities and fora. In 1954, the Commission on 
Human Rights recommended the creation of a special body to conduct a survey on the 
issue of permanent sovereignty "as a basic constituent of the right to self-
determination.,,17 The Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
was established in 1958 by Resolution 1314 (XIII). After lengthy debates, the 
Commission's findings led to the proclamation of the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources which 
explicitly recognizes "[t]he right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources.,,18 
Thus, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources owes its existence to 
the struggles of newly independent and developing states in the post WWII era. At its 
core was the plight of those states to end economic dominance by powerful developed 
16 
UN. Doc. E/CNA/S.R.260, 6 May 1952, p.6, cited in N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over natural resources 
(C~mbridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 45; also available at: 
~dlssertations. ub .rug.nIIFILES/faculties/jurl 1995/n.j . schrijver!h2. pdf> . 
18 Resolution 1803 (XVII): Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 14 Dec. 1962, Preamble. 
Id, art 1. 
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state interests. Although its genesis was very controversial, eventually, both the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR included a second paragraph under Article 1 that incorporates a 
watered-down version of the right to permanent sovereignty. As may be verified below, 
Paragraph 2 avoids any explicit reference to permanent sovereignty and takes a middle of 
the road approach, reaffirming adherence to international law principles and paying heed 
to developed countries' worries about the fate of their assets19 and about access to vital 
natural resources outside their territorial boundaries. Art 1.2 reads: 
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case maya people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence. 20 
Today, many international agreements include permanent sovereignty amongst their 
founding principles.21 
Permanent sovereignty surfaced as an outwardly oriented concept touching primarily on 
North-South issues, most significantly: nationalization of foreign property, compensation, 
and standards of treatment of foreign investments. However, just as the right to self-
determination evolved to apply internally, so has the (accompanying) right to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. As this study will show, current global developments 
19 .~eveloped countries insist on the application of classic intemationallaw concepts to compensation issues 
~~lSIng from nationalization. 
21 lCCPR and lCESCR, art. 1, available at: <www.ohchr.orglenglishllaw/index.htm>. 
See e.g., Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 1972, Pple. 21 ,available at: 
~WWW. u~ep.orgiDocuments. multilinguallDefault.asp?DocumentID=97 &ArticIeID= 1503>; Rio 
eciaratlOn on Environment and Development, 1992, pple. 2, available at: 
<WWw. unep.orgIDocuments.multilinguaI/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticIeID= 1163>. 
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are prompting the gradual evolution of permanent sovereignty to include a state's duties 
to its own nationals and to the international community in connection with natural 
resources management.22 At times, however, internal and external duties are hard to 
reconcile. 
In connection with a state's internal duties and permanent sovereignty, much has been 
said and written about whether permanent sovereignty over natural resources is vested in 
a state or in its peoples. According to some, the latter alternative would justify secession 
whenever the representational gap between a peoples and their government is of such a 
nature and gravity that human rights are inevitably compromised in the process of 
developing natural resources. However, beyond just reasons and concerns about 
indigenous spoliation and government mismanagement,23 the point may be moot in so far 
as, even in newly created states, peoples necessarily require an institutional framework 
and vested representatives to exercise any prerogatives, to ensure rights are respected 
and, in this case, that natural resources are managed in the best interest of all?4 
What is necessary in all cases is to secure the essential conditions of internal self-
determination: the right of every people within a state to choose, participate and control. 
22 Referring to the evolution of human rights law and the concept of sovereignty, L. Henkin talks about a 
shift from state to human values. L. Henkin, "Human Rights and State Sovereignty" (1995/1996) 25 Ga. J. 
Int'l & Compo L. 31. But see: R. Dufresne, "The Opacity of Oil: Internal Violence and International Law" 
(Winter-Spring 2004) 36 N. y.u. 1. Int'l L. & Pol. 331. "In international law, the gap between government 
and people is rarely given operative value" (at 357). Dufresne also argues that the international law 
principle ofPSNR legitimizes contractual relationships between corrupt governmental elites and foreign 
companies 
23 See e . . 24 .g .. R. Dufresne, ld. 
N. Kofele-Kale frames the government's actions regarding natural resources management in terms of the 
public interest doctrine, with government officials acting as trustees. N. Kofele-Kale, "Patrimonicide: The 
International Economic Crime ofIndigenous Spoliation" (Jan. 1995) 28 Vand. 1. Trasnat'l L. 45. 
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To varying extents, these three conditions (the people's choice, participation and control) 
need always be present when it comes to advancing equitable and widespread well being 
through the development and management of natural resources. That is particularly true 
today when, breaking the traditional dichotomy of peoples v. state, new global players are 
starting to emerge. It may be too early to come to a definitive conclusion on whether 
these new players can help or hinder humanity's progress in its quest towards well being. 
One thing is sure, however, and that is that although the notion of sovereignty is changing 
to account for an increasingly interconnected world, 25 as long as the people need a 
vehicle for concerted action and as long as the current political paradigm is in effect, 
states and their governments continue to be relevant in achieving individual and global 
goals.26 
D. Sovereignty and Development 
If one agrees on a basic contemporary definition of sovereignty as "the authority 
to decide, [and] the right to choose among alternative courses of action the one that 
appears most beneficial or least harmful,,27 to the public interest, then a state's "right and 
the duty to formulate appropriate development policies that aim at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals,,28 is 
perhaps the most significant manifestation of sovereignty and the modem states' raison 
2S 
. Stacy offers the following definition of sovereignty: "the responsible governance of the complex 
mteractions and relations of citizens under conditions of globalization." She terms this new notion of 
~~v~reignty "relational sovereignty." H. Stacy, supra, note 5, at 69. 
27 Slmonovic, supra, note 1. 
J. Donnelly, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights" available at: 
~WWw.du.edu/~jdonnell/paperslhrsov%20v4a.htm>.Undertraditional(relative)sovereigntydoctrine.this 
gght to choose would be subject only to the rules of international law. 
Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. G.A. Res. 411128 of 4 Dec. 1986, art. 2.3. 
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d'etre. 29 It is no wonder then that the United Nations declared a right to development as 
an inalienable human right,30 even though its content remains somehow difficult to grasp 
and define. 
Indeed, the task of setting development policies and, most of all, implementing them is of 
such magnitude and significance that states often pool their efforts in order to better their 
chances of success. Developed states have forged alliances to provide their member 
countries mutual assistance and support with policy-making and also to defend the 
common premises on which their policies are based (e.g.: freedom, democracy, etc. ). 
Example of the first type of such alliance is the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).31 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)32 would 
be an example of the second, defense-oriented kind of organization. When looking at the 
developing world, the attempt to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
represented a formidable, yet unsuccessful, common effort to harness international 
support to achieve equitable development. 33 
29 S. . ImonOVlC, supra, note 1; Stacy, supra, note 5. 
30 Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 1, G.A. Res. 411128 of 4 Dec. 1986, available at: 
<www.ohchr.org/englishJlaw/rtd.htm>. 
:~ For additional information see: <www.oecd.org/aboutlO.2337.en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1.00.html>. 
For additional information see: <www.nato.intl>. 
33 Following the failure ofNIEO to set commonly defined rules for development assistance, developing 
South American states continue to pay a high price for the development support of their developed 
counterparts, often through submission to the requirements of developed country-dominated International 
Financial Institutions. The developed countries' support may also materialize directly through development 
a~sistance loans. Loan conditions generally seek to secure advantages for developed country interests. See 
dIscussion below, Ch. III. See also, e.g.: A. Galano III, "International Monetary Fund Response to the 
Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality have Undermined Brazil's National 
Sovereignty" (Spring 1994) 6 Pace Int'I L. Rev. 323; D.E. Moller, "Intervention, Coercion, or Justifiable 
Need? A Legal Analysis of Structural Adjustment Lending in Costa Rica" (Fall 1995) 2 Sw. J.L. & Trade 
Am. 483; D. Shelton, "Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World" (Spring 2002) 25 B.C. Int'l & 
Compo L. Rev. 273. 
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Nowadays, globalization has brought with it some changes to the business as usual 
approach to development policy making. First, by reducing the ability of states to control 
and tax large firms and capital, globalization has loosened the developed world's grip on 
transnational corporations generally, and as vehicles of foreign and domestic policy. By 
the same token, however, it has restricted developing countries' ability to implement 
policies that advance the economic and social rights that are at the core of the right to 
development. 34 Second, by opening the door to a multiplicity of international and local 
stakeholders, including international financial institutions (IFIs), non governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and members of the civil society, it exposes states to enhanced 
scrutiny and outside pressure, making it increasingly hard to ignore or suppress legitimate 
demands and grievances. Third, globalization speeds up change and exposes decision-
makers to voluminous amounts of information, itself in constant flux. For example, the 
highly influential policies, requirements and methods of pressure groups and international 
organizations with an impact on domestic policy-making, including IFIs, are themselves 
under scrutiny and revision. Their relevance and appropriateness for development 
promotion is persistently challenged thereby contributing a destabilizing factor and 
leaving developing states in an increasingly vulnerable position. Finally, globalization 
provides momentum to normative harmonization and to the development and 
implementation of global standards through the operation of transnational networks and 
global courtS.35 
34 
3S Donnelly, supra, note 27; D. Shelton, id; E. Engle, supra, note 5. 
H.v. Morais, "The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance Vs. Sovereignty" (May 2002) 
50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 779; Cardenas, supra, note 4. Globalization could also be blamed for "race to the 
bottom" issues. However, the heightened visibility and forces at play in globalized issues will tend to 
COunter this pull. 
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Summarizing, globalization forces states to re-examine the ways and means through 
which they implement the right to development. But what exactly can be said to be the 
content of the right to development, and, as a result, an "appropriate development 
policy"? 
E. The Right to Development 
In keeping with the idea that development may mean different things to different 
peoples developed in Chapter I, few areas of international law theory may be as full of 
contradiction and conflict as that which relates to the right to development. Because its 
nature and definition (and even its genesis) are so elusive, some authors deny its 
existence. Professor Jack Donnelly, in a thorough analysis ofthe genesis and content of 
the concept affirms that "development is one of the primary objectives of all human 
rights, not a right in itse/f.,,36 Though it may be good and desirable to be developed, he 
goes on to say, as right-holders we can only aspire to pursue development. Development, 
in this view, can be attained through the unobstructed exercise of social, economic and 
cultural rights which, in turn, are grounded on civil and political rights. Such is also the 
view of Justice Higgins of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).37 This position seems 
to coincide with Chapter I's definition of development as a process directed at achieving 
well being. 
36 1. Donnelly, "In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development" at 
484 reprinted in Law and Development, A. Carthy, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1992) 169. 
Though Donnelly's article was written before issuance of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, 
the author does address it in draft format. 
37 H" . Iggms calls it a "long term aspiration." CIEL, Human Rights, Environment, and Economic 
Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in International Law and Global Society, Internet 
publication, available at: <www.ciel.orglPublications/olp3iii.html>;seealso:R.Higgins.supra.note7.Ch. 
6. 
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Notwithstanding the above, another IeJ judge, Judge Weeramantry has referred to the 
right to development as an inalienable human right. His definition, however, is somewhat 
circular. He defines it as the process of "improving the sum total of human happiness and 
welfare.,,38 Judge Weeramantry is not alone in his position since that is more or less the 
view of those that ascribe to the "synthesis theory" which purports the right to 
development to be a synthesis of existing individual and collective human rights, distilled 
or added up. Another group of scholars has come up with what is called the 
"indispensability theory." Rather than arguing for the right to development as a result of 
other human rights, "indispensability theory" authors consider it as an enabling right, 
indispensable for the exercise of all other human rights and at a par with that of self-
determination. Finally, the "generational theory" considers the right to development as a 
new "solidarity right" premised on an international duty to cooperate, with the flow of 
assistance moving from North to South to "compensate inequalities.,,39 
Despite their lofty objective and doubtless good intentions, none of the theories 
mentioned succeeds in defining the content of the right as distinct from the aggregation of 
all other human rights. It may therefore be advisable to tum to the UN Resolution on the 
Right to Development for guidance. Article 1 of the Resolution reads: 
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and 
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
38 
.. ICJ, Separate Opinion of Vice-President, Judge Weeramantry, available at: <www.icj-
~JJ .orglicjwww/idocketlihs/ihsjudgementlihs _ijudgment_970925 _ weeraman.htm>. 
Th.e classification is taken from R.Y. Rich, "The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right" 
reprmted in Law and Development, A. Carthy, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1992) 256. 
25 
2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of 
both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable 
right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. 40 
Unfortunately, Article 1 does little beyond providing a list of ingredients of the right to 
development, amongst which sovereignty over natural resources is but one.41 This leads 
one to conclude with Donnelly, that the right to development is mostly rhetorical; it is the 
end result of the Third World's numeric voting power in the UN countered by its limited 
factual power.42 The sum of these ingredients, however, points to the notion of well being 
as the ultimate goal of the right to development. It is therefore useful to be reminded that, 
as discussed at the beginning of this study, well being can mean different things to 
different peoples. In other words, not unlike self-determination, development is about 
choice.43 Development policy-making, one of the most significant manifestations of 
permanent sovereignty, can be described as "the process of enlarging people's choices,,44 
aimed at achieving well being. 
:~ Available at: <ohchr.orglenglishllaw/rtd.htm>. 
Note that Art. 1 refers to "full" -not permanent- sovereignty. The article's wording seems to imply that 
!~e right to development can be attained with less than permanent sovereignty. 
A good illustration of this are the developing world's failed efforts at bringing about a New International 
Economic Order, which in over thirty years has failed to materialize beyond an ambitious (and equally 
rhetorical) UN Resolution and Plan of Action. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
!~ffered more or less the same fate. 
The right to development can be distinguished from, or subsumed in, the right to self-determination 
which in addition to the ability to choose also requires a measure of participation and control. Often times, ~e distinction is blurry. 
~DP, Human Development Report 1990, "Concept and Measurement of Human Development" 
avaIlable at: <hdr.undp.orglreports/globaI11990/enl> at 10. 
26 
3. CONCLUSION 
Precious time and resources could be wasted trying to unravel the "true meaning" 
of the right to development as a precondition to state action. On the other hand, utilizing 
the powerful rhetorical value of the right to development to insist on compensation of 
inequalities as the cure for all the ills of the developing world, while doing nothing on the 
home front, is unlikely to deliver any well being and is a poor display of sovereign 
authority. In a shrinking world, sovereignty cannot be justified or permanent without state 
action to protect, manage, produce and conserve resources in the best interest and for the 
well being of the public. 
With varying degrees of forcefulness, guidance on how to maximize the chances of 
success in the process towards development, will often come from outside sources, norms 
and practices. Furthermore, because natural resources and the global environment are 
inextricable related, some natural resources' management issues are of common or global 
concern and will elicit coordinated responses from the global community.45 As shall be 
explained in the following chapters, although the nation-state continues to be in the first 
line of action regarding decision-making in natural resources management, it can no 
longer rely on its sovereign powers to do whatever it pleases with its natural resources. 
As discussed in the following chapters, a globalized world will demand that globally 
acceptable standards and practices be kept,46 and that global interests are taken into 
account, sometimes at the expense of local peoples and their right to self-determination. 
45 
46 See Cardenas, supra, note 4. 
See gen.: D. Shelton, "Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World" (Spring 2002) 25 B.C. Int'I & 
Compo L. Rev. 273. 
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Global forces and actors may, at times, negatively interfere or try to redirect a country's 
development path in their own benefit. Other times, external stakeholder action will 
trigger local improvements. Thus, increasingly, sovereignty, and particularly permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, carries limitations and duties. 
The ascendancy of the international community and international law over the full and 
free enjoyment of a country's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources is of 
particular significance when what is at stake relates to economic and financial issues, 
human rights and the environment (including resource conservation), inevitably tied to 
resource development and management. The following chapters will explore some of 
these connections. They will look at emerging global principles and practices, the 
processes and institutions behind them, and their impact on the development of domestic 
natural resource management rules and policies. 
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CHAPTER III 
Barbarians at the Gate: Natural Resources and Economic and Foreign Investment 
Law 
1. INTRODUCTION 
While permanent sovereignty over natural resources continues to be an important 
principle of international law, it cannot resist the forces that are shaping global events and 
relations today. Because the impact of natural resources' management policies and 
practices can be felt globally, I the international community keeps a particularly watchful 
eye. It does so through a variety of tools including loan conditionalities, provisions of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, and oversight mechanisms included in 
conventions.2 A sophisticated network of institutions and organizations supports their 
application. Civil society members and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) around 
the globe are also active watchdogs, often taking on enforcement activities where 
governments and other institutions are unable or unwilling to take action.3 
I 
The connection is economic as well as social and environmental. The Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment, is often cited as the fIrst international document to tie human well being and 
development to environmental and natural resources preservation on a global scale. Developing countries 
Posed extensive resistance to the organization of the Stockholm Conference as they feared that the outcome 
ofthe meeting might pose a threat to their sovereign rights to natural resources. See: 
;:WWw.unep.orgIDocumentslDefault.asp?DocumentID=97 &ArticleID= 1503>. 
Other, non law-based tools including diplomacy and the use offorce are also used. However, this study's 
foCUS is limited to the law and policy on natural resources management and related issues. 
T. Tietenberg, "Private Enforcement of Environmental Regulations in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
~n E~fective Instrument for Environmental Management?" (May 1996) Inter-American Development Bank 
Orklllg Paper Series No. ENV-I0l, Washington, D.C. 
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2. ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
A. International Financial Institutions; Rules and Practices 
Not unlike children tied to their parents for sustenance during their developing 
years, out of the entire extended family of international bodies and organizations, 
developing countries, including South American countries, are perhaps closest to the 
International Financial Institutions (lFIs). IFIs are lenders of last resort and tend to be 
regarded as necessary catalysts of development due to their ability to attract and channel 
much needed funds to developing countries,4 otherwise unable to finance their growth.s 
This section will refer to the policies and practices of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, otherwise know as the World Bank (WB),6 and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (lOB), a regional bank serving Latin America and the 
Caribbean set up under the auspices of the Organization of American States.7 Both Banks 
4 See R.P Delonis, "International Financial Standards and Codes: Mandatory Regulation Without 
Representation" (Winter-Spring 2004) 36 N.Y.UJ.Int'1 L.& Pol. 563. 
5 Countries with a per capita gross national income of$865 or less benefit from access to the International 
Development Association's (IDA) interest-free loans and grants; WB directives and policies are applicable 
to IDA's activities. This study refers to the World Bank as comprising the operations of the IDA. See: 
~web. worldbank.orglWBSITEIEXTERNALIEXT ABOUTUS/IDA>. 
Conceived at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA, during World War II, the World Bank initially 
helped rebuild Europe after the war. In the early 1960s, however, it became obvious that while Europe had 
forged ahead, the Third World had stayed considerably behind. The World Bank's focus shifted from 
reconstruction to development, and from the First to the Third World. Today, its objective is reaching the 
Millennium Development Goals. Membership in its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) is a precondition to membership in the WB. For additional information, including the Articles of 
~greement see <www.worldbank.org>. 
Although the IDB was created to cater specifically to Latin American clients, and might be thought to 
ha~e more ascendance over the formulation of law and policy in the region, the World Bank tends to be the 
mal~ trend-setter in terms of development reform. IDB staff tends to view its own practices as more 
fleXible and less idiosyncratic than those of the World Bank. That view is not necessarily shared by country 
~fficials implementing loan requirements, or supported in the documentation. See also: D. Bouille et aI, 
orld Resources Institute, "Argentina: Market-Driven Reform of the Power Sector," available at: 
~WWW.wri.?rg>. For the Bank's Articles of Agreement see <www.iadb.org>. Even though the influence of 
e InternatIOnal Monetary Fund is of the outmost importance, because of the considerably narrower focus 
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are dedicated to poverty alleviation and development8 through promotion of trade and 
investment, and through the provision of financial assistance. As part of that process they 
also help borrowing countries create and maintain adequate investment environments. 
Availability of IFI funding is of significance because loan terms are more beneficial than 
regular market terms, but also because they facilitate access to additional investments and 
funding that would be otherwise unavailable or too expensive to obtain. IFIs' intervention 
in any given country sends out a positive signal to third party lenders and investors 
regarding the (relative) safety of their investments.9 The "price" for this assistance, 
however, goes beyond the financial consideration of a regular loan. To ensure that IFI-
funded projects meet their development objectives and do not cause "unintended adverse 
effects"IO on people and the environment, the banks make all of their lending operations 
subject to a set of bank-made rules and conditionalities. Thus, funding is tied to the 
countries' good behaviour in the observance of IF Is' recipes for stability and sustainable 
growth as illustrated in the cases discussed below. II 
of its mandate which concentrates on the technicaVeconomic aspects of matters of balance of payment and 
~xc~ange rate, it has not been included in this paper. However, its observations may be applicable to that 
mstitution 8 • 
IFI's definition of development refers to economic indicators and, generally, does not coincide with the 
~orking definition of this study provided in Chapter I. 
loSee: <web.worldbank.orglWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS>. 
Id. 
11 
L{ee R.P Delonis, supra, note 4 (explaining the developments that led to consideration of the IMF as 
R). Contra: G. Hernandez Uriz, "The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry: Can 
the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility?" (2002) 28 Brook. J. Int'l L. 77. Rather than as 
c~talysts of investment flows, Hernandez justifies IFIs ascendance over developing countries on the basis 
o .the magnitude of their expenditures and budgets vis a vis the budgets available to other development 
OrIented UN bodies. 
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I. Conditionalities as Vehicles for Change 
"[D J enial of assistance on the grounds of conditionality non compliance is 
perhaps the most potent sanction that any international organization can use 
against a state. ,,12 
Conditionality may be defined as the "attempt by donors to use aid as an incentive 
for [reform].,,\3 Reform implies change, discarding what is for something that is expected 
to bring about an improvement on the status quo. Are these "attempts" ofIFIs neutral in 
terms of the policies and tools that a particular country may choose to implement 
development reform? Traditionally, the answer has been "no," or as one author 
insightfully puts it "[t]he [World] Bank does not just lend money and produce ideas: it 
packages the ideas and the money together.,,14 Indeed, all loan agreements and 
negotiations on development funding are made subject to close compliance with both IFIs 
standard policies and project-specific requirements. IS 
Accordingly, the concept of conditionality conjures recipes or instructions about the 
direction and content of macroeconomic reform. The package in use during the nineties 
and into the new millennium and that dominated the IFIs' agenda was infused with a set 
ofliberal, market-centred policy principles known as the "Washington Consensus." Atop 
12 D I . 
13 e oms, supra, note 4, at 612. 
C. Santiso, "Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality" (Fall 2001) 
74 G~o. Pub. Pol'y Rev. 1, at 7. 
IS GIlbert et at, quoted in C. Santiso, id at 3. 
d IFls' loans can be roughly divided into two broad types: those that are dedicated to funding specific 
e~elopment projects (private or public), and those that focus on the general conditions and environment in 
W:ICh development takes place. Generally speaking, the latter type of loan, i.e. public sector or structural 
a ~ustment loan, is geared at enhancing a sector or sub-sector's performance or, generally, a country's 
macroeconomic performance and its government's administrative capacity. 
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of the Consensus list was privatization and deregulation of public services and state 
monopolies, most of which deal with natural resources. 16 
Under the Washington Consensus, belief in the market as a mirror of the public's 
preferences 17 was at its peak. State-owned natural resource-based industries and activities 
were privatized and deregulated, foreign investment was highly encouraged and trade 
was increasingly liberalized. The role of the state was deemed minimal and necessary 
only to correct some shortcomings of the market such as internalizing environmental 
costs. Even in those cases, economic instruments were the tool of choice. 18 What these 
policies failed to factor in was that under their dominance and operation marginal groups 
or non-market players, such as indigenous communities and the poor, have no say and no 
stake in the development process, resulting in an obvious imbalance. In practice, as shall 
16 Washington Consensus principles were summarized by J. Williamson, a prominent World Bank 
economist, in the following list often principles of "sensible" policy for Latin America: 
• Fiscal discipline 
• A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns 
and the potential to improve income distribution such as infrastructure development. 
• Tax reform. 
• Interest rate liberalization. 
• A competitive exchange rate. 
• Trade liberalization. 
• Liberalization of foreign direct investment inflows. 
• Privatization. 
• Deregulation to abolish barriers to entry and exit. 
• Secure property rights. !be.se policies represent the "lowest common denominator" of the reforms that Washington-based 
mstItutions could agree were needed in Latin America as of 1989. J. Williamson (1), Institute for 
Int~mational Economics, "What Should the Bank Think About the Washington Consensus" July 1999, 
~vaI!able at: <www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0799 .htrn>. 
See e.g.: L.K. Barrera-Hernandez, "Impact of State and Economic Restructuring Process on Developing 
Countries Energy and Environment Strategies; Background Paper" presented at the Second Regional 
~orkshop on Environmental Regulation for the Energy Sector, Trujillo, Peru, August 26-28, 1998 . 
. Well defined property rights in water were, (and still are), promoted as the best way to provide 
Wld~spread access and ensure conservation. Demand side management was promoted as an ideal tool to 
~hleve efficiency and thereby resource conservation. A study sponsored by the !DB, however, highlighted 
e challenges posed by the use of complex economic instruments for environmental protection in those 
COuntries with weak administrative frameworks. 
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be seen below, that omission would eventually lead to widespread public unrest. In South 
America it would also trigger an economic and political crisis, the results of which are in 
. . t d 19 plam VIew 0 ay. 
In addition to the traditional macroeconomic conditionalities, the Banks rely on another 
set of rules of mandatory application in all loan operations. These rules, or "safeguard 
policies" -to follow the World Bank's nomenclature-, indicate where IFIs draw the line 
in terms of allowing a country's administrators freedom to choose what is best for its 
constituents in some sensitive project-related areas. The idea of safeguards as backstops, 
or "standards oflast resort" for ensuring that IFI-funded projects contribute to a country's 
well-being is not a bad one. However, some concerns about the nature and manner of 
implementation of the safeguard policies may be raised. 
II. WB Safeguard Policies and Other IFI Directives20 
Over the years, the World Bank has developed and refined a set of directives and 
policies to guide borrowers and its own staff as to minimum common standards and 
expectations in key areas of the Bank's and the borrowers' activities. The resulting suite 
of guidelines and related documents deal with some of the most sensitive areas of the 
Bank's work, i.e. the social, cultural and environmental impacts of lending operations. 
19 
. ~h?ugh current to this day, these principles were later revised by Williamson himself who, while 
~s~stmg t.hat .most principles still represent good policy for Latin America, admitted that the manner of 
20 err applIcatIon could use some fine tuning. 
d Although. the analysis is focused on the WB's policies, its conclusions are applicable to similar guidance 
~cuments Issued by the IDB and other IFIs which, more often than not, follow the WB's lead, particularly 
With regards to social and environmental issues. 
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Those policies, which have been mirrored or adopted by other IFIs like the IDB, cover a 
wide range of issues of relevance to natural resources development including: 
• Environmental Impact Assessment; 
• Natural Habitats; 
• Forests; 
• Pest Management; 
• Cultural Property; 
• Involuntary Resettlement; 
• Indigenous Peoples; 
• Safety of Dams; 
• Disputed Areas; and, 
• International Waterways. 
A review of those documents and their equivalents for other lending institutions reveals 
that rather than providing guidance, their provisions tend to be prescriptive and 
mandatory. While responding to global concerns about minimum standards in developing 
countries and also to a desire to hinder a race to the bottom by countries competing for 
foreign investment, they are an unquestionable intrusion on sovereign power. 
The one-size-fits-all approach implicit in the imposition of IF Is' macroeconomic and 
safeguard rules through loan conditionalities does not meet the test of political legitimacy 
and social democracy. Rather than being a product of local rule-making processes and 
responding to the concerns of local parties and interests, the safeguards respond to the 
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priorities of IFIs' constituencies, including lobbies and powerful IFI Board members of 
developed countries which mayor may not coincide with local needs and mores.21 In 
addition, the imposition of externally formed rules may stifle regulatory innovation and 
stunt the development and consolidation of indigenous institutions and practices.22 The 
rules' requirements may be disproportionately taxing on local agencies, generally lacking 
. d . dh 23 in economIC an trame uman resources. 
Notwithstanding the above, and although the source may be questionable24 and the means 
of implementation flawed, IFI standards and safeguards tend to reflect an increasing 
global consensus around the tools that must be used and the limitations that states face as 
well as the duties they must fulfil in the process of developing their resources. 
III. Impact of Loan Conditionalities on Policy and Regulatory Independence 
and on Permanent Sovereignty 
One of the results of IF Is loan conditionalities is that policy-makers and regulators 
in South America face theoretical and temporal constraints for the development of sound 
21 
H.Y. Morais, H.Y. Morais, "The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance Vs. Sovereignty" 
~~ay 2002) 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 779. 
23 Delonis, supra, note 4. 
See D. Kapur and R. Webb, noting that "convergence is towards the standards that already exist in 
ad~anced industrialized democracies. The result is an unequal distribution of the burden of regulatory 
~ustment: those with the least capacity have to travel the greatest distance." D. Kapur and R. Webb, 
CT AD/UN Center for International DevelopmentlHarvard University, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, ~esearch papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs, No. 
,.August 2000, "Governance-related Conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions" [on file 
~lth t?e author]. See generally, L.K. Barrera- Hernandez, "Sustainable Energy Development in Latin 
R menca and Donor Driven Reform: What Will the World Bank Do" in RegUlating Energy and Natural 
24esources (Oxford, U.K: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Morais talks about the "unfortunate perception ofa new form of Western 'imperialism'" H.V. Morais, 
SUpra, note 21, at 807. 
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natural resources' management frameworks in accordance with the states' duty to 
promote and facilitate general and individual well being. 
So far, Washington Consensus principles and their preference for economic tools have 
dominated the theoretical approach to development policy and to regulatory choices 
despite obvious and negative impacts on marginal communities. On the other hand, the 
time between loan negotiations and approval, and the maturity of loan conditions is 
generally too short to set up and implement well tailored and properly structured natural 
resources' management frameworks of any kind, much less to respond to the detailed 
requirements of IF Is' safeguard rules. Loan cycles and the typically slower institutional 
and law and policy development cycle will not necessarily coincide. As a result, 
sweeping, half-baked changes based on the one-size-fits-all Consensus and safeguard 
policies such as opening up natural resource development to the (foreign) private sector 
and to market forces before setting up the framework for control and for distribution of 
benefits, and the practice of including specific (safeguard-derived) requirements in loan 
contracts that have no foothold in local laws and may therefore require recourse to an ad 
hoc supra-national enforcement framework, tend to be the norm. As shall be discussed 
below, that was the case of the water services' sector in Argentina and also of the 
Camisea Gas Project in Peru. 
Changes to the countries' natural resources' management frameworks usually come in 
the wake of loan implementation and attempt to finish the job and "institutionalize" or 
officially incorporate to the administration of the sector concerned the tools already in 
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use as a result of loan conditionalities. This is not done without significant obstacles 
created by the myriad of acquired rights already in place, raised expectations, and the 
administrators' lack of understanding of some of the basic underpinnings of the 
requirements imposed through loan conditionalities. 
B. Trade and Natural Resources Management 
One of the central features of globalization is the breakdown of national barriers 
to international goods and services. Over the latter years, trade has grown to 
unprecedented levels.25 Moreover, trade in natural resources has always been a weighty 
issue loaded with political connotations. Indeed, from the days in which the European 
colonial empires got boatloads of gold and other precious minerals and raw materials in 
exchange for glass beads - to date, the terms of trade and the fate of those countries rich 
in natural resources have been largely defined by the powerful.26 To understand this is to 
understand that trade is not limited to the exchange of goods and services. Goods and 
services do not travel alone. Entire value-systems and issues of domestic policy 
accompany a can of tuna or a metric ton of gas when it crosses an international border. 
The values and issues that accompany traded goods and services often operate changes of 
in local mores, preferences and institutions, including law and policy. That is particularly 
true of the laws and standards for natural resources management. As a result, one can 
2' 
WTO, Statistics Database, available at: 
;;,s~t.wto.orgiStatisticaIProgram/WSDBViewData.aspx?Language=E>. 
. Par.adox of plenty" theorists attempt to explain the low level of development of resource-rich Southern 
countries through reference to the break-down of internal mechanisms but tend to ignore the central role 
by foreign and external forces. For a brief explanation of the paradox of plenty see: The Economist, 
~ Par~dox of Plenty" (20 Dec. 2005), available at: 
, conomlst. com! disp laystory. cfm ?story jd=5 3 23 3 94>. 
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nOW see the values and standards of the dominant trading countries spreading and taking 
root throughout the globe.27 The experience with GATT and the World Trade 
Organization provides ample examples of that. 
I. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) 
Born out of the ashes of WW II in conjunction with the Bretton Woods 
Institutions,28 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) setting the basis for 
the international trade system is grounded on the idea that the free flow of goods across 
national boundaries promotes increased productivity due to specialization and the law of 
comparative advantage. In tum, following the same economics only rationale, 
productivity growth is said to result in increased standards of living across trading 
partners. With that in mind, the GATT was launched in 1946 with the immediate purpose 
of negotiating tariff concessions among members. The final agreement, known as GATT 
1947, entered into force in January 1948. Subsequent negotiations under GATT 1947 
culminated in the Uruguay round of negotiations29 which ushered in a new era in the 
evolution of the international trade system. As a result of the Uruguay Round, ministers 
of more than 120 countries signed a deal to create the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in Marrakech, in 1994. In addition to setting up a body in charge of overseeing the 
27 
A. JUdson Lodge, "Globalization: Panacea for the World or Conquistador ofInternational Statehood?" 
~~pring 2005) 7 Or. Rev. Int'l L. 224. 
The Bretton Woods Conference, held in New Hampshire, USA, created the International Monetary Fund 
to Oversee the world's monetary and exchange rate systems and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
a~d Development, generally known as the World Bank Group. The objective was economic stability and 
~9 e restructuring and development of Western Europe. 
Multilateral trade negotiations, or "trade rounds", under the auspices of GATT offer a packaged approach 
.to trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round was the predecessor to the latest Doha Round, currently 
sUSpended. 
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system, i.e. the WTO, the Marrakech Agreement incorporates a revised version of the 
1947 agreement now known as GATT 1994 as well as agreements on various other trade 
issues such as trade in services and foreign investment.3o 
Under the WTO, the international trade system is said to have evolved from a system that 
was concerned solely with trade, to one that increasingly sees trade as a tool to advance 
widespread and sustainable development. 31 The Preamble to the Marrakech Agreement is 
put forth as evidence as well as source of this shift. The Preamble reads: 
The Parties to this Agreement, 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuringfull employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade 
in goods and services, while allowingfor the optimal use of the world's 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development [ .. ] Agree ... 32 
The Marrakech commitment was reaffirmed in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration33 
which launched the Doha round of negotiations. 
30 
31 See: <www.wto.org>. 
The concept of "sustainable development" was a result of the developed world's awakening to 
environmental degradation and its consequences, first addressed at an intemationallevel by the Stockholm 
Convention and the resulting Declaration of 1972. Though recognizing the need for sustainable 
?evelopment, including adequate local environmental and labour standards, developing countries view its 
IDtroduction in trade discussions as a suspicious attempt by developing countries to interfere in developing 
~~untry affairs in favour of their own trading interests. 
Note that while the Marrakech document talks about "optimal use" of resources, the 1947 Preamble to 
GATT referred to "full use" of natural resources. Note also that development is measured in gains in 
~roductivity and growth. 
<www.wto.orgienglishithewto_e/minist_e/minOl_e/mindecl_e.htm>. By the end of July 2006 the 
negotiations were deadlocked. WTO's Director-General called for and obtained their suspension. 
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Notwithstanding the claims made by free trade scholars and promoters,34 whether or not 
multilateral free trade is compatible with global sustainable development is debatable to 
say the least.35 Arguably, it may be even less so when development is defined broadly as 
the quest to advance well being (as opposed to growth in GDP) as is the case of this 
study. 
II. Natural Resources and Environment under GATT and the WTO 
While GATT's Uruguay Round and its predecessors focused on border measures 
and on lowering tariffs,36 today's GATT negotiations under the Doha Round are all about 
how domestic rules intersect with trade rules and how both sets of rules impacts on each 
other.37 As a result, though opinion may still be divided on the compatibility of ever 
increasing free trade with sustainability, there is no doubt about the impact of global free 
trade on regulatory authority and permanent sovereignty over natural resources.38 
34 See e.g: Speech by P. Lamy, WTO Director-General, "Trade can be a friend, not a foe, of conservation" 
Geneva, 10-11 October 2005; OECD, Trade that Benefits the Environment and Development: Opening 
Markets for Environmental Goods and Services" (6 Dec 2005), available at: 
<WWw.oecd.orgiLongAbstract/0,2546,en 2649 201185 35817888 1 1 1 1,00.html>; K. Matsuoka, 
"Tradable water in GATT/WTO law: Nee-d for new legal frameworks?>' Paper presented at Globalization 
and Water Resources Management: The Changing Value of Water, A WRA/IWLRI -University of Dundee 
~~temational Specialty Conference, August 6-8, 2001. 
M. Halle (1), "Trading into the Future: Rounding the Comer to Sustainable Development" GTI Paper 
~eries, Frontiers of a Great Transition #6, March 13, 2006. 
G.W. Mugwanya, "Global Free Trade Vis-a-vis Environmental Regulation and Sustainable 
Development: Reinvigorating Efforts Towards a More Integrated Approach" (1999) 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 
401. 
37 
38 M. Halle (2), "Trade and Environment: Looking Beneath the Sands of Doha?" (2006) 2 JEEPL 107. 
For example, R. Nardone affirms that "the globalization of economic markets represents a fundamental 
challenge to the traditional al1ocation of regulatory power [over natural resources] because states' power to 
~lf-regUlate is increasingly diminished." R. Nardone, "Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World's 
ater Resources" 19 Conn. 1. Int'l L. 183, at 206. 
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There are two ways in which trade rules, i.e. the GATT -WTO rules, impact on a 
country's sovereign right to manage its natural resources. In the first place, are the 
requirements that certain natural resources (qua products or services like water and 
petroleum) once entered, must remain in the global free trade market and continue to be 
traded as products or services.39 Under this scenario, internal allocation becomes subject 
to international demand.40 In the second place, are prohibitions on domestic resources' 
management rules that are considered incompatible with free trade as well as 
requirements that domestic rules conform to those of a counterpart trading country. 
Typically, trade-related requirements and prohibitions on local regulations will be handed 
down from dominant trading partners either in the form of specific agreements negotiated 
on the basis of trade flows, or as a result of their trade practices.41 Some of the banned 
measures (technical regulations and standards) are specified in the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade which aims at ensuring that domestic regulations and 
standards do not create unnecessary barriers to trade while allowing some room for trade-
restrictive measures intended to achieve legitimate (public) objectives.42 The final arbiter 
:9 A. Kwasniak, "Will Canada be forced to share its water supply?" (Winter 2006) 2: 1 U at 49. 
o This explains current shortages of natural gas in Argentina where a large portion of gas production is 
!~rgely committed to supplying external markets. 
42 Mugwanya, supra, note 36. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Annex 1, defines its scope broadly as covering: 
1. Technical regulation 
~ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, 
~cluding the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also 
mclude or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method. 
2. Standard 
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not 
~and~tory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
abelhng requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. 
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of the acceptability of a local trade-impacting, natural resources-related norm is the 
powerful WTO headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.43 
III. Natural Resources as Tradable Products and Services under 
GATTIWTO 
With the exception of air, natural resources are not evenly distributed across 
countries and regions. Some, however, can be either, substituted by similar substances 
(oil for coal), spared (emeralds), or obtained through trade. Of the must-haves like air and 
fresh water,44 the latter is already so scarce45 that the possibility of having it enter the 
global trade market is daunting for some46 and a lifesaver for others. Legal experts are 
therefore grappling with the question of whether or not, under current GATT -WTO rules, 
a water rich country can refuse to sell their water to others.47 The same question could be 
A vailab Ie at: <www.wto.org/english!docs_e/legal_eIl7-tbt_e.htm> . 
43 While some of these requirements may be considered environment, natural resources, and human rights 
friendly, others may not. The net result of this regulatory push and puIl, is demand-driven rule development 
and harmonization. LogicaIly, the content of those rules will differ according to whether the buyer is, for 
~xample, the United States, Germany or, increasingly, China. 
4 According to some, timber may be equaIly indispensable due to the environmental services trees 
perform. See e.g.: Helen-Eagle Nowlin, "The Effects of the GATT/WTO in World Resource AIIocation: A 
Case Study that Uses both Raw and Processed Timber Resources Conservation-Deforestation Explored" 
~~002) 16 Electronic Green Journal, available at: <egj.lib.uidaho.edulegj16>. 
See BBC New Online, Report by A. Kirby, "Water scarcity: A looming crisis?" (19 October 2004), 
available at: <news.bbc.co.uklllhi/sci/tech!3747724.stm>. For more information see: World Wildlife 
Foundation, "Water Facts and Figures" (March 2003), available at: 
<assets.panda.org/downloads/worldwaterforumwaterfacts.pdf#search=%22water%20scarcity%20facts%22 
>. 
46 
Center for International Environmental Law and World Wildlife Foundation International Discussion 
f,aper, October 2003, available at: <www.ciel.org>. 
P.H. Gleick et aI, "The New Economy of Water" (February 2002) Pacific Institute for Studies in 
Development, Environment and Security, available at: 
<WWw.pacinst.org/reports/new_economy_oCwater/new_economy _ oC water.pdf->. 
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asked of any other natural resource such as oil, also an increasingly scarce resource, so 
far successfully carved out ofGATT-WTO's reach.48 
Why would a country be under a legal duty to allow exports of water or any other natural 
resource? The answer may centre on what constitutes a tradable "product" under GATT-
WTO and the rules that are triggered once that status attaches to a good.49 
IV. Understanding GATTIWTO 
The multilateral trade system under GATT -WTO is based on a few general 
principles that attempt to eliminate discrimination amongst trading partners while 
introducing transparency into the multilateral trading system. Those principles are: the 
most favoured nation (MFN) principle contained in GATT, Art. I, and the national 
treatment (NT) principle of GATT, Art. III. Under the MFN principle, any special 
concession that one country grants to another regarding particular goods has to be made 
extensible to all "like" goods of other trading partners. The NT principle requires that 
once imported goods enter a country's market they be given the same treatment as, or no 
Worse treatment than, domestic goods. Under GATT, Article XI, the multilateral trading 
system also prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and exports (quotas). As a result 
of the application of these principles, and particularly Art. XI, it is feared that once water 
or any other presently non GATT -traded (bulk) natural resource enters the trade stream as 
48 
The application of GATT to oil may eventually result from the extension of GATS to energy services. 
;nergy services are currently on the Doha Agenda for GATS. Gasoline, a refined oil product, has already 
4geen the subject of a WTO decision. 
o R.,J. Girouard, "Water Export Restrictions: A Case Study ofWTO Dispute Settlement Strategies and 
utcomes" (Winter 2003) 15 Geo. Int'I Envtl. L. Rev. 247. 
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a "product," any ban on exports will become illegal under current GATT-WTO law,5o 
unless an exception can be validly invoked.51 
The issue, however, is clouded with uncertainty. On one hand, GATT -WTO does not 
define "product." Though some tum to GATT's Harmonized Tariff Schedule to find an 
answer to what may be considered a product under the agreement, whether in connection 
with water or any other natural resource, there is considerable consensus on the idea that 
the enumeration contained therein does not define the meaning of "product' under 
GATT. 52 Rather, the Schedule is an organizational tool that merely list tradable goods, 
some of which could potentially enter the multilateral trade system as products. 53 
For the case that bulk54 fresh water transfers or any tradable natural resource come to be 
considered products subject to GATT-WTO rules, countries may be able to retain some 
degree of control over exports if they can meet the criteria outlined under the agreement's 
exceptions. 
50 In the Japan Semi-conductors case, 1988, the GATT panel made it clear that the prohibition of Art. XI 
applies broadly to all and any measures not listed as permissible in the article and instituted by a 
contracting party irrespective of the legal status of the measure. Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors; Report 
of the Panel adopted 4 May, 1988, GATT, 104; available at: 
<WWw.worldtradelaw.net/reports/ gattpane ls/j apansemiconductor. pdf>; and, 
~wwW.wto.orgienglish/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm> . 
Prof. A. D. Tarlock strongly opposes this view. In his opinion, GATT does not change the fact that a 
s~te .has the sovereign right to decide to allow or disallow trade in natural resources at any time. He bases 
hiS view on the right to develop. A. D. Tarlock, "How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes 
Adapt to Global Climate Change?" (Summer 2000) 15 & 9 Joint Issue, Land Use and Environmental Law 
* Transnational Law and Policy, 423. 
ft GATT's Harmonized Tariff Schedule lists various categories of water including sea water, aerated and 
aVOured water, and other natural or mineral waters. While there is no doubt in that bottled water is a 
hro~uct governed by GATT-WTO rules, such categorization cannot yet be made for bulk waters on the 
aSIS of the Tariff Schedule alone. See: 
~WWw.wto.orgiEnglish/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm> . 
54 RJ. Girouard, supra, note 49; P.H. Gleick et ai, supra, note 47. \v~ottled and other non-bulk water products are already in the trade stream. Note that the definition of 
. at may be considered "bulk" may change over time as scarcity increases. 
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The first exception is contained in the same article that prima facie imposes the ban on 
exports. Thus, despite the general prohibition, Article XI, II exempts: 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve 
critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting 
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contractmg party 
Though the criteria defined under Art. XI, II may be easily met and demonstrated, the 
exception only provides for temporary control of exportable resources. Some measure of 
long-term control may be best obtainable under the applicable exceptions of Article Xx. 
The relevant sections of Art. XX read: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(. .. ) 
• (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(. .. ) 
• (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption; 
Article XX, and the accompanying Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) are 
also the relevant provisions to focus on when analyzing GATT -WTO-driven rule creation 
and harmonization, i.e.: the "pull" and "push" of trading partners' requirements and 
Objections to local rules discussed above. Indeed, while on the one hand Art. XX may 
S5 
< GATT, Art XL 
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represent a lifeline to retain some measure of control over a given resource; on the other 
hand, it is also the vehicle through which other countries impose their own rules on their 
trading partners. 
Although the GATT -WTO dispute settlement system does not operate on the basis of 
precedent, some guidance on the application of Article XX's exceptions can be drawn 
from past cases. 56 Below is a review of GATT -WTO case law. 
V. GATT-WTO Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future 
Despite some lack of consensus on its design, it was clear from the time of the 
signature of the original 1947 GATT agreement that a system for resolving trade-related 
disputes was a necessary component of a successful multilateral trading regime. 57 While 
the original GATT Panel had limited powers to settle controversies, the current WTO 
dispute settlement system can issue automatically binding decisions and has the 
"strongest enforcement procedures of any international tribunal. ,,58 
Dpon a first reading, mirroring the evolution of the Agreement's objective, it may appear 
that the views and positions of the GATT -WTO dispute settlement bodies have shifted 
Over time and are now more tolerant of domestic measures devised for human health, 
safety, environmental protection or conservation purposes. 59 It looks as if sovereignty has 
56 
Appellate Body Report on Japan - Alcoholic Beverages 11. The Appellate Body in that case stated that 
adopted panel reports created "legitimate expectations" among members. For more information see: 
;WWW.wto.orgiEnglish/res_e/booksp_e/analyticjndex_e/wto_agree_04_e.htm#fntext699> . At least one 
5~thor affirms that a "de facto stare decisis effectively exists." M. Halle (2), supra, note 37 at 115. 
58 ~.J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London, U.K: Routledge, 1995). 
59 I . Nardo~e, supra, note 38 at 203. 
B n the United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products case, the Appellate 
ody expressly alluded to this shift. It stated: "As this preambular language [in the Marrakech Agreement] 
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regained some of its strength and developing countries may enjoy some flexibility when 
formulating and implementing rules to manage their natural resources without fear of 
running afoul ofGATT-WTO rules. In practice, that is far from accurate. Accordingly, 
while the old GATT Panel in the first Tuna - Dolphin case outright rejected the 
application of environmental protection rules with an impact on trade as valid exceptions 
under Art. XX, "{f}rom the start the [WTO Appellate Body] made it clear that it 
considered trade rules to be embedded in a broader framework of public policy made up 
of a web of interacting regimes.,,6o Contributing to the new, apparent flexible approach, 
WTO bodies affirmed that the interacting regimes and rules had to be balanced against 
each other in good faith with the objective of achieving an equilibrium between the rights 
and obligations of trading countries and between free trade and other policy objectives 
such as natural resources management.61 Underscoring this position, the Appellate Body 
in the US - Shrimp case held that: 
conditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether exporting 
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by 
the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures 
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX 
Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to 
substantive obligations established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic 
policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as important and 
legitimate in character. It is not necessary to assume that requiring from 
exporting countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies (although 
covered in principle by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the 
importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under 
Article XX Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific 
the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we believe it must add colour, texture and 
to Our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement." AB-1998-4, available at: 
H wto.orglDDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC>. 
aile (2), supra, note at 115. 
Appellate Body Report in US-Shrimp, (WT/DS58/AB/R). 
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exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of 
interpretation we are bound to apply. 62 
Thus, it appears that a country enjoys a good deal of flexibility to may make use of Art. 
xx to exempt a resource from compulsory trading or to pass natural resources' laws and 
regulations which may otherwise be considered illegitimate under GATT. The flip side of 
this approach is that, clearly, domestic natural resources management could be made 
subject to the application of trading partners' norms and policies. In case of disagreement 
between trading partners, it is up to the WTO to determine that those measures are 
necessary, legitimate and applicable to a given resource. 
VI. Article XX's Scope and Standards 
For the WTO to declare a measure compliant under Art. XX's exceptions, its 
requisites will have to be met. Despite lacking strict binding value, past GATT -WTO 
decisions help clarify the scope of the exceptions and the applicable standards of 
admissibility. 
Article XX b) adopts a "necessity" standard. According to the WTO, 
the term "necessary" refers, ... , to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of 
this continuum lies "necessary" understood as "indispensable"; at the other end, 
is "necessary" taken to mean as "making a contribution to. " We consider that a 
"necessary" measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole 
of "indispensable" than to the opposite pole of simply "making a contribution 
to". 63 
Appellate Body Report in US - Shrimp, (WT/OS581 AB/R). In the result, the disputed measure was 
as GATT-WTO offensive. 
d - ~arious Measures on Beef, para. 161; (WT/OS1611AB/R, WT/OSI69/AB/R). Although the 
eals WIth Art. XX d), the interpretation may be extensible to XX b). 
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In addition, 
determination of whether a measure, which is not "indispensable ", may 
nevertheless be "necessary" within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves 
in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which 
prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the 
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying 
impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.64 
While the precedents shed some light into what may be taken into account in deciding 
whether the necessity standard has been met, the threshold of acceptability of a 
potentially GATT-compliant exception will vary from case to case. Further uncertainty in 
this regard was introduced by the Appellate Body's decision on the EC - Sardines case of 
2002. While in the 1996 US - Gasoline case the Appellate Body stated that it was not the 
necessity of the measure's policy goal that was at stake, but of the particular measure 
chosen to implement that goal,65 it now seems to have reversed its position. Indeed, in 
interpreting the equivalent provision of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement,66 the 
tribunal was unequivocal in affirming that "there must be an examination and a 
determination on the legitimacy of the objectives of the measure.,,67 Thus, the standard 
may now require a double sided and widely restrictive test. 68 
Turning now to Art. XX g), the notion of "exhaustible" natural resource has also been a 
matter of controversy. Accordingly, the Appellate Body in the US - Shrimp case insisted 
64 Id 65 ,para. 164. 
66 US - Gasoline, para. 16; (WT IDS21 ABIR). 
67 Art. 2.2. 
EC - Sardines, para. 286 (WT/DS23 1 I AB/R) [emphasis added]. The same decision clarified that the 
~rumeration of objectives in Art. 2 is not exhaustive. 
Note, however, that the TBT expands on the wording of GA TT, Article XX, b) by stating that: 
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fUlfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, 
inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. 
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on a dynamic interpretation of the concept that could encompass resources which, though 
capable of natural reproduction, are susceptible of depletion. "Exhaustible" is not an 
equivalent of non-renewable or "non-living" under GATT-WTO.69 
The term "relating to" used in the exception is not as demanding a standard as that of 
necessity of Art. XX b). It is taken to be equivalent to "primarily aimed at.,,70 
Also under this exception, there is a requirement of "even-handedness" in that any trade 
restrictive measures need to be made "in conjunction with" restrictions on the domestic 
front. There is a remaining factor of uncertainty to the application of this exception, 
however. While, in the past, the exception has been invoked in connection to the 
conservation of a natural resource other than the one traded (air in connection to gasoline, 
turtles in connection to shrimp, etc.), the Appellate Body has never decided a case where 
the measure in dispute is directly aimed at the conservation ofthe traded natural resource 
as would be a total or limited prohibition on exports. 
In addition to the requirements and standards reviewed above, for an exception under Art. 
xx b) or g) to be admissible, the measure at stake has to satisfy the requirements of the 
article's heading or chapeau/1 i.e. it cannot be an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
amongst countries where similar conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on trade. 
Thus, a two-tiered analysis is required. Even if the conditions of the article's subsections 
69 
70 US-Shrimp, (WTIDS58/AB/R). 
" Us - Gasoline, (WTIDS21 AB/R). In the US - Shrimp case, the AB found that the means were 
7reasonably related to the ends" and, therefore, admissible. US - Shrimp, (WTIDS58/AB/R). 
us - Gasoline, p. 22, DSR 1996:1, p. 3 at 20; (WTIDS21 AB/R). 
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b) and g) are met, an exception will not be admissible under the chapeau if an equivalent 
measure less restrictive of trade could be taken to achieve the same result.72 
Discrimination amongst trading partners is also reason to strike down a measure. 73 The 
objective of the chapeau is to condition and limit the exceptions and prevent abuse by 
attempting to balance the countries' rights and obligations. 
Although Art. XX may represent a well directed attempt to accommodate domestic 
discretion to pursue development, the results so far have been disappointing. The 
requirements of Article XX are, by no means, easy to meet. At the end of the day, while 
full control of resource exports might be impossible within GATT-WTO, on the other 
hand, very few resource management and conservation measures might pass Art. XX , s 
test.74 Those that do are more likely to extend developed country standards to the 
developing world rather than accommodate developing country needs. 75 In addition, 
critics continue to voice legitimate concerns regarding the procedural pitfalls of the 
system's dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Most criticism of the GATT -WTO dispute resolution system centres on the secret nature 
of the proceedings and the lack of provisions for public information and third-party 
intervention as well as around the organization's permeability to powerful corporate 
72 
73 Ee-Asbestos, para. 172, (WT/DS135/AB/R). 
74 US-Shrimp, para. 160, (WT/DS58/ABIR). 
By 2004 the GATT-WTO dispute resolution system had only admitted one out of 12 contested 
txceptions. M. Swenarchuck (l), "International Environmental and Sustainability Governance: Options 
eyond Institutional Reform" (September 2004) Canadian Environmental Law Association, 
<~w.cela.ca>. See generally: S. Gaines, "The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A 
glsguised Restriction on Environmental Measures" (Winter 2001) 22 U. Pa. J. Int'I Econ. L. 739. 
i'e ~ere developing countries were parties to the disputes, they were always on the claimant's side, i.e. 
Slstmg a developed country protection or conservation measure. 
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interests.76 When paired with the system's unparalleled enforcement powers, and the fact 
that trade negotiations are held behind closed doors by trade experts and little to none 
stakeholder consultation 77 its failings have led a number of scholars to decry it as a 
dangerous threat to sovereignty, particularly with regards to natural resources decision-
making.78 As will be illustrated below, the threat looms large for those countries in the 
weaker end of the bargaining table, where developing South American countries usually 
't 79 S1. 
VII. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Natural 
Resources 
If GATT 1994' s application attracts some criticism, that criticism is even louder 
in relation to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the possibility 
that GATT -WTO dispute resolution mechanisms and precedents may be made extensible 
to natural resources through its application. 8o Although the GATS agreement is 
concerned with trade in services, its scope is such that it extends to certain foreign 
investments as well as to any form of measure that affects trade in services, including 
76 
M. Swenarchuck (2), "Civilizing Globalization: Trade and Environment, Thirteen Years On" (Mar. 
;001) Canadian Environmental Law Association, <www.cela.ca>. 
Center for International Environmental Law and World Wildlife Foundation, "GATS, Water and the 
Environment," International Discussion Paper, October 2003, <www.ciel.org>. A. Judson Lodge talks 
about the "loss in democracy" that results from WTO's tribunals' decisions replacing countries' law 
Waking process. A. Judson Lodge, supra, note 27 . 
. R. Nardone, supra, note 38; Swenarchuck (I), supra, note 74. Contra: A. Afilalo and S. Foster, "The :O~ld Trade Organization's Anti-Discrimination Jurisprudence: Free Trade, National Sovereignty, and 
nVlronmental Health in the Balance" (Summer 2003) 15 Geo. Int'! Envtl. L. Rev. 663. According to these 
. ~~thors what is being rooted out is not sovereign power but protectionism. 
e Center for International Environmental Law and World Wildlife Foundation, supra, note 77; T. 
oncannon and H. Griffiths, "Stealing Our Water. Implications of GATS for Global Water Resources" 
.2001) Friends of the Earth, available at: <www.foe.co.uk>. 
GATS Art. XIV, partially mirrors the exceptions contained in its equivalent under GATT. Only section 
b) and the chapeau are reproduced. 
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measures concerning natural resources, from allocation to licensing and standard 
. 81 
settmg. 
Indeed, the much reviled privatization of services in the developing world82 took place, at 
least in part, as a response to GATS' Art. XIX which requires the "progressive 
liberalization" of services in all countries including, among others, water distribution 
81 Article I reads: 
1. This Agreement applies to measures by Members affecting trade in services. 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service: 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any 
other Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the 
territory of any other Member. 
3. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
(a) "measures by Members" means measures taken by: 
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and 
(i/) non-governmental bodies in the exercise ofpowers delegated by central, 
regional or local governments or authorities; 
Infuljilling its obligations and commitments under the Agreement, each Member shall take such 
reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their observance by regional and local 
governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory; 
(b) "services" includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority; 
(c) "a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" means any service which is 
supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers. 
<Www.wto.org>. For some examples and discussion on the measures that could fall under GATS see: 
~enter for International Environmental Law and World Wildlife Foundation, supra, note 77 . 
. cThe most prominent critic of privatization and its promoters is former WB Chief Economist J. Stiglitz 
~ho in his book Globalization and its Discontents and in his presentations questioned, among other things, 
~ te~hnocratic approach to development, the failure to account for local realities, the rapid pace of 
. pnvat!zation imposed and the disregard of social and organizational capital bUilding. Critics also contend 
GATS and its thrust towards privatization are incompatible with human rights and environmental and 
na~al resources conservation and protection. T. Concannon and H. Griffiths, supra, note 79. The authors 
thIS report affirm that GATS does not allow room for application of the precautionary principle. See 
M. Cohn, "The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights 29 Ga. 
Int') & Compo L. 427; M. Barlow and T. Clarke, Polaris Institute, "Water Privatization: The World 
s Latest Market Fantasy" (January 2004), <www.globalpolicy.org>; A.F. Camara Neto and M. 
"Latin America in the Post-Washington Consensus Era" International Development Economics 
'~~\)~IClle~ (16 July 2004), available at: <www.networkideas.orgifeatartljuI2004ILatin_America.pdf>; 
de piqueteros en Aguas Argentinas" La Nacion Online, 3- 22-2005, available at: 
. .ar>; Arg. Indymedia, "Breve relato de la guerra del gas," available at: 
.argentina. indymedia. org>. 
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services and other natural resources-based services. 83 As shall be shown below, contrary 
to its proponents' claims, at least in South America, where the liberalization advanced by 
GATS has taken place the impact on the peoples' well being has been mostly negative. 
Of particular concern for sovereignty under GATS are the ongoing negotiations to design 
rules (disciplines) for developing domestic measures as directed by Article VI.4. 84 Those 
rules could significantly constrain a country's ability to regulate to the point that one 
study suggests that as a result of their application governments may be required to submit 
their draft regulations to comments by their trading partners prior to their official 
adoption and implementation.85 Already, GATS' Article XVI's list of prohibited 
measures for liberalized service sectors runs afoul of tried and true principles and tools of 
environmental and natural resources law including the regulator's ability to set discharge, 
emissions or other resource protection and management quotas and fees that could 
83 GATS, available at: <www.wto.intienglishldocs_e/legal_e/26-gats_Ol_e.htm>.Governrnent provided 
services are technically exempt from GATS' application. Pressure is to liberalize and offer them for 
~clusion under GATS. Once commitments are made in this way, Art. XXI makes them virtually 
Irreversible. For information on the World Bank's pro-privatization position see e.g.: WB, "New Designs 
for Water and Sanitation Transactions: Making Private Sector Participation Work for the Poor" and other 
'papers posted on the World Bank's website: <rru.worldbank.orglPapersLinkslPrivatizing-Water-Sanitation-
Services/> 84 . 
GATS, Art. VI. 4: 
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, 
develop any necessary disciplines. Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, 
inter alia: 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to 
supply the service; 
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of 
85 the service. 
Center for International Environmental Law and World Wildlife Foundation, supra, note 77. 
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indirectly limit the number of service suppliers, output or value. 86 Another tool of sound 
natural resources management that could be severely impaired under GATS is the 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) tool. By banning the use of the 
economic needs test, Art. XVI a), b) and c )87 does away with an important element of a 
balanced ESIA. The prohibition becomes even more critical in the case of a Strategic 
ESIA where being able to inquire whether a service will or will not be required in the 
future is central to the assessment's analysis and to its usefulness as a decision-making 
tool for natural resources planning and management. The provision condones inefficiency 
and even promotes waste for the sake of trade and the economic gain of investors 
contradicting mainstream thinking on the usefulness of ESIAs and Strategic ESIAs 
(SESIAs).88 Indeed, to top things off, GATS' exceptions narrow the scope of GATT-
WTO exceptions to cover only safety and the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
86 Center for International Environmental Law and World Wildlife Foundation, supra, note 77. The 
application of Art. XVI prohibitions may also result in human rights infringements whenever a measure of 
the type mentioned above is struck down and the right to water, health or safety, to name a few, is 
Compromised. 
87 GATS, Art XVI. 2: 
In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Member shall 
not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire 
territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as: 
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, 
monopolies. exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test; 
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical 
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service 
output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the 
88 requirement of an economic needs test; 
See World Bank Environment Strategy, July 2001, and related documents, available at: 
1(. worldbank.orglWBSITEIEXTERNALITOPICS/ENVIRONMENTIO"contentMDK:20274476~pageP 
.21 0058~piPK:21 0062~theSitePK:244381 ,00.html>. 
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health.89 Conservation, a key factor for natural resources management, is not a viable 
objective under GATS. 
Finally, it is worth noting that GATS' protection extends to cover foreign investments in 
liberalized services. This could result in severe limitations to permanent sovereignty. 
However, as explained below, the protection granted to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and the resulting loss of sovereign power does not stop with GATS. 
C. International Investment Treaties 
Spurred by a host of investment promotion regimes set up by investment-hungry 
developing countries at the behest of IFIs, the latter years have seen an unprecedented 
proliferation of multilateral and, particularly, bilateral investment treaties90 (generally: 
international investment treaties, IITs). While the -often implicit- objective sought by 
developing countries upon entering into international investment treaties (IITs) is 
development promotion91 the results have been disappointing to say the least, even from 
the narrow point of view of per capita growth. On the contrary, as shall be discussed 
below, IITs may narrow the development-related law and policy options available to host 
'" 
countries in exchange for empty or half-kept promises. 92 
89 
90 Art. XIV. Other exceptions cover public morals and order . 
. By the end of2005 the total exceeded 5,200. UNCTAD, lIA MONITOR No.1, (2006), "Systemic Issues 
~ International Investment Agreements" http://www.unctad.orglenJdocs/webiteiia20062_en.pdf 
L. E. Peterson (1), International Institute for Sustainable Development, "Bilateral Investment Treaties 
~d Development Policy-Making" (Nov. 2004), available at: <www.iisd.org>. The author highlights the 
~pact of the omission of development among BITs' written goals for the agreements' interpretation. 
th L. E. Peterson (1), International Institute for Sustainable Development, id. Reciprocal investor protection, 
e cornerstone ofIITs, is a highly unrealistic objective and evidence of the relative power of the 
negotiating parties. According to Peterson's study, the dominant capital-exporting country manages to 
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Perhaps one of the most important issues concerning IITs and permanent sovereignty is 
the determination of what may constitute regulatory expropriation under them. In 
particular, when does a host government's issuance and implementation of rules and 
regulations designed to implement natural resources' management policy and that have 
an impact on existing foreign investments constitute a breach ofthe country's 
commitments under IITs and international investment law? 
International investment law has long been grappling with the answer to these important 
questions. In fact, the popularity of IITs is based on the need to deal with issues of 
nationalization and compensation of foreign property, and the uncertainties they raise 
under customary internationallaw.93 Unfortunately, even with the IITs, no definitive 
answer can be given to the question of (il)legitimate exercise of regulatory power. 
Instead, IITs' provisions have been criticized for their "ambiguity and open-endedness. ,,94 
Particularly troubling in this respect are the IITs' "fair and equitable treatment" and the 
p,rotect existing investments while subsequent investments rarely materialize as a result of the agreements. 
When they do materialize, investors often use IITs to renege from their commitments. Another author 
~eports that despite not being a party to any bilateral investment agreements, Brazil is ranked third in the 
.. ' L~ing of investment destinations. C.G. Garcia, "All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, 
.' atm America, and the Necessary Evil oflnvestor-State Arbitration" (June 2004) 16 Fla. 1. Int'I L. 301. ;~ee also: World Bank, "2003 Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries Report" (2002), 
,,~www. worldbankorg>. 
'.' L.E. Peterson and KR. Gray, "International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in 
Arbitration" (April 2003), available at: <www.iisd.org>; G. Verhoosel, "Foreign Direct 
.:IIIVlestn,pnt and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking a "Reasonable" Balance 
Stability and Change" (Summer 1998) 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 451. Another risk-avoidance 
frequently used in international investment schemes is the "stabilization clause" that is typicaIly 
in contracts and that operates as a freeze of the legal and regulatory conditions existing at the time 
Contracts' negotiations. For a critical analysis of the "stabilization clause" mechanism see: W.N. 
"Partnerships with Monarchs - Two Case Studies: Case One" 25 U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L. 1171. The 
argues that such clauses are a derogation of permanent sovereignty. 
'y,Walde and S. Dow, "Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment" cited in L.E. Peterson 
n..R. Gray, id at 9. 
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"full protection and security" standards, which have already gained the reputation of 
being the "black holes of investment treaties.,,95 This ambiguity explains the recent 
proliferation of investor-state litigation. A large number of the cases relate to natural 
resource-related investments and the states' power to regulate the sectors and resources 
. I d 96 JUvo ve . 
Moreover, the proliferation of IITs has served to weaken the "global regulatory system," 
by opening the door to unprecedented levels of forum and rule "shopping." Indeed, cases 
involving corporations with shareholders from different nationalities and several 
domiciles may be covered by more than one lIT, with their corresponding choice of law 
and dispute resolution provisions and with the ensuing potential for contradiction.97 
Available fora under these treaties may include the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), a tribunal working under the auspices of the World Bank 
that specializes in investment disputes; the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); ad hoc arbitration panels; and, domestic 
courts. lIT provisions may also designate the rules applicable to disputes such as those of 
the host state, the UNCITRAL, or of the tribunal of choice. On the other hand, the Most 
Favoured Nation clause commonly inserted in IITs is now being used to allow parties to a 
9$ 
96 C.G. Garcia, supra, note 92 at 333. 
L.E. Peterson (2), "Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable 
pevelopment" (Aug. 2003), <www.iisd.org>. Peterson, who has written extensively on the issue of 
.:temati~nal investment agreements, calls the investors' standing to bring a state to an international arbitral 
;97 bunal a quantum leap forward." 
The LaUder-Czech Republic UNCITRAL cases are often cited to illustrate this point. See: L. E. Peterson ~), Supra, note 91; C.G. Garcia, supra, note 92. Any potential for contradiction amongst international 
bunals adds up to the potential for contrary rulings in domestic courts. See generally: R. Doak Bishop et 
"8 trategic Options Available When Catastrophe Strikes the Major International Energy Project" (200 I), 
at <www.kslaw.comllibrary/pdfldimi2.pdf>; S.D. Franck, "The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions" (March 2005) 73 
L. Rev. 1521. 
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'-
dispute to "shop" for the most favourable conditions available under the whole collection 
of investment treaties signed by a host nation. Such was, for example, the result of the 
position taken by the IeSID tribunal in a case involving Argentina as the host country, 
and a foreign conglomerate that held one of the largest water services' concession in the 
98 
world. 
In addition to the host of tools now available to investors to challenge states in their 
exercise of permanent sovereignty, one should note the tendency to restrict the inclusion 
of performance requirements in IITs such as those provisions that mandate the use of 
specified technology or that require special qualifications of investors and personnel. This 
poses an additional hurdle to the full and free exercise of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources under IITs. Evidence of this tendency may be found in the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).99 
Thus when it comes to international investment, in the struggle between protecting 
economic interests and empowering states to use natural resources in the best interest of 
their people's well-being, economic interests seem to have the lead. Yet, IITs cannot be 
renounced unilaterally. Thus, if IITs are to realize their development potential, a 
balancing compromise will need to be struck. As shall be discussed below, it is uncertain 
98 
. The cost of preparing for and participating in international arbitration proceedings could be prohibitive 
~r certain developing countries. 
In See: <www.wto.orglenglish/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims_e.htm>. See generally: K. Singh, "Multilateral 
Vestment Agreement in the WTO. Issues and Illusions" (2003) available at: 
<WWw.wto.orgienglishiforums e/ngo e/multi invest agreejuly03 e.pdf>. Some performance 
requ~ements may also run co~ter to GATT and GATS; e.g.: qualification requirements for service 
~OVlders; limitations on foreign ownership of natural resources. The North American Free Trade 
~e~ment, art. 1114, on the other hand, allows for measures "appropriate to ensure that investment 
actIvIty in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." 
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whether ongoing arbitration arrangements and proceedings may be able to strike such a 
balance. Private arbitral tribunals may have little incentive to achieve the balance that 
country negotiators could not write into the agreements. 
3. CASE STUDIES 
A. The War on Utilities and Other Messy Stuff: IFIs, Privatization of 
Services, and Foreign Investment in South America 
In 2005 picketers blocked the streets of Buenos Aires for days protesting against 
potential water services' price increases in front of the offices of the private 
concessionaire, Aguas Argentinas. 100 Also in Argentina, the officers and directors of 
foreign-owned public utilities in Argentina were reluctant to attend public hearings on the 
renegotiations of public service pricing for fear of physical aggression from the protesting 
pUblic. lOl Similar issues turned Bolivia into a highly volatile environment and resulted in 
an electoral victory for leftist E. Morales who almost immediately proceeded to 
t· l' 102 na lOna lze the country's hydrocarbon industry. 
In Peru, notwithstanding detailed environment and social impact-related requirements 
imposed by the IDB as conditions for funding the downstream section of the Camisea 
Gas Fields Development Project, a recent report issued by ajoint commission of local 
100 
La Nacion Online, "Protesta de piqueteros en Aguas Argentinas" (3- 22-2005), available at: 
~Fw.lanacion.com.ar>. 
La Nacion Online, "Las empresas temen ataques piqueteros" (18-5-2005), available at: 
.~WWw.lanacion.com.ar> . 
, See: Arg. Indymedia, "Breve relato de la guerra del gas," available at: <www.argentina.indymedia.org>. 
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and national authorities and representatives of civil society documents around US$ 20 
million of unacknowledged and unmitigated negative social and environmental 
impacts. 103 In addition, there is growing discontent in the region of Cusco because 
consumers in Lima have access to the gas from Cusco's own Camisea fields, while the 
locals don't. 
In Chile, farmers and indigenous peoples are worried over water availability, while 
fishermen up and down the coast may have to grapple with the impacts of decisions taken 
behind closed doors at the WTO headquarters in Geneva. 
Natural resources development related accounts of widespread damage and social 
disruption in Colombia, Ecuador, and other resource-rich countries of South America 
constantly hit the news all over the world. 104 
Something is amiss. Following, is a close look at some factual and legal scenarios cases 
that illustrate international economic law and other forces at play in the natural resources 
A. Peru's Camisea Project: IFls Show Who is in Charge 
Beginning in 1991, Peru embarked in aggressive Washington Consensus-style 
reforms directed at attracting investment to develop (among others) its energy resources. 
Pem, Comision Tecnica de Evaluacion de Impactos Ambientales y Sociales en la Provincia de La 
"Evaluacion y Valorizacion de Impactos Ambientales y Sociales del Proyecto Camisea en la 
de La Convencion" (Nov. 2004) [on file with the autor]. 
See e.g.: Maria Ramos, Amazon Watch, "Indigenous Protests Shut Down Hearings for Controversial Oil 
Gas Project in Peruvian Amazon" (26-01-2005), available at: <www.amazonwatch.org>. 
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Development of the rich Camisea gas fields was one of the central components of the 
neW development policy supported by the IFIs. 
As part of its internal due diligence activities in relation to a private loan request for 
funding the transport component of the development of the Carnisea fields, which in 
compliance with Peru's commitment to the International Monetary Fund)05 had been 
previously concessioned to a private consortium, the IDB drew up a detailed "Plan for 
Institutional Strengthening and Support for the Environmental and Social Management of 
the Camisea Project." The corresponding loan, signed on 27 February 2003, added five 
million dollars to Peru's debt portfolio in relation to the "Natural Gas and Gas Liquids 
Transport System Project" or "Carnisea Project.,,)06 
Among the risks identified by the Bank was the fact that the project's construction was 
well under way and that the complex web of agencies with jurisdiction over the project 
could make Camisea's environmental and social management cumbersome and 
ineffective. Consequently, through its loan conditionalities implemented a virtual 
takeover of Peru's management of hydrocarbon resources. Among other things, the loan 
included funding for the set up of a special Technical Group for Inter-agency 
Coordination (GTCI) and of a special ombudsman office for Camisea (Defensoria de 
Camisea). As part of the loan's implementation, the IDB had direct oversight over both. 
---------------------lOs 
p See: Peru Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies of the Government of 
I~ru for the Period April 1, 1999 to March 31, 2002, available at: <www.imf.org>. 
IDB Public Sector Loan 144110C-PE, available at: <www.camisea-gtci.gob.pe>. 
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By June 2003, less than 4 months after the loan had been signed, but with approximately 
60 per cent of the downstream component's construction complete (construction had 
started before funding), the IDB reported the following progress: 
In relation to the [government's} enhanced institutional capacity, the 
results of the IDB Public Sector Loan and work in progress include as 
part of the Institutional Strengthening Component: (i) GTCI is fully 
operational,' (ii) GTCI is coordinating the community monitoring program 
that is being implemented within the [indigenous} Nauha-Kugapakori 
reserved area by the NGDs Pro-Naturaleza and Rede (sic) Ambiental 
Peruana (RAP),' (",) (vi) the [government} has selected the Catholic 
University as the Camisea ombudsman, and has implemented a number of 
workshops and seminars to disclose the information regarding the 
Camisea ombudsman. 107 
On paper, the report suggests much progress but a look at the reality behind it may 
indicate otherwise. 
Although in compliance with loan conditionalities, the fact that GTCI was fully 
operational is not necessarily a positive development. In practice, the requirement to set 
up the GTCI included in the loan agreement as a pre-condition for disbursement has 
proven ill conceived and disruptive for the efficient management of the Peruvian oil and 
gas sector. GTCI's declared objective was to strengthen the institutional framework for 
environmental and social impact management through coordination of supervision, 
monitoring, and enforcement activities. Before GTCI's creation, Peru's own OSINERG 
(Organismo Supervisor de la Inversion en Energia) was the only agency with a pre-
dating legal mandate to ensure compliance with technical, social, and environmental laws 
and regulations relating to oil and gas development, as well as with the obligations 
derived from concessions, impact assessments, and management plans. However, the 
107 
IDB Report, available at: <www.iadb.org>. 
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GTCI-CAMISEA Plan refers to GTCI's ability to 'demand immediate application of 
corrective measures' 108 a task that according to the law falls under the jurisdiction of 
OSINERG but which by virtue of the operation of the IDB's conditionalities came to be 
shared with GTCI and consequently with the IDB. I09 A set of parallel enforcement and 
compliance structures was thereby created and, instead of eliminating overlap and 
streamlining agency cooperation, the creation of GTCI -neither fully taking the lead nor 
letting another agency assume it- added a further element of confusion to hydrocarbon 
110 development management. 
Moreover, although some ambitious initiatives were undertaken under GTCI's 
leadership, the group missed some critical opportunities for enhancing governance within 
the energy sector. Far from promoting an environment of collaboration between agencies, 
the result ofGTCI's set up has been an atmosphere of mistrust and competition amongst 
sectoral bodies and officers and the emergence of GTCI as an elite group -within the 
government's oil and gas managers- with the power to pull the plug on outside 
funding. III That result can be verified, for example, in relation to the activities 
undertaken by GTCI in connection with community relations and indigenous peoples' 
consultation. Again, due to the sensitivity of indigenous issues -particularly with the 
108 
109 Plan GTCI-CAMISEA, s 4, available at: <www.camisea-gtci.gob.pe>. 
OSINERG, an autonomous regulatory agency, was set up as part of the country's efforts to create a 
stable and attractive investment environment for energy development. OSINERG's mission is to 'enforce, 
at the National level, compliance with legal and technical provisions relating to electricity and hydrocarbon 
sector activities, as well as compliance with legal and technical provisions regarding the conservation and P~otection of the environment in the development of the said activities'. Both contractual and regulatory 
?IO ligations fall under OSINERG's compliance and enforcement powers. Peru, Law 26734/96, art. 2. 
(D The creation of a special ombudsman's office (Defensoria de Camisea) in addition to the existing one 
III efensoria del Pueblo) is considered equally redundant and has led to friction between the two bodies. 
The statement is based on the author's personal experience. 
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lOB's constituents-, the Bank (through GTCI) virtually took over community relations. I 12 
Instead of working on perfecting the model in use by Peruvian authorities and on filling 
existing information and conceptual gaps, loan implementation activities started new 
community consultation programs under the leadership ofGTC!. The Bank's demands 
and work in this area were seen as redundant and disruptive by. 113 
Today, notwithstanding the millions of dollars put into strengthening the institutional and 
regulatory framework of the hydrocarbon sector in Peru, governance issues and the 
related social and environmental problems, continue to be its Achilles heel. The country's 
poor environmental and social impact management record makes it a constant target of 
local and international activists. Peruvians in all comers of the country have taken issue 
with the fact that although Camisea's production has exceeded expectations, the people 
have experienced constant increases in the price of energyl14 and their needs continue to 
112 By the time of the Institutional Strengthening Project's kick off, the Directorate of Hydrocarbons of 
Peru had an extensive track record of activities devoted to setting up and implementing a framework for 
W~igenous and other communities' participation. See: L.K. Barrera-Hernandez, supra, note 23. 
The new programs were undertaken despite the fact that the project was well under way and 
. ponsultation meetings had already taken place. Although the Bank lays claim to successful results, accounts 
from the field yield increasing frustration on the part of the affected communities, which report lower than 
expected benefits and numerous instances of unattended claims. See: Peru, COMARU, "TGP provokes 
petroleum spill in the Urubarnba Valley" (26-12-04), available at: <www.amazonwatch.org>; Peru, "Letter 
IDB on Camisea Project Town Hall Meeting" (11-3-05), available at: <www.amazonwatch.org>. 
with DGH officers. 
Average electricity prices went up in Peru in the years following the transformation of the market in 
992, the market then stabilized, but prices have been going up steadily since 2000. Camisea's Liquid 
Gas (LPG) prices are at a par with imports. OXFORD ANAL YTICA, "PERU: Camisea benefits 
gradualIy" (30 March 2005) [on file with the author]; available at: <www.worldenergy.org>. 
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be underserved. 115 As I write, citizens are getting ready to fight yet another private oil 
and gas company: Hunt Oil and its local subsidiary, Peru LNG SRL. 116 
Unfortunately, the mechanisms chosen by the IDB to manage the risks perceived were 
either inadequate or poorly applied and, rather than preventing mismanagement, 
contributed to exacerbate existing problems. Peru's experience illustrates the perils of 
undermining permanent sovereignty to the point where the balance between local and 
international interests is completely disregarded. 
B. Argentina's Experience: Putting Profit over Well-Being in the 
Management of Privatized Services 
In strict adherence to IFI-mandated Washington Consensus principles, in 1989 
Argentina passed the State Structural Adjustment Law which, among other things, 
declared a state of emergency in relation to the public services' sector and every 
. commercial enterprise in which the state had a stake. Under the law, public services and 
the state's commercial interests were made subject to immediate privatization. 1 17 In 
.... "'nl\.l11 to the Structural Adjustment Law, Law 23.697, enacted immediately after, 
an "economic emergency," cancelling all industrial promotion regimes and state 
;r-~u''''.l''''_ (including service's costumers' subsidies), while lifting barriers to foreign 
OXFORD ANALYTICA, id. Privatization of electricity generation has also stalled in the face of public 
In June 2002, for example, the government faced riots in Arequipa, Peru's second largest city, 
the Toledo administration agreed to privatize two electric power plants (Egasa and Egesur) to 
Tractebel. The government was forced to suspend the sale in order to restore the calm. See: 
doe.gov/emeulcabs> . 
EI Diario Intemacional , J. de Castro, "Testaferros de Hunt Oil Compran Fallo del Tribunal 
. , available at <www.eldiariointemacional.com>. 
Ley de Reforma del Estado No. 23.696, available at: 
gov.ar/infolegIntemetianexos/0-4999/98/texact.htm>. 
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investment. IIB Privatization of water and gas services, electric utilities, and other 
important sectors was promptly undertaken far in advance of the set up of a regulatory 
and institutional framework to regulate and control the privatized activities. 119 In 
addition, no attention was paid to strengthening Argentina's feeble environmental and 
social impact management framework. 120 
The new regulatory framework, with its weak controls, resulted in questionable decisions 
and projects. A good example is the case of the Gasoducto Norandino, a gas 
transportation project in the north of Argentina that became socially and environmentally 
explosive and that was the subject of an extensive legal battle between the government, 
the private investor, and a local indigenous community whose well being was at stake. 121 
Investment in new supply infrastructure also lagged behind leaving promises of increased 
118 Arg., Ley de Emergencia Econ6mica No. 23.697, available at: 
<infoleg.mecon.gov .ar/infolegIntemetianexos/0-4999115/texact.htm>. Law 23.928 completed the 
promotion regime by pegging Argentina currency to the dollar. Arg., Ley de Convertibilidad 
23.928, B.O.: 28/03/1991. 
lE. Barbara, "Despues de la crisis del Estado privatizador en Argentina, regulaci6n y control: (,a cargo 
quien y hasta d6nde?" VIII Congreso Intemacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la 
Publica, Panama, 28-31 Oct. 2003 [on file with the autor]. In keeping with the dictates of 
Washington Consensus, regulatory agencies were considered a necessary evil by the Argentine 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3342, V. Foster et ai, "Towards a Social Policy for 
's Infrastructure Sectors: Evaluating the Past and Exploring the Future" (Oct. 2004), 
. worldbank.org>. Argentina's framework environmental management law was not enacted until 
Sectoral environmental and social impact management continues to be very weak. 
The ColIa indigenous people and Greenpeace Argentina, filed suit against a private developer for the 
ion of a gas pipeline, i.e. the 'Gasoducto Norandino'. The pipeline's route traversed a section of 
forests last home of the yaguarete, a species at the brink of extinction, and traditional lands of the 
people. The project's approval was granted on the basis of an EIA that had been completed without 
. or participation of the Colla. The lower court found it "absolutely clear that due deliberation 
dIscussion of the project had not taken place, as should have, through a public hearing." While the case 
under appeal, construction was completed. After a period of intense rains, the pipeline broke causing 
damage to the area's ecosystem and spreading panic among the indigenous population. L.K. Barrera-
"The Legal Framework for Indigenous Peoples' and Other Public's Participation in Oil & Gas 
VCIC'pmlent in Latin America. The Cases of Argentina, Colombia and Peru" in Human Rights in Natural 
Development (D. Zillman, A. Lucas and R. Pring, eds, 2002) 589. 
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access unfulfilled. 122 Contrary to the IFls' teachings the people did not experience gains 
in well-being. A World Bank review conducted in 1999 concluded that, in contrast with 
the Bank's predictions, the conditionalities imposed for public services' reform in 
Argentina aggravated the situation of the poor and contributed to deepen the gap between 
poor and rich, with the latter deriving the most benefits from the policies implemented as 
a result of donor demands. 123 Through over reliance on one-size-fits-all formulas,124 the 
IFI-designed reform had failed to address the needs of a broad section of the Argentine 
public. The people reacted by staging massive protests, boycotting utilities and privately 
run natural resource businesses, and by launching court proceedings demanding 
injunctions and access to resources,125 at times, prompting the government into action. 126 
The disputes often landed in the docket of investment tribunals, where investors sought 
protection from an increasingly hostile host. 127 Argentina entered into an economic crisis 
which eventually resulted in the passage of the Emergency Law of 6 January 2002. 
Through the law, wholesale and retail tariffs of public service concessions were 
122 Argentina, UNlREN, 'Informe de Grado de Cumplimiento de los Contratos de Distribuci6n y 
Transporte de Gas Natural, available at <www.uniren.gov.ar>. 
123 Reported in D. Bouille et ai, supra, note 7. The reform ofthe Argentine gas service sector was 
undertaken under the WB's Public Enterprise Reform and Adjustment Loan I approved in 1991. WB, OED 
Performance Audit Report No. 14809, "Argentina: Public Enterprise Adjustment Loan" 30-6-1995. Conf. 
Argentina, Defensor del Pueblo de la Naci6n, "Estudios del impacto de la estructura tarifaria de los 
~~rvicios pUblicos en la economia de los usuarios contribuyentes" available at <www.defensor.gov.ar>. 
, See WB, "Review of Bank Conditionality: Issues Note" (01-24-2005), available at: 
<WWw.worldbank.org>; WB, OD 8.60 Adjustment Lending Policy, replaced as of August 2004 by OP/BP 
8.~O Development Policy Lending; "Reshaping Power Markets - Lessons from Argentina and Chile", WB, 
VIewpoint, available at <www.worldbank.org>. The evolution of the Bank's thinking on utilities' reform 
from its stance in the early 1990s towards the latter part of the decade can be traced in: WB, Sector Report, 
"Argentina - Reforming public utilities: issues, challenges and best practices" (June 1996), available at 
~~. worldbank.org>. 
E.g.: USUARlOS Y CONSUMIDORES EN DEFENSA DE SUS DERECHOS ASOCIACION CIVIL 
C/ AGUAS DEL GRAN BUENOS AIRES SA S/ACCION DE AMPARO EXPTE. 44.453, available at: 
~~ttp:llwww.abogadosvoluntarios.netlcontenido.asp?idcontenido= 121 &acceso= 1 >. 
f For an account of the process that led to the termination of the water concession contract in the province 
~L !U~u~an, Argentina, eventually ending in ICSID arbitration (Vivendi Case I and II) see e.g.: J. Piaget, 
l~llJts III Water Concession Contracts: The Case of Aguas del Aconquija (Argentina)" (April 2003), 
~~allable at: <www.hec.unil.chliumi/iumil>. 
See <www.worldbank.orglicsid>. 
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", i~ 
converted to pesos and frozen 128 and public utility contracts were made subject to 
renegotiation. 129 More companies launched complaints before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an arbitral tribunal set up under the auspices 
of the World Bank to settle disputes between governments and private investors. 130 
Argentina now faces billionaire claims which threaten to set the country further back in 
the road to development. 
Similar scenarios can be found in Bolivia and other developing countries. 
C. ICSID Arbitration 
The catastrophic failure of IFI -dictated rules and policies in Argentina resulted in 
a dearth of foreign investment arbitration cases, particularly before the WB' s ICSID. As a 
result of these and prior decisions, some jurisprudence is starting to accumulate which 
may provide a glimpse of how permanent sovereignty might fare under the current -
private!- interpretation of international economic and foreign investment law. 
128 Law 25.561 as amended (in force through 12-31-2006 - Law 26.077 of 1-1-2006), available at 
<www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/anexos/70000-74999/71477/texact.htm> . 
129 The Kirchener administration concentrated renegotiation procedures under a single agency -UNIREN-
with representatives of the affected sectors. The procedures for renegotiation contemplate public 
consultation and review of preliminary agreements between the private companies and UNIREN in public 
hearings; finalized agreements are subject to fast-track Congressional approval. The President has final 
approval power. Ley 25.790, 21-10-03; Decreto 311, 3-7-03; Res. Conjunta, Ministerio de Economia y 
Produccion y Ministerio de Planificacion Federal, Inversion Publica y Servicios 188/2003 y 4412003, 6-8-
2003; Decreto 1172,3-12-03, available at: <www.uniren.gov.ar>. See <www.worldbank.orglicsid>. 
In the wake of the crisis, some measures to provide disgruntled utilities some breathing room were passed. 
Two legislative initiatives, one on social tariffs and one on a common regulatory regime for public utilities 
which increased the discretionary powers of the President were launched. Arg., Proyecto de Ley, Regimen 
Nacional de Servicios Publicos, available at <www.proconsumer.org.ar>. See also: Arg., Clarin, "Acuerdo 
entre el gobiemo y el Congreso para sacar la ley" (16/3/04), available at <www.clarin.com.ar>;Arg .• La 
Nacion, "Nuevas critic as al proyecto de servicios publicos" 25-10-2004, available at: 
<WWw.lanacion.com.ar>.Aspotmarketforgaswasalsoregulatedbuttodate.June2005.itis not 
operational. Decreto 180/2004, Boletin Oficial 16-02-2004, No. 30340, available at: 
~~w.infoleg.mecon.gov.ar> . 
( Co~vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
Washmgton Convention), available at: <www.worldbank.orglicsid>. 
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In the first place is the issue of jurisdiction. Unlike other ad hoc arbitral tribunals, the 
tribunal's founding document, the Washington Convention, article 25, imposes 
jurisdictional requirements for settlement of disputes under ICSID. 131 Despite that 
limitation, so far, ICSID arbitrators have taken an expansive view oflCSID's 
jurisdiction. They have done so by either considering treaty and contractual claims as 
separate and distinct, and asserting jurisdiction over the former, 132 or, by plainly 
assimilating contractual claims to treaty claims under ICSID's jurisdiction. 133 Another 
way in which ICSID tribunals have expanded their reach is by giving a wide 
interpretation to standing rules. On various occasions, ICSID arbitrators have stated that 
standing is not limited to the juridical person under which investments have been made, 
but that the definition of investor extends to shareholders regardless of the size of their 
share in the investment. 134 Moreover, ICSID jurisdiction can be extended by recourse to 
the Most Favoured Nation principle as in the case of Camuzzi v. Argentina. There, the 
more favourable rules available to the complainant under the MFN principle served, 
among other things, to overcome issues of temporal jurisdiction. 135 Thus, as a result of 
131 
The case must involve an "investment" dispute; one of the parties must be a contracting state; the state 
must give written consent to ICSID's jurisdiction; and, the private party must be a national of another 
~~ntracting state. Washington Convention, available at: <www.worldbank.org/icsid>. 
E.g.: Compaflia de Aguas del Aconquija, SA. v. Argentina (Vivendi II), Decision on Annulment, ICSID 
No. ARB/97/3, 41 ILM 1135, 1154 (2002) (ad hoc comm. July 3,2002). A recent review of the decisions 
concerning Argentina, places most cases under this category. P. Di Rosa, "The Recent Wave of 
~bitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal 
I~~ues" (Fall 2004) 36 U. Miami Inter-Am. Law Rev. 41. 
J SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID No. ARB/02/6 ~;. 29, 2004). On "integrationist" v. "dis integrationist" approaches to jurisdiction, see: Y. Shany, 
ontract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced 
. Claims" (October 2005) 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 835. 
SIemens A. G. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8; Enron Corp. v. 
_o-'''."u~ Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 0113. 
Camuzzi v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2. In another case involving a 
Concession in Argentina, Spanish and British investors sought and obtained the protection of the 
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ICSID practice, developing states are dragged into private arbitration procedures at an 
increasing rate. The system appears to be eschewed to favour private interests. 
Indeed, the application of the MFN principle to favour individual investors is a good 
example of the unbalanced evolution of international law under globalization where the 
prevailing drivers are economic interests. While the MFN principle was originally 
devised to operate between states as a manifestation of a globally sanctioned public 
policy that is deemed mutually beneficial (free trade), in this case, its effect is to favour 
private interests directly; the state is at the losing end of the bargain. The scenario is most 
unfair in the case of capital importing states, which will not have the opportunity to 
benefit from reciprocal treatment in the person of their (non-existent) national 
investors. 136 In those cases, the reciprocity built into the IITs is merely decorative 
diplomacy. 137 Adding insult to injury is the fact that, because arbitral tribunals are private 
fora, a country's fate is decided behind closed doors, on purely commercial terms, and 
with very little in terms of procedural safeguards. 138 International arbitration is not open 
to participation and scrutiny by third parties or the public. 139 Legitimate public concerns 
seem to have no place in the tight framework devised to protect investors. 
more favourable IIT negotiated between France and Argentina despite the existence ofIITs between 
~rgentina and their own countries. Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case 
13~' ARB/031I0, available at: <www.worldbank.orglicsid>. 
D' C.l. Suarez Anzorena, R. Wisner, U. Coe, Jr., CT. Salomon, K.S. Gans, "International Commercial 
13~spute Resolution" (Summer 2006) 40 Int'l Law. 251. 
tr A.l?o~ at the docket of ICSID shows that the respondents in the cases before it are developing or 
13:nSltIonmg economies. 
~or example, witnesses' exposure to criminal liability is weak and evidence can be suppressed by the 
~~tJes unwilling to cooperate. 
b?ne reason for this is that IITs dispute resolution rules are usually transplanted from commercial 
ar Itration tribunals' rules that deal with private matters. 
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Very few decisions on the merits have been rendered in the cases involving Argentina. 140 
So far, the case law coming out ofICSID generally, has been marked by contradiction 
and inconsistency. 141 However, as illustrated in the two first cases involving Argentina to 
arrive at a decision on the merits, by nature, international arbitration interpret treaty 
provisions in the manner most conducive to the broad objective of foreign investment 
promotion and not of the countries' specific development objectives which mayor may 
not have been served by the specific investment at stake. 142 Though it's been contended 
that the protection granted to investments under I1Ts should cede to jus cogens rules or 
rules intended to implement a state's human rights obligations, some of which are 
connected to natural resources management such as the right to water, life, and health,143 
this is yet to be recognized by an international investment tribunal. 144 
Thus, 
[cJonfusion as to the boundaries of acceptable government regulation in 
this realm prevails at a worrying time, as there is clear evidence that 
investors have awakened to the existence of the full constellation of 
international investment treaties and are challenging host state laws in 
record numbers. 145 
CMS Gas Transmission Co. V Argentina, ICSID Case N. ARB/Oll08; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID 
No. ARB/01112, available at: <ita.law.uvic.ca>. 
C.I. Suarez Anzorena et aI, supra, note 136; B.M. Cremades, "Investor Protection and Legal Security in 
!~'CUunl(>nal Arbitration" (May-July 2005) 60-JUL Disp. Resol. J. 82. 
In Azurix, the Tribunal states: 
"For the Tribunal, the issue is not so much whether the measure concerned is legitimate and 
a public purpose, but whether it is a measure that, being legitimate and serving a public purpose, 
give rise to a compensation claim. " 
Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/OUI2, para. 310, available at: <ita.law.uvic.ca>. See also: 
E. Peterson (1), supra, note 91. 
• L.E. Peterson and K.R. Gray, supra, note 93 at 13 . 
.. The argument, however, does not extend to cover rules relating to other (non-human rights/non-ius 
L public policy purposes such as natural resource conservation and management. 
.E. Peterson and K.R. Gray, supra, note 93 at 13. 
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The one certain conclusion that can be drawn from the operation of ICSID and similar 
tribunals is that in allowing standing in international arbitrations to private investors 
against states, while not imposing correlative stewardship obligations prompting them to 
take into account some measure of the public's interest in their decision-making, states 
have lost considerable ground in their power to ensure that management of natural 
resources proceeds in the best interest of the public. 146 A state's regulatory and 
contractual freedom may be effectively curtailed by existing IITs. In addition to losing 
ground to private interests, states remain subject to diplomatic pressure. Indeed, although 
one of the alleged objectives and main advantage of IITs was to de-politicize investment 
disputes, capital exporting states still find it their place to throw their weight around in 
defense of private interests operating in developing states. Such is currently the case, for 
example, of France vis a vis Argentina in connection with the Vivendi case. 147 This loss 
of power is aggravated by the lack of effective review mechanisms of arbitral awards. 
Perhaps, opening arbitration proceedings to consideration of arguments based on human 
rights or environmental protection instead of restricting the analysis to commercial issues, 
as was unsuccessfully attempted by Argentina in the Azurix case,148 might turn the tables 
on what so far has been a very unfavourable climate for state defendants in their struggle 
,-
to manage natural resources in the best interest of their peoples. After all, if a private 
claimant's actions amount to demonstrable human rights infringements, it is a state's duty 
C.G. Garcia, supra, note 92; L.E. Peterson (2), supra, note 96. 
Arg., La Nacion, "Francia planteo sus inquietudes a Kirchner" (9 Oct 2006), available at: 
.lanacion.com.ar/politicalnota.asp?nota_id=846935&origen=Premium>. 
Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/Oll12, available at: <ita.law.uvic.ca>. 
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to stop them and it is highly unlikely that any tribunal, even a private arbitral tribunal, 
would find fault in it doing so. 
D. One Scary Story: Chile's Private Water Model Would Make IFls and the 
WTO Proud 
Chile's 1980 Constitution, still in force, wholly embraces the neo-liberal market 
economics favoured by the international financial and investment community and 
reflected in the Washington Consensus principles. Among other things, the Constitution 
strengthens and expands property rights to include rights over water. 149 Accordingly, the 
Water Code of 1981 (the Code)I50 puts water rights in the same category as all other 
property rights that enable the owner to use, enjoy and dispose of the water at his or her 
will (derecho real).I51 It also classifies those rights into consumptive and non-
consumptive depending on whether or not the rights' holder can consume all the water in 
the course ofhislher activities. Non-consumptive rights' holders can use the water but 
must return it to its source. 152 The Code recognizes all rights acquired or granted under 
previous laws but not through traditional uses, which are subject to special proof 
requirements. New rights can be freely acquired from the Water Agency as long as they 
are physically and legally available. Under the law, any person desiring to acquire water 
rights may apply to the Water Agency for free adjudication of available rights. There are 
no restrictions as to who may own water or in what quantities. Water rights are 
completely separate from the right to land and can be freely sold, transferred or 
.49 
.'0 Art. 24, last paragraph. 
d 
Decreto Con Fuerza de Ley 1.122, Fija Texto de C6digo de Aguas. Chile, Diario Oficial de 29 de octubre 
e 1981 
·'·Id . 
• '2 . Art. 6. 
Id. Arts. 12 through 15. 
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mortgaged. There is also no priority of use rules for allocation and no requirements 
d . h' h k' 153 imposing any utles to put t ose ng ts to wor m any way. 
Rather than having a deliberate plan to ensure the provision of sufficient and safe water 
on an equitable basis to all the population, the Chilean strategy towards fulfilling that 
duty relies on the operation of the market with the government taking the back seat. 
Water availability is thus a result of the operation of the free market and not of the 
implementation of a national water strategy specifically geared at ensuring access to 
water to all the population as required by human rights law setting minimum standards of 
well being. However, it is common knowledge that the market tends to favour the highest 
bidder. 
As if this scenario were not scary enough, if any private owner of water rights managed 
to export water in bulk, it would open the tap for endless water exports under GATT-
WTO rules. As explained above, the exceptions may only be triggered when life or the 
resource itself is at risk. By then, any attempt at managing the resource and achieve well 
. being may be futile. Chile, however, is constantly showered with praise by the IFls and 
the international economic establishment for having embraced the free market 
development principles they promote. As shall be seen in another case study below, those 
left behind by the market are starting to raise their voices. 
--
1S3 ----------
Id. Libro I, Tit. III, De la adquisicion del derecho; Libro II, Tit. I, De los procedirnientos 
vos. 
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E. GATT-WTO Case-Law 
Cases of regulatory pull, i.e. extraterritorial application of regulation or standards 
that align local norms with a foreign countries' policy objectives, are well documented in 
the WTO case law. A well know case is the US Shrimp-Turtle case that confronted the 
US with India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand. 154 The case concerned a US ban on the 
importation of shrimp not caught with turtle excluder devises as required by US law. It 
illustrates the WTO' s double-sided bias in the tug between unhindered trade and 
protection of natural resources. In the first place, despite declarations to the contrary, the 
organization's dispute settlement bodies are consistently reluctant to favour legitimate 
natural resources-related policy goals over free trade as evidenced in the original Shrimp-
Turtle Panel's ruling and the Appellate Body's decision, both of which managed to strike 
down the resource-protective measure under different arguments. In the second place, the 
WID's preference for negotiated solutions to resource protection and conservation as 
evidenced in this case puts developing countries at the mercy of their stronger developed 
trading partners. 155 Thus, while in the hands of the powerful trade becomes a leverage 
tool for managing natural resources beyond a country's borders, the WTO's reluctance to 
allow Art. XX exceptions it puts on a straightjacket on developing countries' attempts at 
managing their resources. 
~ispute. I?S5 8, avai lab Ie at: <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm> . 
or addItIonal information see: <www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/envirbackgmde/c8s2e.htm>. 
- - - - -
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4. CONCLUSION 
The above seems to indicate that a fair number of natural resources management 
measures, including human rights, environment and conservation-related laws, 
regulations and administrative practices 156 could be considered illegal barriers to trade 
and subject to be struck down and to carrying penalties under international trade rules. A 
similar conclusion could be drawn with regards to foreign investment and the potential 
for infringement of IITs deriving in billionaire compensation and damages' payments. 
This is compounded by the fact that IFIs and trading countries may condition their 
dealings with developing countries on the adoption of a host of standards and measures 
for resource management that tend to be ill suited to the developing country context and 
fail to advance development. 
The aggregate operation of international trade and investment rules determines that when 
it comes to managing their natural resources, developing countries find themselves 
between a rock and a hard place. While countries' hands are largely tied and permanent 
gnty continues to be eroded, the global system advanced to replace local decision-
making raises significant doubts, particularly when it comes to the interests represented 
advanced therein 157 as well as its overall coherence and relevance to developing 
. Indeed, reviews of the effectiveness of development assistance over the past 
GATS' definition of measures is wide, covering any government-backed practice whether it is based in 
regUlations, policy or institutional culture. Measures taken to comply with a multilateral environmental 
(MEA) could also be at stake. 
C. Dommen, "The WTO, international trade, and human rights" (2004), 3D, available at: 
Jdthree.org>; reproduced under another title in <www.surjournal.orgleng/index3.php>. 
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decades have demonstrated that reforms are more likely to be sustained and development-
friendly when the reform program emerges from a country's own domestic political 
process and is suited to that country's specific circumstances. 158 
Whether the interests served are those of transnational corporations 159 or of dominant 
trading partners, at the end of the day the restrictions placed by international economic 
and investment law on a country's free management and disposition of its natural 
resources are extensive. In fact, one author goes as far as to declare that "countries have 
ceded their right to independently determine their countries' development priorities.,,16o 
At the end of the day, the loss in permanent sovereignty does not result in any gains in 
well being. As the case studies show, sovereignty matters. 
ISS 
WB, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Issues Note, Jan. 24, 2005, available at: 
.worldbank.org>. 
J. Oloka-Onyango and D. Udagama, "The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
--·.~",,'UI and Its Impacts on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights" Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
Protection of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 52nd • Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CNA/Sub.212000113, par. 15,66-
(2000), cited in M. Cohn, supra, note 82 at 437. 
D. Shelton, "Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World" (Spring 2002) 25 B.c. Int'I & Compo L. 
273 at 298. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Natural Resources and Human Rights Law: Paving the Road with Good Intentions 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to whatever doubts may be raised by the previous chapter regarding 
developing states' control over local resource management, the assertion that "the extent 
to which the people in a resource rich region of a State (. .. ) are entitled to benefit from 
resource exploitation in their region is in principle a matter of domestic politics"l is also 
questionable under the light of international human rights law and of recent decisions and 
opinions of human rights bodies and tribunals. It is abundantly clear from looking at the 
1948 United Nations Declaration on Human Righti and subsequent instruments that, if 
human rights are to become fully effective, domestic natural resources management is of 
fundamental importance. Life, the one human right without which all of the others are a 
abstraction, cannot be sustained without natural resources. Take life-giving natural 
away, and the whole construct of human rights falls apart. It is inevitable then, 
the law on human rights will have a significant impact on the way those resources are 
'N.Schrijver, Sovereignty over natural resources, Balancing rights and duties (Cambridge, U.K.: 
'. University Press, 1997) at 9 . 
• AVaIlable at: <www.unhchr.ch/udhr/index.htm> . 
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2. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 
A. Human Rights Law Basics 
The first concerted international legal effort to provide minimum human rights 
guarantees across the globe was the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights.3 Although 
the Declaration is not per se binding, it represented a momentous first step in the 
development of contemporary international human rights law. Following its 
proclamation, the international community continued to work together to develop a more 
comprehensive system covering civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights. As a 
result, in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)4 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)5 were 
adopted. 
Operating under the Declaration and the Covenants, which together make the 
International Bill of Rights, is a whole network of bodies and institutions charged with 
promoting, monitoring, implementing and developing human rights. Of particular note 
are the Human Rights Committee in charge of ICCPR implementation and the Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Committee implementing the ICES CR. These Committees are 
composed of independent experts who examine the reports that signatory nations submit 
under the treaties and issue observations and comments. In those reports Committee 
----------------------lId 
4 • 
General Assembly res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc.A/6316 (1966); available at: 
iWWw.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> and <www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/a cescr.htm>. 
Id. 
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experts summarize their concerns about the state of human rights in certain countries and 
give recommendations for the future. In both cases, to assist state parties in fulfilling their 
obligations, the Committees issue specific recommendations and interpretations 
(Comments) clarifying the scope and requirements of the rights included in the 
Covenants. As shall be illustrated in the Ralco case explained below, Comment 15 of the 
Economic and Social Committee is a perfect example of the gravitation of the 
international human rights system over natural resources management. 
While the Human Rights Committee can hear individual persons' complaints on human 
rights violations, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee does not have that 
ability. 6 
I. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; General 
a. Comment 15 on the Right to Water 
Though fundamental for human survival, until recently, the right to water had 
only received scattered attention and was not explicitly defined and recognized under the 
main American and global human rights' instruments. That scenario has changed 
dramatically since the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee issued Comment 
15 on the Right to Water in November 2002.7 In Comment 15, for the first time, the 
Committee defines concrete and measurable steps that governments must take to comply 
with their obligations under arts. 1 1 and 12 of the ICESCR Covenant with regards to 
6 
For additional information see the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on 
~uman Rights, available at: <www.ohchr.orglenglishlbodies/treaty/index.htm> 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-ninth Session, Geneva, 11-29 November, 
2002, The Right to Water, Articles II and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
CUltural Rights. UN Doc. E/C.12/2002111 (26 November 2002). 
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water.8 Comment 15 is thus devoted to defining the human right to water as intrinsic to 
the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health of arts. 11 and 12.9 
After a general affirmation of the right to water as an indispensable human right, 
Comment 15 describes that right as containing freedoms and entitlements. While on the 
one hand, all persons are said to have the right to continuous access to existing and new 
quality supplies in minimum sufficient quantities, on the other, the Comment imposes 
three types of obligations on State parties, i.e. to respect, protect and fulfill the right to 
water. These obligations require, among other things, that the States refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the right to water including interference with customary 
management arrangements (respect). They also translate into the need to prevent 
interference from third parties through adequate measures directed at safeguarding water 
quality and quantity and, generally, from any activities that would result in inequitable 
access (protect). In order to fulfill their obligations, States must take positive steps "to 
adopt the necessary measures directed towards the full realization of the right to water" 
(para. 26). In all cases, access to a "minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient 
8 M. Leighton, "The Human Right to Water" paper presented at I Encuentro Iberoamericano de Doctores y 
Doctorandos en Derecho Ambiental. Reunion Cientifica: "EI acceso al agua potable en el siglo XXI". 
U?iversidad Autonoma Metropolitana - Azcapotzalco, Mexico. 22,23,24, Y 25 de octubre de 2003 [on file 
~Ith the author]. 
.Comment 14 of the same Committee refers to the right to water as an "underlying determinant" of the 
fight to health. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-second session, Geneva, 25 
April-12 May, 2000, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 
(General Comments). Comment 4 on the right to housing also includes access to water as intrinsic to 
adequate housing. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Sixth Session, 1991, The Right to 
Adequate Housing. UN Doc. Ell 992/23 (General Comments). For a precursor to Comment 15 see S. ~CCaffrey, "A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implication" (Fall 1992) 5 Georgetown 
nternational Environmental Law Review, I. 
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and safe for personal and domestic uses" (para. 37 a) must be ensured on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
Comment 15 takes particular note of indigenous and small-scale farming communities. 
According to its introductory remarks, the right to water in the case of indigenous and 
rural communities must be approached from the much more complex duty of ensuring 
that those peoples are not "deprived of [their] means of subsistence." Freedom from 
interference with traditional and customary access and management practices through, for 
example, encroachment and pollution (para. 16 c and d), is therefore a key area of 
concern. Thus, as far as indigenous peoples and subsistence farming communities are 
concerned, beyond continued efforts to expand water services and access to water 
(obligation to fulfill), compliance with the obligations to respect and protect, including 
refraining from taking any measures that may be considered retrogressive (para. 19) 
should become crucial components of a country's efforts to guarantee equality in the 
enjoyment of the right to water. 10 
Notwithstanding the developments referred to above, as mentioned, one should be 
reminded that no complaints' procedure is currently available for violations of the 
10 
. ~he Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples highlights these duties by recognizing 
~dlgenous peoples' special relationship with water, their traditional rights to water and by requiring 
mformed consent prior to the development, utilization or exploitation of water resources in traditional lands 
or of approving projects that may impact on traditional water resources. UN. Doc. E/CN. 
4.SUB.2.RES.1994/45, Arts. 25, 27 and 30, available at: 
;Y:!:tLw.unhchr.ch/huridocdalhuridoca.nsf/(SymboI)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.I 994.45.En?OpenDocument>. The 
nternatlOnal Labour Convention 169, concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
of 1989, Art. 15, reaffirms the need to pay particular attention to safeguarding the rights of indigenous 
peoples "concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands." Available at: 
<~unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm>. 
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economic, social and cultural rights under the Covenant. II This, of course, includes the 
right to water defined as intrinsic to other economic, social and cultural rights such as the 
right to health and adequate standards of living. 12 However, the universality and 
indivisibility of first and second generation human rights and freedoms (civil and political 
on the one hand, and, economic, social and cultural rights on the other) have received 
widespread acceptance as fundamental to international human rights law. 13 As a result, in 
a practical application of the principle of indivisibility and to avoid the issues of 
justiciability that cloud the effective enforcement of social, economic and cultural rights, 
quite often, complaints pertaining to the right to water will be subsumed in claims 
relative to the right to life or other justiciable human rights. 
Moreover, despite the lack of a formal complaints procedure under ICESCR, the 
Committee's oversight power includes the ability to designate special rapporteurs to 
investigate the situation of social, economic, and cultural rights in member countries as 
well as to respond to country reports and rapporteurs' findings. The Committee's 
observations are closely followed by the international community and add to the pressure 
II 
A protocol to establish a complaints procedure under ISECR has been proposed and is under study. At 
the core of the arguments against it is the justiciability of social, economic and cultural rights. See: 
Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-third Session, 18 Dec. 1996, Draft Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, UN. Doc. E/CN. 411 99711 05; 
Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-eighth Session, 12 February 2002, Report of the Independent Expert, }?N Doc. E/CN. 4/2002/57. 
See e.g. Human Rights Committee, Communication No 18211984 (1987), F.H. Zwaan-de Vries c. Pays-
gas. CCPR/C/291D1I 8211 984. See also: note 9 on Comments 4 and 14. 
V!hat link is highlighted, for example, in the Preamble to the Protocol of San Salvador and the 1993 
. le~~a Declaration and Programme of Action which clearly states that "[a]lI human rights are universal, 
~dlVlsible and interdependent and interrelated." Art. 5, U.N. Doc .A/CONF. 157/23, 12 July 1993. This 
:terrelation is particularly important when the right to water can be thus tied to a human right of the type 
I at does not pose issues of justiciability, such as the right to life, and the right to equal protection under the 
~w recognized, inter alia, in the American Declaration, the American Convention and the International 
oven ant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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faced by countries considered in violation, which often find it in their best interest to 
change their practices. 
II. The Inter American System for Human Rights 
The Inter American System for Human Rights functions under the umbrella of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) created in 1948. Peaceful coexistence through 
regional cooperation in dispute resolution, regional economic and social development and 
promotion of democratic values are the Organization's core functions, making the human 
rights system a fundamental component of the OAS. 14 In the years since its creation, the 
organization has expanded its membership to 35 countries and exerted increasing 
influence over its membership, particularly in the area of human rights. IS 
The Inter American Human Rights System is governed mainly by two documents: the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948),16 one of its foundational 
14 
Art, 2 of the OAS Charter lists its objectives as follows: 
a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent; 
b) To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of 
nonintervention' 
c), To prevent' possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may 
anse among the Member States; 
d) To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression; ~ To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; 
To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development; 
g) To eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the 
peoples of the hemisphere' and ~) To achieve an effecti~e limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the 
;;.est amount of resources to the economic and social development of the Member States, 
IS S,C,harter, <www,oas,org>, 
D O~I?ma,1 membership was of 21 countries, Although Cuba is a member of the organization, its 
16aglclpatlOn is on hold since the advent of the Castro administration. 
EA, AG/RES, 1591 (XXVIII-OI98), OEAlSer.L.V.!II 82 doc,6 rev, I at 17 (1992), 
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documents, and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) which expands and 
updates the principles and rights contained in the Declaration. 17 
The OAS System provides recourse to people in the Americas who have suffered 
violations of their human rights and who have been unable to find justice in their own 
country. The pillars of the system are the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
based in Washington, D.C., and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, located in 
San Jose, Costa Rica. These institutions apply the regional law on human rights and are 
also influenced by the law and practice of other international bodies. 
III. The Inter American Commission 
In 1959, the Inter American Commission was created as a permanent body with 
the mandate to promote the observance and defense of human rights. 18 The 1970 
amendment of the OAS Charter changed the Commission's status to that of an official 
organ of the OAS with authority over all member states under the OAS Charter and the 
American Declaration. It also has jurisdiction to apply the American Convention to 
process cases brought against those countries which ratified that instrument. In either 
case the Commission's powers are broad. 
17 
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36,1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into 
. force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
OEA/Ser.L.VIII.82 doc.6 rev. 1 at 25 (1992). In addition to the two basic human rights instruments 
---'''~'''''U_ a relevant development of the 1969 Convention is the Protocol in the Area o/Social, Economic 
Cultural Human Rights of 1988 (Protocol o/San Salvador); <www.oas.orgLjuridico/english/Treaties/a-
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The Commission is empowered to receive, investigate and analyze individual allegations 
of human rights violations, conduct on-site visits, observe the general human rights 
situation in member states and publish reports with its findings, recommend the adoption 
of measures to improve the protection of human rights in specific states, and request 
states to adopt specific precautionary measures to avoid serious and irreparable harm to 
human rights in urgent cases. In urgent cases which involve danger to persons the 
Commission may also request that the Court order provisional measures, even where a 
case has not yet been submitted to the Court. 
Standing requirements for petitioning the Commission are broad allowing any citizen of a 
member state to petition regardless of harm. However, no hypothetical or merely 
theoretical petitions will be entertained. 19 Petitions may proceed against the state and its 
agents or against any person where it can be prima facie demonstrated that the state failed 
to act to prevent a violation of human rights or failed to carry out proper follow-up after a 
violation, including the investigation and sanction of those responsible. The requirement 
of exhaustion of local remedies that is common to international tribunals also applies to 
the Commission's jurisdiction. Accordingly, petitioners must show that all means of 
remedying the situation domestically have been exhausted. Non-exhaustion of local 
remedies does not preclude recourse to the Commission when it can be shown that the 
. petitioner tried to exhaust domestic remedies but failed because: 1) those remedies do not 
provide for adequate due process; 2) effective access to those remedies was denied, or; 3) 
there has been undue delay in the decision on those remedies. The Commission's 
I.K Scott, "The Inter-American System of Human Rights: An Effective Means of Environmental 
? 19 Va.EnvtI.L.J. 197. 
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jurisprudence is clear in that it does not constitute an ordinary appeal jurisdiction from 
domestic procedures and that it will refuse review where a petition "contains nothing but 
the allegation that the decision was wrong or unjust in itself" 20 
When the Commission receives a petition which meets, in principle, the requirements 
established in the rules on jurisdiction it can initiate proceedings. This decision to open a 
case does not prejudge the Commission's eventual decision on the admissibility or the 
merits of the case. The Commission may still declare the petition inadmissible and 
terminate the process without reaching the merits or may find that no violation has 
occurred. If the Commission decides that a case is inadmissible, it must issue an express 
decision to that effect, which is usually published. On the other hand, the Commission 
need not formally declare a case admissible before addressing the merits. In some cases 
the Commission will declare a petition admissible before reaching a decision on the 
merits. In others it may include its discussion on the admissibility of a petition with its 
final decision on the merits. 
the course of the process, parties are given plenty of opportunities to state and 
their cases. The Commission may also carry out its own investigations, conducting 
visits, requesting specific information from the parties, etc. Its rules and 
emphasize its powers to broker negotiated friendly solutions to the cases 
it. At the conclusion of the process, the Commission prepares a report containing 
conclusions and, where applicable, providing recommendations to the state concerned. 
e.g.: Marzioni v. Argentina. 
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This report is not made public. The Commission allows the state party a set period of 
time to resolve the situation and to comply with its recommendations. 
If upon the expiration of this period of time the problem subsists, the Commission can 
choose to prepare a second -similar- report. If the state persists in its disregard for the 
Commission's recommendations, a second report will be issued and made public. 
Alternatively, if the country involved has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter American 
Court, the Commission can decide to submit the case to the Court for a binding decision. 
"The decision as to whether a case should be submitted to the Court or published should 
be made on the basis of the best interests of human rights in the Commission's 
'd t,,21 JU gmen. 
The fact-finding and advisory powers of the Commission are an important part of its 
functions. These may be exercised either as a result of a specific petition or as part of 
routine activities and result in Country Reports.22 
IV. The Inter American Court 
The Inter American Court on Human Rights is a creature of the American 
Convention adopted in 1969,23 although it did not start holding session until over a 
22 OAS, <www.oas.org>. 
In April 1997, the Commission issued a Report on Ecuador. In its report, the Commission denounces the 
state's interference with the indigenous population's right to cultural and physical integrity. It states that 
government-sponsored activities, including hydrocarbon, forestry and agricultural production activities, 
encroach upon and interfere with those peoples use of traditional land and resources threatening their 
phYSical and cultural survival. It also finds that indigenous access to land and resources is severely limited 
domestic laws and practices, regardless of constitutional and legal recognition of indigenous rights to 
resources. As a result of its findings, the Commission recommends that the Ecuadorian state adopt the 
measures to guarantee the right to life and physical integrity of jungle-dwelling groups, including 
protection of the lands they inhabit. The state is also required to take adequate protective measures to 
cultural survival in connection to resource development, including guaranteeing meaningful 
"\ugenOlll~ participation in development decision-making. The resolution of title claims and land 
issues is also urged. 
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decade later. The Court has both advisory and adjudicatory powers?4 Only states and the 
Commission have a right to submit a case to the Court. However, according to the rules 
of the Court, once a case is admitted, the victims and their representatives may submit 
pleadings, motions and evidence autonomously?5 The Court can take provisional 
measures at the Commission's or the victim's request as well as de ojicio. If a breach is 
found, the Court can order a state to take specific measures to ensure the enjoyment of 
the right or freedom violated. It can also order remedies and compensation.26 Its 
judgments are binding and final. 
V. Decisions and Opinions of the Inter American Organs 
From its creation to date, the Inter American System has gathered an extensive 
track record in the area of resource allocation and use. This might sound odd in light of 
the fact that the Inter American System does not include a right to natural resources as a 
')"UWU'Ul right. As will be shown below, however, it has managed to interpret individual 
and freedoms, including -but not limited to- the right to property, in such a way 
domestic decisions on resource allocation and use can no longer disregard its 
[JWl(lates. Although a great deal of its work and decisions deal with indigenous peoples, 
resulting analysis and principles may have widespread applicability as they relate to 
well being in connection with allocation of natural resources. 
Convention on Human Rights, "Pact a/San Jose, Costa Rica", Arts. 52-69, available at: 
Juridicol englishiTreatieslb-32 .htm>. 
a/the Inter American Court on Human Rights, OAS Res. 448 (IX-0/79), arts 1 and 2; available at 
American Court on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure, available at: <www.oas.org>. 
Convention on Human Rights, arts 62 and 63. 
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a. Decisions of the Commission 
When considering the decisions of the Commission, it is important to be reminded 
of the fact that only a fraction of the Commission's decisions are made public. What is in 
plain view may only be the tip of the iceberg. For example, though several unofficial 
sources report proceedings in connection with the Aguinda case involving Texaco's oil 
production operations in Ecuador,27 no official mention of the case can be found among 
the materials published by the Commission. However, given the consistency of the 
Commission's opinions, it may be safe to assume that all (undoubtedly numerous) other 
cases concerning human rights and natural resources are given similar treatment and 
decided with the same principles in mind. As is evident from the cases below, the 
Commission has no problem with asserting the prevalence of human rights over domestic 
laws and practice, even in cases where what is at stake is a state's sovereign and 
permanent right to develop and manage its natural resources. 
i. Yanomami Case (Brazil) 
A landmark case concerning resource use is the one dealing with a petition 
against the government of Brazil filed by de Yanomami indigenous group in 1980. The 
petition originated in the government-sponsored occupation and mineral and agricultural 
development of an area of the Amazon and the Territory of Roraima where official 
demarcation of the boundaries of Yanomami lands was pending. It was based on such 
disparate rights as the right to life, liberty and personal security, the right to equality 
before the law, the right to religious freedom and worship, the right to the preservation of 
-----------------------
27 
See Chapter V. 
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health and well being, the right to education, the right to recognition of juridical 
personality and of civil rights, and the right to property. 
After verifying that the Y anomami' s territory had been invaded by mining and farming 
interests that brought destruction to the group, the Commission concluded that "a liability 
of the Brazilian Government arises for havingfailed to take timely and effective measures 
to protect the human rights of the Yanomamis.,,28 The government's actions awarding 
priority to, and even promoting, economically productive uses of the land were against 
international human rights law. In particular, the Commission found that in failing to 
demarcate indigenous lands and to prevent encroachment and invasion, the government 
was in violation of the right to life, liberty and personal security, the right to residence 
and movement, and the right to the preservation of health and to well being. 
ii. Maya Case (Belize) 
Another case directly concerning a state's disposition of natural resources, 
. including land, is the one concerning the Maya indigenous communities of the Toledo 
District of Belize. The petitioners in that case complained that the logging and oil 
concessions granted by the state in over half a million acres of land traditionally used and 
by the Maya, violated the communities' human rights to property and equality. 
ruling for the petitioners, the Commission made a significant statement regarding the 
of protection granted to property rights under the Inter American system in 
that "the organs of the inter-American human rights system have recognized that 
American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 12/85, Case 7615, Brazil, March 5, 1985, 
~"Vllilmeridati'ions # 11. 
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the property rights protected by the system are not limited to those property interests that 
are already recognized by states or that are defined by domestic law, but rather that the 
right to property has an autonomous meaning in international human rights law.,,29 The 
Commission further states that "development activities must be accompanied by 
appropriate and effective measures to ensure that they do not proceed at the expense of 
thefundamental rights of persons who may be particularly and negatively affected.,,3o 
Based upon these findings, the Commission took steps to halt the state's action in 
connection to the resources in question and to curb any future attempts to dispose of them 
against human rights law. It recommended that the state provide the Maya people with an 
effective remedy, including recognizing their communal property right to traditional 
lands, and to delimit, demarcate and title the territory in which this communal property 
right exists, in accordance with the customary land use practices of the Maya people. The 
Commission further recommended that the state abstain from any acts that might lead the 
agents of the state itself, or third parties acting with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to 
affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property located in the geographic 
area occupied and used by the Maya people until their territory is properly delimited, 
demarcated and titled. 
iii. Western Shoshone Case (United States of America - US) 
Also of importance in this context is the Dann v. United States case (also known 
.. as Western Shoshone Case) decided and published by the Inter-American Commission in 
,~j.:~ ------
"29 --------
. Inter American Commission on Human Rights, REPORT W 40/04, CASE 12.053, MERITS, MAYA 
Id COMMUNITIES OF THE TOLEDO DISTRICT, BELIZE, October 12,2004, para 117. 
,para 150. 
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2002. At issue in this case was the right of the indigenous petitioners to access and use 
traditional (allegedly public) lands and resources for livestock grazing and gathering of 
subsistence foods. In denying access, the United States argued that indigenous title to the 
lands in question had been extinguished as a result of the occupation of the West by non-
indigenous settlers (inverse condemnation). 
Without getting into the details of the arguments given to uphold the government's title to 
the lands, the Commission determined that the procedure set up by the US to decide on 
indigenous land claims that resulted in the alleged extinction of the petitioners' rights was 
defective, lacking the requisites of fully informed and mutual consent that are 
fundamental to the protection of the human right to property. As a result, the Commission 
concluded that the United States had ''failed to ensure the Dann's right to property under 
conditions of equality ( .. .) in connection with their claims to property rights in the 
Western Shoshone ancestral lands . ,,31 
Of particular importance in the resolution of this case is the fact that the Commission 
. made clear its Willingness to reach outside the main human rights instruments to interpret 
.... and define the content of the rights disputed in each case, including inter alia 
of the Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights as a valid source of law "to 
extent that [in the present opinion ofthe tribunal] the basic principles reflected in 
of the draft Declaration ( .. .) reflect general international legal principles.,,32 
may open the door to increasing intervention of the System's organs in resource 
172 
20 REPORT N" 75102, CASE 11.140, MARY AND CARRIE DANN-UNITED STATES, December 
02, available at: <www.cidh.orgiannualrep/2002englUSA.11140b.htm>. 
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and management decisions particularly if the disputes before them revolve 
around issues of environmental law, inextricably connected to resource development and 
the protection of human life and health.33 
b. Decisions of the Inter American Court 
i. Awas Tingni Case (Nicaragua) 
In 2001 the Inter American Court had the opportunity to pronounce itself in a case 
concerning a 1995 commercial logging concession in traditional indigenous lands. Since 
then, the case ofthe Mayagna (Sumo) A was Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (the Awas 
Tingni Case) has become a landmark Court case in relation to the extension of a state's 
power over natural resources management. 
The Awas Tingni case was filed by the Inter American Commission on behalf of a 
Nicaraguan indigenous community. The Commission requested the Court to decide, 
among others, whether the state violated the obligation to respect rights, the right to 
and the right to judicial protection of the American Convention. 
to submitting the case to the Court, the Commission had found that: 
The State of Nicaragua is actively responsible for violations of the right to 
property, embodied in Article 21 of the Convention, by granting a 
concession to the company SOLCARSA to carry out road construction 
work and logging exploitation on the Awas Tingni lands, without the 
consent of the Awas Tingni Community.34 
A petition was recently tabled before the Commission against the US on behalf of the Inuit of the Arctic. 
petitioners argue that the US' acts and omissions on climate change represent a violation of that 
s human rights, inter alia, the rights to life and to cultural integrity. Information on this submission is 
at : <www.earthjustice.orgllibrary/reports/summary_ ICC --petition. pdf>. 
can Court of Human Rights, Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
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Among other things, the Commission recommended that Nicaragua should: 
Suspend as soon as possible, all activity related to the logging concession 
within the Awas Tingni communal lands granted to SOLCARSA by the 
State, until the matter o/the ownership o/the land, which affects the 
indigenous communities, [is} resolved, or a specific agreement reached 
between the state and the Awas Tingni Community?5 
The Inter American Court agreed with the Commission's findings and ordered 
Nicaragua to take all measures to correct the country's violation of the Awas 
Tingni's human rights in connection with the community's property rights to its 
ancestral lands and natural resources 
In addition to the fact that the decision's practical effect is to curtail the country's 
power to dispose of natural resources within its jurisdiction, a look at the 
transcript reveals that the System's organs are willing to take a deep look at the 
operating principles behind traditional expressions of sovereignty such as 
disposition of land and concessions to exploit natural resources. 
In its allegations before the Court in connection to the right to property, the 
Commission takes a close look at the status of the lands and resources at stake and 
finds a violation in Nicaragua's assumption that "all lands not registered under 
formal title deed to be State lands.,,36 Although the Court's decision does not 
directly address it, the argument is significant in that it challenges the extent of 
v l-r 
'llcaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001, para 25. 
d. 
Id., para 140 (j). 
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state powers over those lands that may be considered res nullius ("unowned" 
things), thereby disputing the modem application of the Roman law-based 
principles used to justify a states' taking of lands and natural resources that are in 
operation since discovery and colonization. According to those principles, res 
nullius remain the common property of all mankind until they are put to some 
productive use at which time the person putting the thing to a "good" (productive) 
use can claim it for him/herself and obtain legal title. In other words, if lands and 
resources aren't used to generate economic value, the state can dispose of and 
exploit them as it sees fit. In doing so it can displace "lesser" (non-productive or 
subsistence) uses, such as the use to support subsistence lifestyles (hunting-
gathering/subsistence farming), religious uses, esthetic uses, environmental uses, 
etc. 
In questioning the continued undisturbed application of res nullius principles, the 
System is taking a very important step towards redefining the content of a state's 
sovereign powers over natural resources. It is forcing a re-examination of present 
rules and practice concerning a state's exercise of its permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources by questioning the traditional prevalence of economic 
Useslbenefits over other beneficial uses, and, also importantly, by considering the 
of the exercise of sovereign powers on the individuals within a state and 
extent to which they may benefit or suffer as a result. 
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ii. Yakye Axa Case (Paraguay)37 
This recent case concerns a claim by an indigenous community to lands registered 
to and used by private parties. The claim in question covered operating faming 
establishments known as "estancias" (ranches) Lorna Verde, Maroma and Ledesma sold 
by the government of Paraguay to British interests through a public tender process that 
took place in London in the early nineteenth century. Though, initially, the indigenous 
population stayed on the land as farm hands, deplorable living conditions and the promise 
of a better life drove the Yakye Axa to seek shelter with the Anglican missionaries 
charged with their "pacification." After experiencing equally taxing hardships, the 
indigenous group sought to recover its ancestral territory. 
In 1993 the Yakye Axa initiated administrative procedures to recover the lands in 
question. The procedure eventually ended in a petition to the Inter American 
Finally, Paraguay's recalcitrance caused the Commission to submit the case 
reviewing the case, the Court found Paraguay in violation, among others, of the 
to property. It ordered Paraguay to identify and transfer to the Yakye Axa the lands 
In case of conflict between private and indigenous title the Court provides the 
with criteria to evaluate the admissibility of potential limitations to the claimants' 
to property vis a vis the private title-holders. According to the Court, admissible 
must: 1) be declared by law, 2) be necessary, 3) be proportionate, and 4) be 
Inter-Americana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Comunidad Indfgena Yakye Axa vs. Paraguay, 
de 17 de junio de 2005; available at: <www.oas.org>. 
99 
I"" 
directed at achieving a legitimate common (as opposed to individual) objective in a 
democratic society. The issue of "need" should be determined in relation to whether the 
proposed limitations are directed at the satisfaction of a pressing objective of public 
interest. Significantly, the Court specifically rejects "usefulness" as an objective that per 
se can justify any restrictions to the right to property. In addition, the Court highlights the 
value of land for the preservation of indigenous cultures and their human rights as a 
factor to be taken into account in deciding on the resource's allocation.38 
Once again in this case, in reclaiming their abandoned ancestral lands, the Yakye Axa 
petition brought about an examination of the deeply rooted Roman-law principles 
upholding a state's decisions in the exercise of its sovereign rights over land and 
resources. At the core of the legal dispute was the status of the indigenous group's 
original title vis a vis the existing title of the private land-holders. Throughout the local 
procedures initiated in 1993 and in the proceedings before the organs of the Inter 
_uvu",",,,. System, though recognizing the Yakye Axa's right to the land, Paraguayan 
"''''''VUI'',",~ consistently referred to the private title-holders' "rational," i.e. productive, use 
lands as the main obstacle barring their transfer to the claimants. They based their 
"'-.,'" ... on the fact that Paraguayan law adjudicates preemptive status to the title of the 
ve owner.,,39 As was explained above, the Court, however, rejected utilitarian 
"-·""U.L" as sufficient justification for rightful limitation of the human right to property 
article 21 of the American Convention. 
para 144 through 156. 
Para 54 (g) and 122 (t). 
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3. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION CONVENTION 169 
A discussion on natural resources management cannot be complete without direct 
reference to the rights of indigenous peoples. Natural resources are central to the cultural 
and material survival of indigenous communities; they are intrinsically tied to their 
distinctiveness and to the protection that the recognition of that distinctiveness entails.40 
In the developing world, natural resources' development is increasingly taking place in, 
or very close to traditional indigenous areas. While resulting in much needed revenues 
and the potential for enhanced well being for some sectors of the population, for the most 
part, the peoples in the areas where the resources are located tend to bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative impacts of resource development through reduced 
access to resources and direct exposure to pollution and environmental degradation. That 
is when international law and institutions step in. 
Though, individually, states may drag their feet with regards to recognizing and 
implementing indigenous peoples' rights in connection to natural resources, international 
law has developed at a much faster pace. Indigenous rights are specifically dealt with in 
Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration41 which promotes indigenous peoples' participation 
In sustainable development and in the Framework Convention on Biological Diversity 
;----------------------
D. Kinley and J. Tadaki, "From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for 
~Orporations at International Law" (Summer 2004) 44 Va. J. Int'I L. 931. 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, 1992, 
.. WWw.unep.orgiDocuments.multilinguaIlDefault.asp?DocumentID=7 8&ArticleID= I 163>. 
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42which calls countries' attention to the importance of preserving traditional cultures and 
their role in biodiversity conservation.43 Though its adoption is pending, "traditional 
collective systems for control and use of land, territory and resources, including bodies 
a/water and coastal areas" 44 are specifically recognized and protected as fundamental to 
indigenous survival and well-being in the American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples sponsored by the Organization of American States.45 
Most important in this context is the International Labour Organization Convention (No. 
169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169).46 
Though ILO 169 may lack worldwide significance as a source of international law due to 
a low number of ratifications, the Convention is of great relevance in Latin America, 
where it has been ratified by 13 countries, eight of which are located in South America.47 
Because it is backed by such a highly respectable and experienced organization as the 
International Labour Organization, with long standing control and enforcement 
procedures, ILO 169 has received a lot of attention from indigenous groups and 
lawmakers in South America. 
:~ See: <www.biodiv.orglconventionlarticles.asp>. 
For additional information see: M. Berraondo L6pez, Los derechos medio-ambientales de los pueblos 
~digenas (Quito, Ecuador: Abya-Yala Editing, April 2000). 
OAS, supra, note 2, Preamble, para. 5. Art. XIII refers genera\1y to the right to "conserve, restore and 
Psrotect their environment and the productive capacity of their lands, territories and resources." 
~rganization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1333rd . session, 
95 . regular session, 26 February 1997. Negotiations on the 1997 proposal are ongoing. However, the 
United States has clearly stated that it wi\1 not support a declaration that undermines sovereign 
pferogatives. For an account of the negotiations and their outcome see: www.dialoguebetweennations.com. 
I~O 169, Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation 
~ Its seventy-sixth session. Entry into force: 5 September 1991, available at: <www.ilo.org>. 
E As of September of 2006 the list includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
cUador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. 
102 
Infused by the principles of respect and participation,48 ILO' s Convention 169 identifies 
indigenous and tribal peoples as a clearly distinct stakeholder group with a "right to 
decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, (..) and 
the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control to the extent possible, 
over their own economic, social and cultural development . ... (and to) participate in the 
. formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and 
regional development which may affect them directly. 49 Accordingly, ILO 169 recognizes 
indigenous peoples the following: 
• The right to recognition of ownership and possession of traditional lands; 
• the right to be free from encroachment and intrusion in their traditional lands; 
• the right to participate in the use, management, protection and conservation of 
natural resources; 
• the right to be consulted before natural resources on their lands are explored or 
exploited; 
• the right to studies on the effects of exploration and exploitation on their lands; 
• the right to benefit in the profits made from any exploitation and use of natural 
resources from their lands; and, 
• the right to be compensated by the government for any damages caused by natural 
resources exploitation on their lands. 50 
V""'''''IU'il, OIT, Convenio No. 169 sobre pueblos indfgenas y tribales en pafses independientes, 1989, 
de Norrnas, Oficina Regional de la OIT para America Latina y el Caribe, 9a. Edici6n 
~"'W'~IJL.ilUa_ junio de 1997. For a complete guide to ILO 169 see: "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: A Guide 
ILO Convention No. 169" available at: 
. i10. orglpubl iclEnglish! emp loyment/strat/po Idev/papers/ 1998/ 1 69guide/ 1 69guide.htm#C4> . 
169, art. 7. 
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Ratification of an ILO Convention involves a commitment by the member States to 
render its provisions effective within their national legal system, and to provide 
information to relevant ILO supervisory bodies. ILO members must address requests for 
information resulting from complaint procedures initiated before the Organization and 
must present periodic reports on the status of legislation and practice in relation to the 
matters dealt with in ILO Conventions and Recommendations regardless of ratification. 
Disputes falling under ratified ILO Conventions may eventually find their way into the 
docket of the International Court of Justice. 51 
The Convention is already having a tremendous impact on domestic natural resources 
management in South America. As illustrated below, the periodic report and observations 
process is a very powerful tool to achieve compliance with ILO rules and to guide 
domestic rule making and implementation. As a result, the ILO is an important driver of 
law and policy for natural resources management and has intervened in numerous cases 
as discussed below. 
51 Periodic country reports are subject to a technical review by an advisory body known as the Experts' 
Commission which may choose to communicate directly with the governments (generally regarding issues 
ofa technical or secondary nature) or publish its comments as "observations" in a formal report to be 
submitted for discussion at the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (CCAS) in 
preparation for the annual meeting of the International Labour Conference. The Commission's Report 
:ovides the basis for tripartite discussions at the CCAS. The conclusions of that discussion are presented at 
e ~LO Conference in plenary session. Although no formal sanctions may proceed from the procedures 
outlmed above, the organization's political and moral leverage exerts considerable pressure and has a 
~---· .. ~",U, impact on a country's international reputation and credibility. ILO Constitution, Art. 19, ss.5(e), 
and 7. For examples of enforcement procedures initiated against Colombia see: 
--~r'.II\J.\;IJ: 1567 /pubIic/english/50normes/inflegliloenginewcountryfTameE.htm>. 
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4. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIAL 
REGULATION 
Stretching the reach of domestic norms and adjudicators to rein in corporate 
activities beyond a country's borders may be another way in which the international 
community has an impact on natural resources management. There are two ways in 
which this could be attempted. On the one hand, is the practice of allowing cases with 
little or no connection with a given state to be heard in that state's courts through the 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 52 On the other hand, is the 
possibility of extending the application of municipal law and policy outside the confines 
of the domestic territory. Examples of the latter practice have already been discussed in 
connection with trade and the GATT-WTO agreements and will not be re-visited here. 53 
This section will concentrate on universal jurisdiction under the United States' (US) Alien 
Tort Claims Act and its impact on natural resources management outside the US. 
A. Universal Jurisdiction under the US Alien Tort Claims Act 
One of the positive outcomes of globalization is the possibility of accessing and 
sharing information across the globe in real time. As a result, the work of activist groups 
is facilitated and enhanced. Their message can promptly reach all the comers of the 
World; they can tap into a wide and rich pool of human resources and forge alliances with 
~niversal jurisdiction allows states to exercise jurisdiction over persons in their territory suspected of 
~rllnes against humanity, no matter where such crimes took place. According to Oppenheim it represents 
'the recognition of the supremacy of the law of humanity over the law of the sovereign state when enacted 
applied in violation of elementary human rights in a manner which may justly be held to shock the 
of mankind". Cited in Amnesty International, "Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to 
and Enforce Legislation" available at: 
.orgllibrary/indexlengior53008200 1 ?OpenDocument>. 
See discussion on GA TT/WTO law and jurisprudence in Ch. III. 
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other groups as may be required by their cause. These alliances allow often marginal 
groupS or causes to overcome practical and legal hurdles at home and abroad. A major 
hurdle and one that is sadly common in developing countries is the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the courts. Therefore, access to alternative fora under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction is actively sought. Perhaps for economic or other reasons, including 
lack of sufficient knowledge and understanding of alien regimes as well as stringent 
standing requirements, few cases end up finding their way into foreign courts. However, 
of those that do, a vast majority has to do with natural resources' exploitation. 
US federal courts have been particularly receptive to foreign victims' claims for 
violations of the law of nations54 which are admitted under two statutes: the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (A TCA)55 and the Torture Victim Protection Act. Of the two, ATCA is 
consistently used in human rights cases arising out of natural resources' exploitation 
projects in the developing world. The criteria for admissibility, however, are strict and 
only allegations concerning violations of the law of nations, i.e. well established, 
universally recognized norms of international law, are heard. 
US case law has limited the interpretation of the content of the law of nations to a very 
narrow list of violations that meet the "specific, universal and obligatory" standard of 
AreA. The violations that may be covered include genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial 
------------------------S4 
T. Collingsworth, "Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Application of The Alien Tort Claims ~ct to Violations of Fundamental Human Rights by Corporations" (Spring 2003) 37 U. of San Francisco 
ssaw Review 563. 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). 
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killing, slavery, torture, unlawful detention and crimes against humanity. 56 In fact, the 
- courts are often criticized for not allowing environmental torts to be litigated in the US 
under ATCA. 57 Notwithstanding this limitation, human rights-based allegations have 
proved a good enough basis for accessing the US courts, including in those cases where 
environmental harm is part and parcel to the substance of the victims' claims.58 
Furthermore, A TCA allows suits to be brought against states as well as private persons. 
The latter, however, can only be held liable for jus cogens violations. 59 
The list of natural resources-related cases litigated in the US under ATCA is long and 
includes several causes celebres, such as Aguinda v. Texaco in Ecuador, alleging large 
scale destruction and contamination of indigenous peoples' rain forest habitat leading to 
human rights violations and decimation of indigenous groups; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company in Nigeria, involving the summary execution of an activist leader, 
Ken Saro Wiwa, for his activities protesting the company's and the government's human 
rights and environmental violations; Bano v. Union Carbide arising from the Bophal 
incident, India, where the release of a toxic chemical from a factory lead to the death of 
as much as 20,000 people;6o and, the case filed against Unocal Corp. for using forced 
labour in the construction of a pipeline in Burma (Myanmar). 6 1 
S6 
The courts have approached the law of nations from an evolutionary stand-point. This signals the 
P70ssibility of the expansion of this list in the future. 
N See court's decision on dismissal: Flores v. So. Peru Copper Corp., 2002 WL 1587224 at 9-10 (S.D. 
· .Y.2002) 
· 58 . 
N.L. Bridgeman, "Human Rights Litigation under the A TCA as Proxy for Environmental Claims" (2003) 
· ~9 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. I. 
· 60 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232,238 (2d Cir. 1995). 
For further information on the Bhopal incident see: <www.bhopal.orglwhathappened.html> and 
~web.amnesty.orglpages/ec-bhopal-eng>. 
· The Unocal case ended in a settlement in December 2004. For further information see: 
.Iaborrights. org/pro j ects/ corporate/unocal/index. htm I>. 
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The cases are a sticky diplomatic issue for US international relations and can easily end 
up in a dismissal on comity,jorum non convenient and even political question grounds. 
However, regardless of their final outcome, the cases are a powerful driver of change in 
the developing world. Already, ATCA claims have proved instrumental in bringing about 
changes in how municipal laws and practices deal with natural resources decision-making 
and management. For example, since the Aguinda case was filed in 1993, the government 
of Ecuador has gone from siding with the defendant company for dismissal of the case in 
the US, to acknowledging the legitimacy of the proceedings in the US and promising to 
assist in the implementation of its outcome.62 Legal and regulatory changes were also 
introduced in an attempt to instill accountability on companies and government officials 
in the management and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. 63 
Whether due to the lawsuits per se, or to the negative attention they bring on countries' 
and governments' practices in connection with natural resources management, the impact 
is the same. Once again, though short of handing out specific rules to be implemented by 
developing states, in the end the manner in which states exercise permanent sovereignty 
folIows outside prompts. 
62 
It should be noted that some recent reports denounce the government's (particularly the military) 
~esumption of hostilities against the plaintiffs. For a summary of the case and main legal documents filed, 
IIlcluding a letter from Ecuador's Attorney General in support of the plaintiffs suit in the US, see: 
<WWw.texacorainforest.com/case/index.htm>. See also Amnesty's International account in: 
~WWw.amnestyusa.org!business/sharepower/chevron.html>. 
The case is currently before Ecuadorian courts. Despite advances in Ecuadorian laws and regulations, the 
administration of justice, including the enforcement and judicial branch of Ecuador's system, continues to 
very weak. Several reports of procedural irregularities and extrajudicial misconduct, including numerous 
and beatings of members and friends of the plaintiffs' party, have been reported. For additional 
"lur1'n~1fiA~ see the website of the Amazon Defense Coalition available at: 
.com/eng/index. php?option=com _ content&task=view&id=52&Itemid=5 3&PHPSESSI 
15678c90f07c048b5338fff40569d7>. 
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5. CASE STUDIES 
A. Chile's Ralco Project 
In 1989 the Chilean government approved an ambitious hydro-electric 
development plan for the upper Bio Bio River area on traditional indigenous Mapuche 
lands: the Pangue-Ralco Project. The Pangue-Ralco Project consisted of the construction 
and operation of a series of dams to be built along the Bio Bio River as well as of the 
additional support infrastructure for electricity generation. The project was to be 
undertaken by a newly privatized company, ENDESA, with funding from the 
International Financial Corporation (lFC), a subsidiary of the World Bank Group. Once 
completed, the project would supply 570 MW of electricity to mostly urban areas and 
would represent over 10% of the country's supply. 
Thus, the local Mapuche, 64 who for centuries had lived in the upper Bio Bio practically 
bed, became involved in a struggle to protect their land and water resources that 
over 12 years until the signature of parallel agreements between the government 
the Mapuche,65 and between ENDESA and the last Mapuche families whose lands 
affected by the dams' construction, put an end to the dispute.66 
case involves the Mapuche-Pehuenche band. 
agreement was presented to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights as a negotiated 
to a complaint presented by the affected Mapuche families in December 2002. It was approved by 
. Commission on II March 2004. Its terms will be discussed below. OEA, Informe #30104, Petici6n 
17/02, Soluci6n Amistosa, MJ. Huenteao y Otras, Chile, II de marzo de 2004. 
'''Tierra Pehuenche ahora es de Endesa" Chile, Diario EI Sur, 19 Feb. 2004. 
109 
. it' 
I. The Conflict 
Once the plans for the Pangue-Ralco Project became known, with the support of 
non-governmental organizations, environmentalists and the government agency in charge 
of indigenous affairs, (CONADI-National Corporation for Indigenous Development),67 
Mapuche representatives raised concerns about the environmental and social impacts of 
building the proposed series of dams on the Bio Bio. They argued that since the first dam, 
Pangue, was designed to work in conjunction with a large upstream reservoir-dam 
(Ralco), the government ought to consider the cumulative environmental and social 
effects of building the two dams before giving approval to Pangue. Among the concerns 
cited were the project's impacts on the Bio Bio River, its ecosystem and on the 
communities dependent on it. It was argued that the natural flow of the river would be 
disturbed and that the quality of the water would be altered and would no longer be 
suitable for existing human and traditional uses. The project also required the 
displacement of the Mapuche families of the area, whose lands were to be flooded. 68 
Pangue resulted in a highly visible court battle between the Mapuche, environmentalists 
and other water rights' holders on one side, and ENDESA on the other. At issue was the 
67 
CONADI was conceived under the auspices of the Nueva Imperial Agreement. Its subsequent creation by 
~~w 19.253 of 1993 (the Indigenous Law) was welcomed by Chile's indigenous peoples who found that 
It S composition, including 8 elected indigenous representatives, was an important step towards the 
recognition of their rights. After a series of measures taken by the Chilean government, including 
~eplacement of several members and directors, the Commission's reputation suffered significantly and its 
~dependence from the administration is seriously questioned. 
L. Nesti, "The Mapuche-Pehuenche and the Ralco Dam on the Bio Bio River: The Difficult Protection of 
Indigenous Peoples' Right to (Their) Land" available at: <www.unisi.it/ricercaicentrilcisai/nesti.htm>.In 
a.ddition to the impacts mentioned above, the Pangue dam would retain most of the natural nutrients that the 
fJve~ discharged in the Arauco Gulf, one of Chile's prime fishing grounds. See gen.: M. Baquedano, 
InstItuto de Ecologia Politica, La Batalla de RateD (LOM Ediciones Ltda., Santiago de Chile, Chile: 2004). 
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right of ENDESA to alter the Bio Bio River's flow in a manner that could potentially 
injure other water rights' holders. Strengthening the case against the dam's construction 
was the argument advanced by down-stream farmers who saw the potential reduced and 
uneven water flows as a threat for agriculture and their livelihoods. However, breaking 
ranks with its traditional protection of consumptive rights' holders69 and reversing the 
Appellate Court's decision, Chile's Supreme Court decided in favour of EN DES A 
clearing the way for the dam's construction and dismissing the plaintiffs' claims as 
exaggerated and premature. 70 
Continued opposition to the project could not stop construction of the first of the dams 
planned, the Pangue dam, including building of access roads and relocation of families. 
Once Pangue had been completed, ENDESA forged ahead with its plans to build the 
Ralco dam 27 kilometers up-stream from Pangue. The expected social and environmental 
impacts of Ralco were far greater than Pangue' s, including the displacement of 91 
families. Mapuche opposition grew and, amidst much turmoil which included scandalous 
allegations of foul play on the part of the World Bank and the International Financial 
Corporation/ i the families refused to be relocated. 
69 
70 F.or a~ explanation of the different categories of water rights see footnote 91 and accompanying text. 
Cited m C.J. Bauer, "Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the Neoliberal Model in Chile" 
(Winter 1998) 38 Nat. Resources J., 109. Case law in Latin America is not always commercially published 
~~d available as in North America. With some exceptions the author had to rely on secondary sources. 
The World Bank and the IFC were repeatedly denounced by members of the civil society for approving 
the project without a full EIA as required by World Bank policy, and for alleged abuses resulting from the 
proJect's implementation. On November 1995 the Grupo de Acci6n por el Bio Bio presented a claim before 
:e Bank's Investigation Panel requesting a formal investigation. Although the petition was denied by the 
anel, the Bank's President, J. Wolfensohn, ordered a special investigation headed by Dr. Jay Hair, an 
~hroPOlogist. A similar, parallel, investigation was commissioned to another anthropologist, Dr. 
I eodore Downing, by the IFC concerning the Pehuen Foundation, an agency set up as a result of the IFC 
oa? to provide local development support and offset the project's socioeconomic impacts. Both reports 
~Ive~ at ~imilar and highly critical conclusions, condemning the World Bank and the IFC for not 
° lowmg mternal policy and documenting abuses resulting from the project's implementation. Although 
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After years of bitter legal disputes over the right of the government of Chile to allow the 
development of a hydroelectricity project in traditional indigenous lands involving 
significant environmental impacts on water and related resources as well as the 
displacement of the local inhabitants, in December 2002 a few indigenous women whose 
lands and families were the last remaining obstacle for the completion of the Ralco dam 
filed a complaint before the Inter American Commission. The complaint was based on 
the right to life, the right to humane treatment, the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom 
of conscience and religion, the rights of the family, the right to property and the right to 
judicial protection of the American Convention on Human Rights. At the time of the 
petition Ralco was 70% complete. The petitioners requested the Commission to issue 
precautionary measures to avoid the serious and irreparable harm that would ensue from 
the continuation of Ralco, particularly as a result of the imminent flooding of the 
reservoir. The precautionary measures were granted and the Commission requested 
Chilean authorities to abstain from undertaking any actions and to stay any proceedings 
that could result in the eviction of the petitioners from their traditional lands until the 
petition had been reviewed and the agencies of Inter American System had had a chance 
to issue their decisions.72 The Commission never got to consider the merits of the case. 73 
The complaint eventually resulted in an Amicable Agreement between Chile and the 
results were initially withheld from the public and particularly the directly impacted Mapuche, 
public pressure resulted in the release of the information and a public mea culpa on the part of 
'tb World Bank. American Anthropological Association, Committee for Human Rights, "The Pehuenche, 
, e World Bank Group and ENDESA S.A" available at: <new.aaanet.orgicommittees/cthr>; C. Opaso, 
Bio-Bio Project: A Lesson Not fully Learned by the World Bank" available at: 
, OEA, Comisi6n de Derechos Hum~nos, Informe No. 30104, Petici6n 4617/02, Soluci6n Amistosa, MJ. 
'~'-'"m:''''' Beroiza y Otras, Chile, 11 de marzo de 2004. 
Note that the Commission would have had to interpret the meaning and scope of Chile's reservation 
the right to property. 
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petitioners that the Commission approved on 11 March 2004. Though loosely phrased, 
the Commission-brokered Agreement, including a series of conditions binding the 
government of Chile in future natural resources-related decisions with an impact on 
indigenous communities, marked a first step in curtailing the state's sovereign 
d d· . . I 74 management an ISposltlOn powers over natura resources. 
Unfortunately, a progress report presented by the Mapuche to the ICHR on October 2004 
severely criticizes the government of Chile for its unilateral approach and lack of 
cooperation regarding the Amicable Agreement's implementation. According to the 
October 2004 report, despite the promises made by the government of Chile, no attempts 
have been made to establish any channels of communication, exchange and consensus 
building with the Mapuche. The government is accused of foot-dragging in several fronts, 
including the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, ratification ofILO 169, 
and the satisfactory resolution of legal proceedings against indigenous leaders for their 
activities in connection to Ralco, such as the prosecution of Mr. V. Ancalaf under special 
"anti-terrorist" laws. 75 
74 
For details of the Agreement of 16 September 2003, see: 
<mYw.mapuexpress.netipublicaciones/memorandum-ralko2.htm>. The government of Chile and the 
petitioners signed a simultaneous agreement where the government undertook several supplemental 
Commitments aimed at securing the lands for ENDESA, available at: 
~YiJLw.mapuexpress.net/publicaciones/memorandum-ralko.htm>. 
d At th~ time of the October 2004 report, Mr. Ancalaf had been found guilty of participating in the 
. eS~ctlOn of pieces of ENDESA's equipment and was facing the prospect of spending 5 years and I day 
In pnson. Contrary to the Mapuche's expectations and underscoring the accusations made in the October 
~POrt, his sentence was confirmed by Chile's Supreme Court on November 22,2004; see: 
~odo50.orglazkintuwe/noviembre29 I.htm>. The application of special anti-terrorist and national ;~unty laws to indigenous activists was an issue of special concern to the UN Special Rapporteur, Prof. 
C venhagen. Though predating it for almost a year, Prof. Stavenhagen's report echoes most of the general 
~~cerns Voiced in the progress report. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
C fu~d~mental freedoms of indigenous people, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, submitted in accordance with 1~~ISSlOn resolution 2003/56, Addendum, Mission to Chile, UN, E/CNA/2004/S0/Add.3, ss. 31-40, Nov 
, 003. For further information on the application of special laws to indigenous activists see the report 
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While the legal battles were taking place in Chile and before the Inter American System 
the issue was under the lens of the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur 
on indigenous peoples who criticized the country for its handling of the Pangue-Ralco 
case.76 Chile also received negative reviews from the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights for its treatment of indigenous peoples. On November 26, 
2004, just days after the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the Ancalaf case reaffirmed 
the indigenous leader's prison sentence for his activities in connection with Ralco, and 
after reviewing Chile's first report on the status of economic, social and cultural rights 
under ICESCR, the Committee expressed regret over the existence of unsettled claims in 
connection with indigenous lands and resources and generally urged the country to 
address indigenous issues. 77 
Though Chile managed to complete the project, it was not without significant costs in 
time, resources and reputation. The bright light of the international human rights 
community continues to shine over Chile and its handling of its natural resources. It is 
doubtful that future projects of similar characteristics will be allowed to proceed 
unchallenged. Sovereignty may be permanent, but not at the expense of human rights. 
by Human Rights Watch and the Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas, "Undue 
:rrn""oo" available at: <www.hrw.orglreportsI2004/chilel004/4.htm>. Indigenous groups are also accusing 
government of trying to undermine indigenous rights over traditional lands through an attempt to amend 
17 of the Indigenous Law, regarding the indivisibility of small tracts ofland. "Chile: Consejera 
de CONADI se opone a la subdivision de la tierra,"available at: 
.quechuanetwork.orglnews _ template.cfm?lang=q&news _ id= 1996> 
See: <www.unhchr.ch/indigenous/rapporteur.htm> . 
.. It should be noted that the Committee is the body in charge of implementation of Comment 15 on the 
to Water. UN, CESCR, E/C.12/1/ Add. 105, Nov. 26, 2004. The CESCR also expressed concern 
. the lack of constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples and lack of ratification ofILO 169. 
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B. Colombia's U'wa Peoples 
The case that pitted the U'wa indigenous community against a foreign petroleum 
consortium and the government of Colombia, has received the close attention of the 
International Labour Organization and the international community in general. 
The conflict with the U'wa peoples started in 1992 when a consortium of foreign oil 
companies made up by Occidental and Shell bought petroleum exploration rights to a 
section of the Colombian territory traditionally occupied by the indigenous U'wa 
community. Despite the U'wa's opposition to the project, after implementing a much 
criticized consultation program, the consortium petitioned and obtained the approval of 
the environmental license to conduct seismic operations in the area. The U'wa continued 
to oppose the project and threatened to commit mass suicide in protest for the invasion of 
their lands. Two separate actions were initiated by the Public Defendant on behalf of the 
U'wa demanding the cancellation of the environmental license for lack of compliance 
with the country's domestic laws and particularly international obligations under ILO 
169. While the Superior Court considered that the licence had been issued in violation of 
indigenous rights, the State Council confirmed the validity of the licence under dispute 
arguing that the consultation had proceeded according to existing law, i.e. Decree 1397, 
and Was therefore sufficient. 78 In revising the decision of the Superior Court, the 
State Council rejected the Defendant's motion on the basis that the duty to consult with the 
'''UJ,~en<ous communities did not imply an absolute power to veto projects, but that it sought to arrive at 
with, or obtain the consent of, those communities. 
A. Santiago Reyes, Ecopetrol, "EI Caso Sam ore y la Comunidad U'wa" [on file with the author]. See 
<http://www.minambiente.gov.co/uwa/>. According to ONIC, Colombia's National Organization of 
Peoples, the special relationship of the indigenous peoples with their land warrants consultation 
a project may impact on those lands. Consultation in its view, goes beyond providing information 
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" ___ ~"TT1"" Court agreed with the State Council and ruled in favour of Occidental. In the 
domestic round of litigation, the Constitutional Court determined that consultation 
been insufficient to protect the U'wa's fundamental rights and decided in favour of 
granting a temporary suspension of the licence pending proper consultation.79 
The conflict with the U'wa people played itself beyond the country's borders. 
Dissatisfied with the results obtained at home, in 1997, the U'wa filed a petition before 
the Inter American Commission on Human Rights. Around the same time, a Colombian 
petition for assistance to the OAS resulted in the set up of a special commission made up 
ofDAS and Harvard University professionals. The ~AS/Harvard Commission was 
,\lIHI.U',.,.,,,, with investigating and mediating the conflict. The OAS/Harvard Commission 
a report that called for: 1) an immediate and unconditional declaration from the oil 
comloarnes committing to suspend plans for oil exploration and exploitation in the area; 
advances in the process of titling U'wa lands; 3) moderation of public rhetoric from all 
; 4) recognition and respect for the U'wa system of authority and leadership; and, 
, other measures to promote understanding. Soon thereafter, the Inter American 
7V &&UUJl""JLUU issued a recommendation advising the parties to seek a friendly solution to 
agreeing on how its people will participate as the Government pretends. In ONIC's view, it must 
.. in an authorization from the part of the community and an agreement arrived at from the basis that 
project will not harm the community. Colombia, ONIC, "Sobre el Petr6leo" presentation at the public 
held between the U'wa Peoples and the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Environment and 
of Mines and Energy, Tamaria (Cubani), Boyaca, May 29 of 1997 [on file with the author]. 
<Www.moles.orgluwa/crisis/news.html>. 
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Despite some efforts towards achieving a friendly solution, no progress could be 
achieved. In September 1999, the Ministry of the Environment issued another licence for 
exploratory drilling in the area known as Gibraltar 1. The licence was not issued in 
consultation with the U'wa under the pretext that the area in question was not part of the 
lands officially recognized as U'wa territory.8o Further court proceedings and protests 
ensued. 81 The government of Colombia decided to militarize the area and a series of 
repressive actions were taken. The U'wa and their supporters renewed their efforts before 
domestic courts and petitioned the Inter American Commission for precautionary 
measures to put a halt to the hostilities against the U'wa. 82 
Eventually the international oil consortium dissolved and ended up withdrawing from the 
area. However, the Colombian government, through the state-owned oil company 
Ecopetrol, continued to act upon its determination to produce the oil that might be locked 
under U'wa territory. As a result, in 2001 Colombia was denounced before the 
International Labour Organization for failing to properly regulate and implement its 
duties under Convention 169. Upon investigation, the Organization concluded that the 
process of consultation, as provided for in Colombian law was not consistent with ILO 
169 and requested the government to amend the legislation concerned, and that it 
improve the consultation procedures to come into conformity with the Convention's 
reqUirements. It also asked the government to provide information on a wide range of 
ISSues related to consultations with indigenous peoples when planning and carrying out 
;---------------------
81 ~ee: <www.moles.orgluwa/crisis/chron99-00.html>. 
Be ee: <Www.minambiente.gov.co/uwa/>; <www.ecopetrol.com.co/>; and, M. A. Santiago Reyes, 
~etrol, ".EI Caso Samore y la Comunidad U'wa", supra, note 78. 
e case IS # 11.754. No further information has been released by the Inter American Commission. 
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development projects that affect their land rights, particularly regarding mineral 
exploitation. A further request for information made in 2003 included information on the 
criteria applied in practice for the granting of concessions for extraction and exploration 
in indigenous areas, and reiterates its previous request for information regarding the 
manner in which indigenous peoples participate in the benefits of the exploitation. The 
ILO also insisted that the government of Colombia "adopt all the necessary measures to 
guarantee that the U'wa people benefit from all the rights afforded by the Convention.,,83 
Unable to shake off international attention and scrutiny, the government of Colombia 
responded by asking the ILO' s technical assistance to facilitate consultations with the 
U'wa peoples. In the meantime the resource is not being developed. 
Beyond showcasing a government's powerlessness when human rights issues are 
combined with an active and driven stakeholder group and international attention, the 
case of the U'wa is also demonstrative of the significant impact of another aspect of 
globalization: communication technologies. Through the use of modern communication 
technologies and the media, the U'wa were able to reach and maintain an important 
support network amongst global non-governmental organizations and activists. 84 Their 
--"'VUl'-U efforts have ensured the continued and worldwide visibility of the U'wa's 
plight, have enhanced government accountability in oil and gas decision making and had 
decisive impact on the private oil companies' decision to withdraw from the project. 
ILO, CEACR 2003, 74th. Session, Observations, 
~V1U:SH·.1n orgipublic/db/standards/normes/appUindex.cfm?lang=EN> 
In 1997 The U'wa Defense Project, a coalition ofNGO's, is formed in the US. The coalition is made up 
. the Action Resource Center, Amazon Watch, Center for Justice and International Law, Colombian 
Rights Commission (DC), Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Earth Trust Foundation, Project 
-llUl~r(ho",,_ Rainforest Action Network, and Sol Communications. 
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C. Ecuador: Aguinda v. Texaco/Chevron 
Of all cases concerning natural resources and human rights, Ecuador's Aguinda v. 
Texaco/Chevron and accompanying cases have earned the distinction of being a 
showcase of the human rights community's zeal in pursuing human rights violations in 
connection with natural resources exploitation. 
Since 1993, Aguinda plaintiffs and those of its companion cases in Peru and Ecuador 
have insistently requested the assistance of local and US courts as well as of international 
human rights organizations including the Inter American System on Human Rights,85 the 
UN Commission on Human Rights,86 and the International Commission of Jurists. 87 The 
plight of the South American plaintiffs has also garnered the support and assistance of 
prominent international non governmental organizations (NGOs) and ad hoc activist 
. groups around the globe. Amnesty International, Amazon Watch, the Sierra Club, 
COrpWatch and EarthRights International, to name a few, are part of their support 
In the US, Aguinda and related cases were eventually dismissed in deference to the local 
(forum non convenient). Though this outcome could be hailed as a victory for 
sovereignty, the case continues to attract international attention and 
Indeed, legal battles around oil exploitation, including but not limited to 
See: <www.amazonwatch.orgiamazonlEC/view_news.php?id=1198>. 
See: <chevrontoxico.comlarticle.php?id=300>. 
See: <www.icj.orglnews.php3?id_article=3942&lang=en>. 
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Aguinda, continue to take place on Ecuadorian soil where the many failings of the justice 
. system and the resurgence of governmental hostility against the Aguinda plaintiffs and 
their supporters have opened the door to intervention by the Inter American Commission 
and the Inter American Court on Human Rights. Local government leaders are 
increasingly under international pressure to apply internationally sanctioned rules and 
practices as well as to rectify the situation uncovered in Aguinda. Illustrative of this was 
the reaction of the Ecuadorian Minister of Energy and Mines to a recent decision on 
precautionary measures by the Inter American Commission. The decision was met with 
defiance by the Minister who was prompted to exclaim that "the OAS does not give 
orders [in Ecuador]. ,,88 
Despite the government's posturing, the ripple effects of Aguinda and sister suits can 
already be felt across the country and South America. Community groups inside and 
outside Ecuador,89 backed by a strong international support network, have been 
empowered to stand up to the government and request participation in natural resources 
decision-making and management. Recently, two additional oil concessions in Ecuador 
Were suspended as a result oflocal opposition,90 and local communities have found a 
Powerful ally in responsible investment funds, which are increasing the pressure on 
companies to clean up their act. 91 The repercussions of their activities might prompt state 
decision makers into injecting transparency and accountability to their performance in 
See: EarthRights International, "Achuar Nation Wins Landmark Agreement to Stop Toxic Contamination 
Lands" (24 October 2006), available at: <www.earthrights.org/campaignfeature/achuarwin.html>. 
EarthRights International, id; Amazon Watch, Ecuador Report (14 August 2006), available at: 
.amazonwatch.org/amazonlEC/view _ news.php?id=1198>. 
See: EarthRights International, id. 
See e.g.: <www.bostoncommonasset.com/newslburlington-amazon.html> . 
120 
natural resources management in order to project an image that is attractive to investors 
and assuages companies' worries about increased shareholder activism. Local and global 
stakeholders stand fast to guide governments in this aspect of their exercise of permanent 
sovereignty, to monitor their performance and to press for changes where necessary. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most remarkable transformation of the principle of sovereignty over 
natural resources that can be noted through the analysis of the law and work of the human 
rights bodies and tribunals dealt with in this chapter is that the principle's application is 
now beginning to stretch beyond the protection of collective rights as represented by the 
state. While the rights to self-determination and development provided the original basis 
for the collective claim to sovereignty over natural resources during decolonization and 
independence, individual human rights as interpreted by international and regional human 
rights bodies can be seen to operate a distribution of the attributes (risks and benefits) of 
sovereignty over natural resources among the individuals populating the states. 
Past decisions on resource use and allocation, including the distribution of risk and 
benefit, were the exclusive domain of government bureaucrats. That can seldom be said 
to be the case today. Largely as a result of international developments, stakeholder 
participation is increasingly a feature of resource decision-making processes. In the 
Americas, absent participation and any other requisites to ensure that the well being 
derived from resource use is widespread and that the full enjoyment of human rights is 
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guaranteed, human rights bodies, particularly the organs of the Inter American System 
and the ILO, are not shy about interfering with a state's sovereign rights over resources . 
.In addition, US courts may be leading a trend, -soon to be followed by other countries-,92 
in their increasing willingness to intervene in natural resource-related cases when human 
rights are at stake. Thus, the application of human rights' law to natural resources' issues 
seems to be taking the next most logical step in the area of international natural resources 
law: from equality amongst states to equality amongst individuals within states, in the 
enjoyment of the benefits derived from the use and possession of natural resources.93 
Notwithstanding some substantial progress towards ensuring equitable management of 
natural resources for the benefit and well being of all prompted by human rights law, a 
disturbing fact remains. In the great majority of the cases to date, the strength of the 
individual claims, petitions, findings and resolutions lies in the protection owed to 
indigenous peoples as a group. Indeed, of late, indigenous peoples and their cause 
command such attention and have such a presence in the international arena that their 
claims cannot be easily ignored.94 However laudable the attention and protection afforded 
to this group might be, indigenous peoples do not necessarily represent all of a country's 
>I'W''''',",,",_ not even all the poor and marginalized peoples. One cannot help but to wonder 
Whether the human rights' community would be equally bold about interfering with 
, permanent sovereignty over natural resources when indigenous peoples' issues are 
Though in a different kind of cases, Spanish and Belgian courts are two, very active, examples. 
An equitable distribution of benefits assumes an equally equitable distribution of risks. 
For and excellent account of the historical treatment of indigenous rights to land and resources see: A. 
"Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Determination" (2005) 16 Colo. 1. Int'l Envtl. L.& Pol'y 
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Also alarming is the transnational corporations' perseverance in defending and 
perpetuating reprehensible corporate practices in the developing world. It becomes more 
worrisome in light of the fact that the states' responses to human rights' tribunals' 
recommendations and decisions are often slow or practically non-existent.95 
An example is a recent US initiative to sell public lands, including Western Shoshone lands. See press 
from U.S. Representative Nick Rahall, 5 Nov. 2005, 
.house.gov/apps/listipress/iiOO _ democratslbudgetmininglaw.html>. On the progress made by 
a year after the Court's decision, see J.P. Vuotto, "Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: International 
for Indigenous Land Rights?" 22 B.U. Int'l L.1. 219; regarding Chile and Ra\co see: CASO p_ 
7-02 - MERCEDES JULIA HUENTEAO Y OTRAS V. CHILE, INFORME SOBRE EST ADO DEL 
DE SOLUCION AMISTOSA, 14 de octubre de 2004, available at 
. igenas.cl/Observatorio/documentos/ralko _271 004.htm>; and L.K. Barrera-Hernandez, 
--'''''''lIlll"" Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: Chile's Mapuche Peoples and the 
to Water" (Spring 2005) XI Golden Gate Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law. 
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CHAPTER V 
Natural Resources and International Environmental Law: Another Brick in the Wall 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the legal community has seen the rapid proliferation of 
international environmental law. Indeed, some sources estimate in over four hundred the 
number of international environmental agreements, half of which have been introduced 
over the last 25 years. I From the early days of bilateral, single resource protection 
agreements, environmental treaties have evolved to become complex webs of objectives 
and commitments covering entire ecosystems and regions, or, increasingly, the entire 
, world. Though treaties signify a country's willingness to bow to international law and 
,ww ... v .... vs, the sheer number of commitments and obligations that they embody land 
~~ ... ~~ ... , resource administrators in an intricate labyrinth of legal requirements and 
that added up can significantly curtail their freedom of action. In addition, 
•• ... ".v •• " for some international environmental agreements may have unexpected 
over natural resources management in the developing world, an impact that is 
now starting to become evident. 
British Columbia Guide to Watershed Law and Planning, available at: 
.orglissues!waterlbcgwlp!s3.shtml>; Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators 
Database, available at: <sedac.ciesin.columbia.eduientriitreatyTexts.jsp>. 
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Adding to the voluntary written commitments embodied in treaties, international custom 
" and principles have also evolved to incorporate the main environmental law tenets.2 To 
top things off, environmental law has evolved from being reactive to proactive, thus 
. forcing a shift in decision-makers' and administrators' attention from post-decision 
management of environmental issues to preventing and mitigating impacts at the 
planning stages of resource development and management. 
Unlike local environmental norms, where the duty to abide by environmental rules is 
owed to the local people, the duty to respect international environmental law in domestic 
decisions on resource management is owed to the international community. Non-
compliance has international repercussions. While in the dawn of the environmental 
movement low levels of environmental awareness coupled with relatively slow 
communications determined that in most cases repercussions were negligible, nowadays, 
they can be significant. Global warming is a case in point, with the remaining recalcitrant 
countries increasingly the subject of pressure and criticism. In South America, an 
example of this shift in attitudes is provided by the current conflict between Argentina 
and Uruguay over the establishment of two paper mills on the Uruguayan margin of a 
watercourse. For decades, the shores on both sides have seen the establishment of 
and other undertakings with no major repercussions on either side of the river. 
, today the new paper mill projects are being fiercely opposed by the Argentine 
and authorities on environmental grounds. The otherwise cordial relations between 
38 of Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates primary international law sources as 
treaties, custom and principles of international law; <www.icj-
.org/icjwww libas icdocuments/ibasictextlibasicstatute .htm#CHAPTER _II> . 
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both countries are at an all time low, and the case is a matter of discussion at the 
headquarters of the World Bank and the Peace Palace in The Hague. 
The following sections survey the extent to which natural resource management decisions 
are increasingly constrained by current international environmental law. The analysis will 
focus on three core substantive principles of international environmental law: 1) 
intergenerational equity; 2) good neighbourliness; and, 3) fair and equitable utilization of 
shared resources.3 It will show that although some of these principles may be embodied 
in environmental and resource-related agreements voluntarily entered into by states, their 
existence and operative-ness is independent from them and is unaffected by seemingly 
conflicting principles of international environmental law. Whether treaty, custom or 
principle-based, their impact on a country's natural resources management practices and 
rules is increasing, particularly in the developing world. Finally, through the specific 
example of the Climate Change agreements, this section will illustrate the extent to which 
even voluntary undertakings may have far reaching, though scarcely discussed, 
Sovereignty -eroding effects. 
the more established principles are dealt with. Others, like the precautionary principle or sustainable 
may have similar sovereignty-abrogating effects. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRINCIPLES 
A. Intergenerational Equity 
Intergenerational equity is a principle that can be easily and directly linked to 
natural resources management. It refers to the ability of future generations to enjoy and 
benefit from the earth's natural endowments in the same or as similar as possible a 
manner as present ones. Corollary of this ability is the present generations' duty to 
protect and conserve the environment and resources. 
Several international environmental agreements refer to this principle. As early as 1972, 
The Stockholm Declaration, Principle 1, affirmed that: "Man ... bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
generations." Most importantly, Principle 2 states: 
The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora 
and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, 
must be safeguardedfor the benefit of present and future generations 
through careful planning or management, as appropriate. 4 
O-"'~''''''VUUl equity is also the cornerstone of sustainable development as defined by 
~nVI'rr}17m'7Y1t and Development subjects the right to development to the developmental 
Declaration a/the United Nation Conference on the Human Environment, available at: 
orgIDocuments.multilinguaIlDefault.asp?DocumentID=97 &Artic1eID= 1503>. 
--'UUUIC development was defmed by the Commission as: "development that meets the needs of the 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." World 
c .... ulsslf'n on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
1987) at 43, The concept has been criticized as vague or pro-development, and is the subject of much 
Contra: G. Mayeda, "Where Should Johannesburg Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to 
'-, 1·~E~"aIlIP Development in the Context ofIntemational Environmental Law" (Winter 2004) 15 Colo. J. 
nvtl. L. & Pol'y 29. 
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and environmental needs of not just present but of future generations.6 In addition, 
.. beyond the soft law treaties referred to, intergenerational equity fonnulations can be 
found in many other environmental agreements. Examples are the 1979 London Ocean 
Dumping Convention,7 the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species,8 and the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage. 9 
In 1996, the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of 
Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
reaffirmed the status of the principle as a source of international law by stating that: 
[TJhe rights offuture generations have passed the stage when they were 
merely an embryonic right struggling for recognition. They have woven 
themselves into international law through major treaties, through juristic 
opinion and through general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations. 
[TJhis Court wouldfail in its trust ifit did not take serious note of the 
ways in which the distant future is protected by present law. The ideals of 
the United Nations Charter do not limit themselves to the present, for they 
lookforward to the promotion of social progress and better standards of 
life, and they fix their vision, not only on the present, but on "succeeding 
generations". 10 
3 ; <www.unep.orgiDocuments.multilinguallDefault.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticIeID= 1163>. 
at: <www.londonconvention.org>. 
at: <www.cites.org>. 
at: <whc.unesco.orglpg.cfin>. 
AdVisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, <www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/icases/iunanliunanframe.htm>. See also 
of22 September 1995 (NZ v. France); <www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/icases/inzfr/inzfrframe.htm>. 
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concept of intergenerational equity formulated and developed in international fora, 
and currently part of the catalogue of principles that serve as sources of international 
environmental law, has a direct impact on domestic decision-making. One could ask, 
however, how this principle translates into legal imperatives when it is not spelled out in 
the specific norms and commitments of an international agreement. Perhaps no other 
scholar has devoted as much attention to the subject as Professor Edith Brown Weiss. Her 
teachings might be of assistance in finding an answer. 
Professor Weiss argues that "we are part of the natural system and that we hold the global 
environment in common with past, present and future generations of the human species. 
We have both rights to use it for our own benefit and obligations to care for it for our 
generation and future generations."ll According to her writings, three types of obligations 
may be derived from the principle: 
1. diversity conservation; 
2. environmental quality conservation and enhancement; and, 
3. equitable access to natural resources. l2 
One difficulty that arises in the implementation of those duties is that of the legal 
representation of future generations. Who can legitimately speak for or bring a claim in 
name of unborn generations? While Judge Weeramantry in the Advisory Opinion found 
E. Brown Weiss, "The Rise or the Fall ofInternational Law?" (Nov. 2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 345, at 
Some contend that the same requirements apply to environmental protection for present generations; the 
,.·-->q",I.IIH1 is considered moot. D.B. Gatmaytan, "The Illusion ofIntergenerational Equity: Oposa v. 
as Pyrrhic Victory" (2003) 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 457; P.A. Barresi, "Beyond Fairness to 
Generations: An Intragenerational Alternative to Intergenerational Equity in the International 
~nVlll'onmental Arena" (Winter 1997) II Tul. Envt'l L.J. 59. 
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no impediment in placing that burden squarely on the states, the issue could become more 
contentious at the municipal level. This difficulty was overcome in the case of A. Oposa 
etal v. F. Factoran decided by the Philippines' Supreme Court in 1993. 
The Oposa case was brought to the courts by a group of children and their parents who, in 
the name of their own generation and those to come, sued the state's administration 
demanding cancellation of existing logging licenses and an indefinite moratorium of 
logging activities in the Philippine rain forest. In granting them standing to sue in a class 
action the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed that: 
This case ... has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert 
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We 
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their 
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their 
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be 
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the 
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned Such a right, as 
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature. " 
... Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to 
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced 
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their 
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the 
performance of their oblif!ation to ensure the protection of that right for 
h . J1 t e generatIOns to come. 
recognizing the right to a sound environment as sufficient grounds to bring action, the 
;~Urlrf'n-\", Court based the petitioners' standing on a duty to preserve that right for future 
lenl'r"ti" ..... 14 The decision has been celebrated outside the Philippines as a significant 
Philippines, Supreme Court, G.R. No. 101083 July 30,1993, available at: 
.Iawphil.net/judjuris/juri 1993/juI1993/gr_1 0 1 083 _I 993.html>. 
The case is grounded on a substantive right to the environment. The right is far from being universally 
l30 
advance in the development of environmental law, 15 and is already being used to gain 
access to the courts in other jurisdictions. 16 
Although the direct impact of the intergenerational equity principle on current municipal 
practices may be limited, the day may not be far off when a country is taken to an 
international court for failing to take into account future generations in its management of 
a natural resource. Unlike other principles that order neighbour relations or the use of 
shared (sovereignty) resources, intergenerational equity-based complaints could be 
legitimately launched from anywhere around the world. How long will it be before the 
issue finds its way into some international adjudicatory forum? In fact, the tiny island-
state of Tuvalu has already threatened to take action before the IeJ against the United 
States and other polluter countries for failing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 17 The weak 
environmental record of most South American countries makes them easy targets for this 
of action. The fact that they host the largest share of the remaining global 
versity resources is also a magnet for intergenerational equity based concerns and 
"~""UF;",.,.18 Deforestation in the Amazon, for example, is a constant target of 
Ul:nnatlional campaigning and petitions. 19 It comes as no surprise then that Brazil, for 
See e.g.: M.S.z. Manguiat and V.P.B. Yu III, "Maximizing the Value ofOposa v. Factoran" (2003) 15 
Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 487; UNDP, Human Development Report 2000 Background Paper, A. Dias, 
Rights, Environment and Development: With Special Emphasis on Corporate Accountability" 
at: <hdr. undp.orgldocs/publicationslbackground ---'papers/Dias2000 .html>. Some authors contend 
recourse to intergenerational equity as a means to access environmental protection is unnecessary and 
in so far as the same result can be achieved by purporting to protect the environment for 
generations. See e.g.: D.B. Gatmaytan, supra, note 12; P.A. Barresi, supra, note 12. 
: Farooque v. Bangladesh cited in M.S.Z. Manguiat and V.P.B. Yu III, supra, note 15 at 494. 
Jacobs, "Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United States 
International Court of Justice" (January 2005) 14 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol'y J. 103. 
Nations Environment Programme, Global Environmental Outlook 2000, 
87.htm>. 
Greenpeace, "Soya traders agree to a moratorium on Amazon deforestation following customer 
(July 25,2006), available at: <http://www.greenpeace.orglintemational/press/releases/soya· 
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example, has already moved to review its policies and efforts to enhance the protection of 
its share of the Amazonian forest. 2o 
B. Good Neighbourliness 
The good neighbour principle, or the obligation not to cause trans boundary harm, 
made its environmental debut21 in a case concerning pollution damages caused in the US 
by a smelter located in Canada. The case, know as the Trail Smelter case,22 was awarded 
by a special treaty-made arbitral tribunal. The tribunal found that according to 
international law, 
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence?3 
The rule, later incorporated to the Stockholm Declaration under Principle 21 and into 
.•. other international agreements,24 is nowadays accepted as customary internationallaw.25 
traders-agree-to-a-morato>. See also: D. Howden, "BRAZIL: Eating the Amazon: The fight to curb 
Corporate destruction" (July 17,2006), available at: <www.corpwatch.org/articie.php?id=13908>.Asin 
Tuvalu's case, deforestation in the Amazon basin could be brought to the ICJ's attention by an island or 
low lying state that finds that it adds to and accelerates the effects of global warming thereby escalating 
threats to its existence. 
20 Mongobay.com, "Brazil Takes Action to Slow Amazon Rainforest Loss" 
~rainforests.mongabay .com!amazonlexternal_ nov04.html>. 
· E.L. Hughes et aI, Environmental Law and Policy, 3rd • ed., (Toronto, Canada: Emond Montgomery 
· Publications Ltd., 2003). The same principle in a non-environmental context was applied in the ICJ's 
· ~ecision in the Corfu Channel Case, (UK v. Albania), 1949 I.C,}. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
United States v. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal, Montreal 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941; United Nations 
~eports of International Arbitral Awards 3 (1947) 1905. 
/dat 1965. 
E.g.: 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; 1997 UN Watercourse Convention; UN GA Res. 
~281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50, art. 30. 
The United States courts, for example, have referred to its incorporation in the Rio Declaration on 
· EnVironment and Development as evidence of state practice in Aguinda v Texaco. (1996) US Dist. LEXIS 
16884 (SDNY 12 November 1996). The US had previously renounced the doctrine supporting absolute 
· territorial sovereignty over natural resources originating solely within one state known as the Harmon 
goctrine. L. Waldron Davis, "Reversing the Flow: International Law and Chinese Hydropower 
· evelopment on the Headwaters of the Mekong River" (Summer 2006) 19 N.Y. Int'! L. Rev. 1. 
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It recognizes a state's sovereign right to exploit its natural resources while subjecting it to 
"the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
. d' t' ,,26 JUrIS IC IOn. 
Although the corollary rules on state liability for transboundary harm are highly context-
dependant and remain unsettled,27 states are nevertheless obliged under customary 
intemationallaw to take steps to ensure that natural resources' activities within their 
territories do not cause unacceptable harm to its neighbours.28 Applying due diligence to 
assess and avoid transboundary harm will always be a requirement limiting a state's 
options in the management of its natural resources. Failure to take specific assessment, 
avoidance or mitigation measures and to regulate accordingly would be a breach of a 
country's international environmental law obligations. In some cases, the costs of 
litigating potential breaches could be such that the benefits of a resource undertaking that 
does not abide by the good neighbour principle could be entirely wiped OUt.29 
One author argues that the principle was already inherently a part of the principle of permanent 
Sovereignty. See: F.X. Perrez, "The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" and the Obligation 
~ot to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage" (Winter 1996) 26 Envt'l L. 1187 . 
. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), 
PrinCiple 21. Note that Principle 21 dropped the "serious consequence" standard of the Trail Smelter case. 
~WWw.unep.org/Documents.multilinguallDefault.asp?DocumentID=97 &ArticleID= 1503>. 
See discussion on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited 
under international law in the website of the International Law Commission, available at: 
<untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9.htm>. See also: A.E. Boyle, "Globalising Environmental Liability: The 
~~terplay of National and International Law" (2005) 171. Envtl. L. 3. 
One author suggests that the Trail Smelter precedent implies an obligation to negotiate and arbitrate 
disputes. M.T. Delcomyn, "Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Oil: Canadian and Gwich'in Indian Legal 
~esponses to 1002 Area Development" (Summer 2004) 24 N. III. U.L. Rev. 789 . 
. See e.g.: M.T. Delcomyn, id, referring to the litigation that may follow a US decision to open up a 
Wildlife sanctuary in Alaska to oil development and concluding that the litigation costs may spoil the 
. e~onomics of the decision. If such is the case with US and Canada regarding oil exploitation, a similar 
SItuation in SA could be potentially ruinous. Already, the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay referred 
to above has ramped up a significant bill and prejudiced the economies of both countries. 
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C. Reasonable and Equitable Use of Shared Resources 
Shared resources are those straddling more than one country,30 like a body of 
water along the boundary lines of two countries or a mineral deposit that stretches on 
either side of those lines. They are different from the global commons in that countries 
can and do have legitimate sovereignty claims over them. On the contrary, the global 
commons are the "common heritage of mankind" or res communis, i.e. no sovereign 
rights to the resources are recognized by the community of states which shares the 
resources in common.3 ) While some resources, like biodiversity, have been labeled a 
"common interest of mankind," that designation does not interfere with sovereign rights 
over the resources it applies to. On the contrary, the coining of the phrase reflects 
developing countries' zeal in retaining their sovereign rights over local resources, which, 
like biodiversity, have such value and potential that the whole world has a stake in their 
preservation and use, and would like to see them catalogued as "global commons. ,,32 
Art 3 of the 1974 Charter 0/ Economic Rights and Duties 0/States33 imposes on 
countries a duty to cooperate and consult regarding the use of shared natural resources to 
avoid damages to the legitimate interests of their counterparts. The inclusion of this duty 
in the Charter, following a motion by Argentina, was not welcome by some developing 
, countries, most prominently Brazil. According to that country, the provision could only 
apply to shared sovereignty resources, such as boundary rivers, but not to the part of a 
Straddling fish stocks move from coastal waters to the high seas and are shared by several fishing 
. Some examples of global commons are: deep sea beds, the atmosphere and outer space. 
J. Schwartz, 'Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know': How Kyoto May Change Who Controls 
(2006) 14 N.Y.U. Envt'l L.J. 42l. 
GA Res. 3281 (xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50. 
134 
shared resource that is entirely within a state's territory where application of the good 
neighbourliness principle (duty to avoid trans boundary harm), wherever relevant, was 
seen to suffice. The contrary, according to that country, would render pennanent 
sovereignty devoid of any content. 34 Despite opposition, the principle is now an 
established rule of customary international law that requires countries to ensure that their 
use of a shared resource is both reasonable and equitable.35 It's application, however, is 
highly context-dependant and has led to the subscription of a myriad of multilateral 
agreements of specific application to the numerous existing shared resources.36 Fish 
stocks and bodies ofwater,37 typical examples of shared resources, are the subject of the 
vast majority of multilateral agreements.38 In fact, it was a water-related agreement: the 
1966 International Law Association's Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers that codified the principle for the first time.39 The Helsinki Rules 
provided a set of criteria to detennine compliance with the principle in relation to 
34 M. Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law, 2nd• Edition, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 
35 E. Hughes et aI, supra, note 21. Contra: S. Upadhye, "The International Watercourse: An Exploitable 
Recourse for a Developing Nation Under International Law?" (Spring 2000) 8 Cardozo 1. Int'l & Compo L. 
61. 
36 A.T. Wolf, "Criteria for equitable allocations: The heart of international water conflict" (February 1999) 
V. 23:1, Natural Resources Forum, 3. 
37 The world's 263 international river basins cover almost half of the surface of the earth. Some 145 
.. are classified as riparian to these transboundary basins, and about 45% of the world's population 
·lives in internationally shared river basins. Over 50% of the available surface water is located in 
~ansboundary basins. Program, World Water Week, Aug. 20-26, 2006, <www.worldwaterweek.orgl>. 
Report of the 52nd . Conference (August 1966). Similar principles are contained in the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (not in force); (1997) 
, vol. 36 International Legal Materials 703. The International Law Commission is currently working on rules 
for shared underground resources that are not covered by the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses. FoIlowing a recommendation by the Special Rapporteur, 
the ILC concentrated its efforts on groundwater (aquifers) while voicing its firm reluctance to deal with the 
of oil and gas, "whose problems were of a different nature and which were usually addressed 
diplomatic and legal processes." Report of the ILC Shared Resources Workgroup Chairman, E . 
. to the Fifty-eighth General Assembly, Press Release, GAlLl3242, 03/1112003, 
.un.orginewslPress/docs/2003/gaJ3243.doc.htm>. For additional information on the ILC's work on 
resources see: <www.un.orgilaw/iIc/>. The ILA has also issued the Seoul Rules on International 
!WUunawal'erS, <www.internationalwaterlaw.orgllntlDocs/Seoul_Rules.htm>. Most agreements are specific 
certain countries and resources. 
Available at: <www.internationalwaterlaw.orgiIntlDocslHelsinki_Rules.htm>. 
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navigable watercourses. Nowadays, current advances in knowledge and environmental 
awareness have determined that much larger "baskets" of resources such as watersheds 
and entire ecosystems are increasingly the focus of this legal principle and its 
codification. 
Equity and reasonableness in the management of shared natural resources are hard to 
define in abstract. 4o At a minimum, the principle embodies a state's right to fair 
development of shared resources and a duty to consult and to negotiate in good faith.41 
These obligations were highlighted by the arbitral tribunal deciding the 1956 Lac Lanoux 
case between Spain and France. 42 The case, often cited as the landmark decision on 
equitable and reasonable access, dealt with France's intention to divert the waters of a 
40 Both the Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Convention provide some guidance. The UN Convention, art. 
6.1 lists factors that are relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization as including: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural 
character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse 
States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(t) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the 
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use. 
~untreaty. un.org/i\c/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8 _3 _1997 .pdf>. 
For example, Art. 63 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), dealing with 
shared stocks of living resources states: 
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks 
without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part. 
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive 
economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the 
States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area. 
~WWW.un.orgidepts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/partS.htm>. 
D DNEP, Compendium of Judicial Decisions on Matters Pertaining to the Environment. International 
eCisions, Vol. I, December 1998. 
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watercourse shared with in Spain. The waters would be used for hydroelectricity 
generation and later returned to their course which flows into Spain. The works were to 
take place entirely in French territory. The dispute was decided in the context of the 1866 
Treaty of Bayonne between France and Spain. Striking a balance between the rights of 
both states, the tribunal's award rej~cted France's claim of absolute sovereignty while 
negating Spain's right to veto reasonable upstream development in France. It found that 
"the upstream State has a right of initiative ... provided it takes into account in a 
reasonable manner the interest of the downstream State.,,43 
According to some scholars, particularly those that specialize in water resources, the 
practical application of this principle of intemationallaw traditionally favours pre-
existing, (mostly commercial), uses.44 However, equity and reasonableness may be 
evolving to include a less utilitarian, development-oriented approach to management of 
shared resources. This shift is reflected in the ICJ's decision in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project case.45 
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case resulted from the implementation of an investment 
treaty between Slovakia and Hungary to develop a shared section of the Danube for 
and other purposes. While Slovakia dutifully complied with its 
tments, Hungary stalled and eventually renounced the treaty on the basis of its 
"->"U<1£11 to cause negative environmental and economic impacts. Subsequently, Slovakia 
Cited in A.T. Wolf, supra, note 36. 
• A.D. Tarlock, "Safeguarding International River Ecosystems in Times of Scarcity" (Spring 2000) 3 U . 
. Water 1. Rev. 231; A.T. Wolf, supra, note 36. 
IC], <www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketlihs/ihsframe.htm>. 
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implemented an alternative development plan, unilaterally assuming control of the 
resource. According to A. D. Tarlock, a well reputed scholar in the area, in confirming 
the validity of the investment treaty and insisting on a negotiated outcome, the ICJ's 
decision: 
firmly establishes that international rivers are shared resources subject to 
the principle of equitable apportionment and that all riparian states have 
equal rights to enjoy both the commodity and non-commodity ecological 
benefits of the river, hydrologically connected groundwater, and the 
riparian corridors . ... the opinion integrates the merging norms of 
international environmental protection and the law of international 
watercourses into the law of treaties and water management, clearly 
establishing that the doctrine of equitable apportionment is the grundnorm 
[sic] of international water law. 46 
Though referring specifically to water resources, the case affirms that equity and 
reasonableness in the use of shared resources now requires striking a balance amongst the 
environmental, social and economic factors implicated in resource management 
· decisions. Indeed, while the sole motivation behind early shared resource agreements was 
to maximize and optimize consumptive uses,47 -for which conservation was a necessary 
premise-, increasingly, modem treaty making and interpretation includes a preoccupation 
ecosystem integrity and sustainability. This shift, however, is neither complete nor 
· fast as exemplified by the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
46 
. A.D. Tarlock, supra, note 44, at 245. Judge Weeramantry's separate opinion is also significant. In it, he 
· highlights the importance of balancing developmental and environmental considerations and embraces the 
· notion of sustainable development as a principle with "normative value" in intemationallaw. ICJ, Separate 
~pinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, <www.icj-
· cIJ.org/icjwww/idocketlihs/ihsjudgementlihs_ijudgment_970925_ frame.htm>. In 1998 Slovakia requested 
an additional Judgment mandating Hungary to implement the Court's decision. 
E. g.: UNCLOS, Art. 62: 
The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 
61 imposes on coastal states a duty to take conservation measures to maintain "maximum sustainable 
" <www.un.orgldepts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm> . 
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a/International Watercourses which continues to subordinate ecosystem sustainability to 
optimum use. Eventually, the principle of equitable and reasonable use could fully evolve 
into that of equitable and reasonable management to better accommodate the adaptability 
requirements of ecosystem protection and (sustainable) development. 48 In the end, the 
duty to consult and negotiate attached to reasonable and equitable use may make joint 
management, as proposed by the Ie] in the Slovakia-Hungary dispute, an increasingly 
common feature of shared resources regimes and a requirement of international 
environmentallaw.49 
D. A Note on Procedural Principles 
As may be concluded from the discussion above, the operation of all three 
intemationallaw principles: intergenerational equity, good neighbourliness and equitable 
. and reasonable use, rests on the effective implementation of indispensable procedural 
mechanisms. Access to information, participation and justice are part and parcel to the 
implementation of the substantive principles reviewed. The adoption by states of tools 
that implement those principles is a fundamental step towards achieving full compliance 
: with the requirements of international environmental law. 
A.D. Tarlock, supra, note 44. 
Numerous joint management regimes are currently operative under multilateral treaties. One example is 
Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission to manage fish stocks in the Barents Sea. For more 
on the Commission see: 
fnLno/projects/norwegian _russian_fisheries _ commission.html>. In the case of shared water 
it would be interesting to find out if seasonal water transfers across borders may trigger the 
of GA TT rules under WTO resulting in an obligation to open bulk water trade generally. 
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3. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT. 
CLIMATE CHANGE: OFF THE HOOK OR GRAPPLING FOR AIR? 
A. The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities as 
Sovereignty's Shield 
Despite the entrenchment of the legal principles of intergenerational equity, good 
neighbourliness and equitable and reasonable use in international law, the emergence of 
some novel principles such as "common but differentiated responsibilities" and, possibly, 
"sustainable development" emphasizing, among others, the idea of growth as necessary 
to combat poverty-derived environmental deterioration, may cast some doubt as to their 
applicability to developing nations. The issue can be easily illustrated with reference to 
the international legal framework to combat climate change. 
Among the instruments adopted for signature at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment 
Development was the text of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC - the Convention).50 The Convention, an agreement to curb emissions 
of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) responsible for climate change, entered into force in 
. Shortly afterwards, the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol), designed to reinforce the 
tments made in the Convention through the inclusion of measurable emission 
··--·"Ul'\,;Ul targets, was adopted in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. 51 
(1992) I.L.M. 849; <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>. 
On. Doc. FCCCICPI19971L.7/Add.I; 
backgroundlkyoto yrotocollbackgroundlitemsl13 51. php>. Opened for signature in 
; in force since February 2005. 
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Under the Convention, developed (Annex I) countries, committed to cutting their 
emissions of greenhouse gases to the levels of 1990 by the year 2000. Developing 
countries (Annex II Parties), including all of South America, were not bound by that 
target. Rather, they were expected to achieve the Convention's goals through a series of 
house-keeping activities including the preparation of GHG inventories and national 
mitigation plans. The commitments of the Convention were hardened in the Kyoto 
Protocol, where developing countries adopted legally binding reduction targets to be 
achieved by the years 2008-2012. Collectively, those commitments amount to an average 
reduction of six greenhouse gases by 5.2 per cent. No quantitative reductions were 
included for developing countries in Kyoto. 
Climate change is one of the most talked about and hotly debated environmental issues of 
the day. Its complexity, implications and scale is such that it is easier to blame it on the 
neighbours than to take steps to address it. In fact, developing countries have prompted 
the codification of this "blame thy neighbour" approach into environmental international 
law as the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities." And blame they can. 
Indeed, to continue with the example of greenhouse gases, there is no dearth of data and 
studies to demonstrate that while the unwanted pollution originates mostly in the more 
developed areas of the world, -which also carry a commeasurable share of historical 
responsibility for the current state of the global environment and climate-, their 
Consequences can be felt (more or less) equally throughout the globe. Similar arguments 
can be made about other shared environmental goods such as the ozone layer, etc. As a 
result, while the North enjoys the benefits of development, and even though developing 
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countries may eventually catch up in terms of their contribution to atmospheric pollution, 
today, as in the past, the burden of development's effects is on the poor and undeveloped . 
. The commitments undertaken in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the subsequent Kyoto Protocol are premised on exactly that idea.52 
It could be argued that this principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
provides developing countries of the world, including South American countries, with an 
escape mechanism to exempt them from following international environmental law 
principles owed to the international community as the ones discussed in the beginning of 
this chapter. The argument appears to be true at least in relation to climate change, where 
common but differentiated responsibilities have been specifically codified in the 
international agreements. 53 But the issue is not that simple. Let's examine Tuvalu's threat 
to the US and others in a different context. 54 Can Venezuela, a developing non-Annex I 
country but South America's top greenhouse gas emitter, remain indifferent to the fate of 
low-lying Uruguay under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities?55 
What about neighbouring Guyana?56 
Air and climatic conditions are a shared resource. While it is true that greenhouse gas 
abatement measures, such as forest protection from clear-cutting and setting stringent air 
'2 Stone questions why "should the fight against poverty extend to making poverty a defense against laws 
. against pollution?" C.D. Stone, "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law" (April 
.. t004) 98 Am. J. Int'I L. 276 at 293. 
Interpretations ofthe notion of "sustainable development" that emphasize the developmental angle seem 
~ underscore this conclusion. 
s, See footnote 17 above and related text. 
D. Erosa, "Uruguay y el cambio cliImltico," 
~WWw.uruguayambiental.comJarticulos/ErosaUruguayCambioClimatico.html>. 
Guyana is a low-lying state with 90% of its population living on the coastal strip. See Guyana's National 
Communication to the Climate Change Secretariat, available at : <www.unfccc.int>. 
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quality and emission standards, may not be immediately required of South American 
states under the climate change agreements, the same may not be true under the 
principles of international environmental law reviewed above. Under those principles, 
Venezuela is at least partly responsible for the dire consequences of climate change on 
every other member of the international community of states, including Uruguay and 
Guyana. Allowing a country like Venezuela to take no action while blaming climate 
change exclusively on the bigger polluters turns this vital issue into a meaningless game 
of charades. 57 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities cannot and 
does not trample the other fundamental contributions of environmental law to the 
protection of the global environment.58 Though perhaps fragile and often criticized,59 the 
climate change instruments strike a balance among the need to curb overall emissions, 
historical responsibilities and sustainable growth. This is done through an agreement on a 
shared objective and through setting differentiated commitments as well as through 
provisions on financial and technology transfer. While the differentiated commitments 
allow countries to adjust the abatement objective to their own pace and circumstances, 
the latter (transfer) mechanisms attempt to level the playing field of historical 
responsibilities through a North/South transfer of knowledge and wealth. It is hoped and 
expected that while the most resourceful countries move to curb their emissions 
immediately, the new resources available to the rest will facilitate that development be 
57 
When pressured to ratify Kyoto, Venezuela responded by requesting compensation for future forgone 
natural resources development. India and China took a similar approach in the negotiations concerning the 
~8epletion of the ozone layer. C.D. Stone, supra, note 52. 
A.C. Dowling, '''Un-Locke-ing' a 'Just Right' Environmental Regime: Overcoming the Three Bears of 
. International Environmentalism - Sovereignty, Locke and Compensation" (Spring 2002) Wm. & Mary 
~nvtl. Law and Pol'y Rev. 891. 
While some criticize the agreements for failing to account for and mitigate future growth of emissions in 
developing countries, particularly China, India and Brazil, others find the technology transfer and funding 
provisions ineffective and a poor means of redress for the disproportionate pollution burden carried by the 
developed world. Additionally, developed country contributions are found to be chronically in arrears. 
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in a less environmentally destructive manner. At the end of the day, the 
·«'filmdamemaI message comes out loud and clear: good neighbours should change their 
> harmful ways to avoid future harm and respond for the harm caused to others in the past, 
and all must ensure that present and future use of air is done in a reasonable and equitable 
manner for the benefit of present and future generation. As signaled by Tuvalu's threat, 
rather than starting from a clean slate, the climate change agreements reaffirm and 
enshrine pre-existing principles of international law. The apportionment of 
responsibilities and obligations contained therein help define specific expectations and 
outcomes but does not do away with customary and other international law principles 
which continue to apply beyond and despite the written agreements. Accordingly, 
developing state parties are fully accountable to the climate change bodies in charge of 
verifying compliance with UNFCC-Kyoto commitments and to the entire international 
community for any breach of general international environmental law. Should Venezuela 
fail to live up to its specific duties under the agreement, Uruguay, -and even developed 
country parties to the UNFCCC-, will be able to request whatever sanctions may be 
applicable under the Convention. Its neighbour, Guyana, may be in a better position to 
ask for direct reparation under customary international law provided there is 
.. demonstrable damage and causation is clear. Also under customary law, renegade states 
remain accountable to the community of nations for their contribution to the climate 
change problem. Natural resources should be managed accordingly . 
. Notwithstanding the above,per se, the developing nations' commitments under the 
DNpccc and the Kyoto Protocol may not be enough to significantly impinge on those 
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states' sovereign rights over natural resources. Sovereignty, however, is very much at 
stake in the operation of the clean development mechanism (CDM). 
B. CDM and Sovereignty 
To assist Annex I countries in achieving their abatement goals, the UNFCCC 
encouraged collaboration among parties to find flexible, cost effective measures to cut 
overall emissions. That led to the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of three "flexibility" 
mechanisms: emissions trading (art. 17), joint implementation (art. 6) and the clean 
development mechanism or CDM (art. 12). Of the three mechanisms, the CDM is 
particularly relevant to developing countries and the management of their natural 
resources. 60 
Under article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, setting the basis for the CDM, developed 
countries are allowed to demonstrate compliance with their Kyoto targets through 
funding the implementation of GHG abatement projects in developing countries. Through 
the successful implementation of a COM project, the sponsoring developed country 
(itself or through private investors) can accrue Certified Emission Reduction credits 
(CERs) which it can apply towards demonstrating compliance with its obligations under 
the Protocol. The credits are deducted from the actual emissions of the sponsoring party 
. during the commitment period.61 The rationale behind the mechanism is that it is easier 
. and a more efficient use of resources (cheaper) to invest in greenhouse gas abatement in 
60 
61 The other two mechanisms cannot apply to developing countries. 
, Decision l7/CP.7, Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 
12 ofthe Kyoto Protocol; <unfccc.intiresource/docs/cop7113a02.pdf#page=20>. 
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the developing world than it is in the developed countries.62 Also, as potential hosts of 
CDM projects, developing countries of South America that are parties to the Convention 
and the Protocol are faced with a considerable opportunity to attract new foreign 
investments. As discussed below, these investments are subject to strict international 
rules that will run the fate of all CDM projects well beyond their completion date, locking 
in the projects' natural resource base while subjecting it to the authority of an 
international body. 
For the CERs of any particular developing country to be an attractive investment, their 
integrity as veritable abatement credits needs to be irrefutable. 63 For that reason, the 
UNFCCC-Kyoto authorities have developed a sophisticated third-party certification 
procedure and oversight mechanism dedicated to guaranteeing their worth. The 
procedure, overseen by the CDM Executive Board, consists of several steps: validation, 
registration, verification, certification and monitoring. For an eligible project to be 
registered with the CDM Board, an independent third party or "Operational Entity," must 
validate its compliance with the requirements of the CDM as defined by the Meeting of 
the Parties in the Marrakech Accords.64 
62 
At the time that Kyoto was being negotiated, the reduction cost of a ton of C02 in the developed world 
Was estimated to be in the US$50-100 range, while it was calculated at about US$ 30 in developing 
COuntries. Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy and Environmental Law in Latin 
America, (Quito, Ecuador: OLADE, 2000). The flexibility mechanisms have been criticized for allowing 
developed countries to reap the "low hanging fruit" while leaving host countries to pick up the higher cost 
. Zf second generation abatement measures in the future. 
Environmental Defense Position Paper, "Clean Development Mechanism Rules of Procedure: Standards 
for the Executive Board and Operational Entities" (January 11,2002), available at: 
~Www.environmentaldefense.org!documents/606 _ CDM _ ethics. PDF>. 
Decision 17/CP7, <cdm.unfccc.intiReference/COPMOP/decisions_17 _ CP.7.pdf.>. 
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According to the rules laid down in Marrakech, once a project is registered, including 
acceptance by the host country and approval of the baseline and monitoring 
methodologies, the project may proceed. Throughout the project's life an Operational 
Entity is in charge of verifying, through periodic review and monitoring, the effective 
reductions in anthropogenic emissions that have occurred as a result of the CDM project 
activity. Certification is the written assurance by the designated Operational Entity that, 
during a specified time period, a project activity achieved the reductions in emissions as 
verified. Issuance of the certified emission reduction credits, or CERs, follows the 
submission in good order of a certification report.65 Projects may be undertaken for a 
fixed crediting period of ten years or for up to three periods of seven years (renewable 
crediting period).66 Sink projects (afforestation and reforestation) have a longer duration 
of30 years (fixed) or 20 years, renewable twice (up to 60 years).67 
A result of the implementation of CDM rules is that once a project is approved by the 
national CDM authority the host country's ability to control the project or the resources it 
utilizes is significantly curtailed. On one hand, the resources involved will be locked in 
for the duration of the project, sometimes up to 60 years (renewable period sink projects), 
regardless of any changes in the country's circumstances or needs. For example, if a sink 
project stands in the way of any other land use project, including exploitation of valuable 
sub-surface resources that may require forest clearing, the new land use would have to be 
65 
66 Decision 17/CP7, <cdm.unfccc.intiReference/COPMOP/decisions _17 _ CP. 7.pdt>. 
Decision 3/CMP.I, para 49, <cdm.unfccc.intiReference/COPMOP/08aO l.pdf#page=6>. See also: CDM 
~Iossary, <cdm.unfccc.intiEBlMeetings/007/eb7ra04.pdt>. 
Decision 5/CMP.I, para 23, <cdm.unfccc.intiReference/COPMOP/08aO l.pdf#page=6>. 
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put on hold through the duration of the project's certification period, and even beyond. 68 
Similarly, the water demanded by a hydroelectricity project will not be readily available 
for other uses. Arguably, locking-in resources is a common feature of all long term 
development projects. In those cases expropriation, cancellation or non-renewal of 
permits and the like always remain a state's prerogative in the public interest. It is 
doubtful, however, that a state may be willing to make use of such controversial 
prerogatives after agreeing to host a CDM project. The repercussions of such a measure 
would stretch far beyond any impact on the project's owner exposing the frailty of the 
system in place and shaking the foundations of global efforts to combat climate change. 
Taken from a different angle, CDM rules require the host country to confirm that a 
proposed project contributes to sustainable development in that country. Host country 
CDM project acceptance and approval is by the national CDM authority which functions 
as an investment promotion agency. A country is not required to produce any evidence to 
prove that a project fits the country's long-term sustainable development plan, or that it 
even has such a plan. As a result, for example, the sum of individually approved CDM 
projects in a country may end up defining the development matrix of that country with 
little intervention, planning or control by the natural resources, environmental and other 
relevant local (non-CDM) authorities.69 Whether the end result is sustainable or not, may 
be owed more to luck than to deliberate and concerted state action. Thus, South American 
-----------------------68 
Harvesting is allowed if re-planting is to follow (no change in land-use). Even iflegally possible, once 
~e new forest is in place, public activism may hinder or impede changes in land use. Decision 17/CP.7, 
p odalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto 
69rotocol; <unfccc. int/resource/docs/cop7 /l3a02. pdf#page=20>. 
Ironically, developing countries' unfettered ability to certify the sustainability of a project rests on 
sOVereignty arguments. 
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countries' traditional lack of long term planning paired with foreign investor and 
developed country pressure could result in a development matrix that may not reflect the 
best interests of those countries in the long term. Even in those cases like Argentina, for 
example, where the lack of official policy guidance on eligible CDM projects is said to be 
deliberate, sovereignty is injeopardy.7o Whether Argentina's position is the result of 
careful consideration or is a cover up for the country's deficient development planning 
ability and thirst for investment, the end result is a handover of development decisions to 
foreign investors and international CDM authorities. 71 
The above is aggravated by the fact that a country's national CDM authority does not 
have the last word on the acceptability of a project. That function is reserved to the 
international CDM Executive Board. The Executive Board wiIl accept or reject a project 
based on its own interpretation of the CDM rules, rules which have been often criticized 
as ambiguous and open to significantly different readings.72 A system of project-by-
project approval by an international authority, driven by international interests and 
.. According to Argentine officials, the evolving nature of sustainable development requires flexibility. For 
reason, they argue, the quality rather than the type of project is what determines eligibility. L. Barrera-
lemlimclez, "Argentina, Climate Change and the Clean Development Mechanism" (March 2006) 3 
!''''IIlCl[IOnal Energy Law and Taxation Review 77. 
Even in countries with a more solid policy making and long-term planning tradition, like Brazil and 
project choice may be more determined by the need to attract investment than any other factor. 
energy projects, for example, a preference for hydroelectricity projects is already evident, followed 
by biogas. However, some authors warn about the potential stress on food supplies and agricultural 
derived from a significant increase in demand for energy crops which, in turn, may require more 
of wetlands and forest land into arable land. Beyond being counter-productive in terms of 
alleviation, GHG abatement and environmental protection in general, the loss of wetlands and 
cover that may result from unplanned energy development could have a detrimental impact on 
production through the disruption of natural water flow regimes. UNFCCC, CDM, 
, Jim Cook and Jan Beyea, National Audubon Society, "An Analysis of the 
'!IVlrOnmelrltal Impacts of Energy Crops in the USA: Methodologies, Conclusions and Recommendations" 
at: <www.panix.com/-jimcookldataiec-workshop.html>; 
• .futurepundit.com!archives/cat energy biomass.html>. 
J. Schwartz, supra, note 32. - -
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developed country investors, that rests on the weak environmental protection and natural 
resources development planning capacity of developing country authorities and their 
. pressing need for investment and technology, does not bode well for permanent 
sovereignty. Also, throughout the duration of its life under the CDM (certification 
period), a project is subject to CDM rules and is ultimately under the control of the 
UNFCCC-CDM authorities through the verification and certification procedures. 
Although the Operational Entity is intended to act as an independent third party, it is 
chosen by the project developer, -generally a developed country or a developed country 
investor-, and responds to the CDM Board, not the host country. 73 
Finally, by transferring the burden of abatement from the developed to the developing 
world, CDM projects in effect curtail the developing nations' freedom to use air for their 
own advancement or, in other words, reduce their ability to pollute for the sake of 
development. In the future, developing countries will find themselves literally grappling 
for air. 74 Because the most cost-effective abatement measures have already been 
implemented through CDM projects, sustainable development will become significantly 
more expensive and increasingly beyond the developing world's (independent) reach, 
perpetuating the cycle ofNorthiSouth domination.75 
J. Schwartz, id. 
. E. Richman, "Emissions Trading and the Development Critique: Exposing the Threat to Developing 
(Fall 2003) 36 N.Y.UJ. Int'I Law and Pol'y 113. Contra: Stone, arguing that the ability to 
with targets through financing projects in the developing world is a more efficient approach to 
warming, while equity and welfare goals should be pursued independently. C.D. Stone, supra, note 
. New technology transfers will likely be necessary at a point where they will no longer be free. 
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4. CASE STUDY 
A. Paper Wars: Argentina v. Uruguay 
Argentina and Uruguay are separated by the second largest water basin in South 
America which in the section that borders both countries comprises the Uruguay and 
Plata rivers. Over the last few years, Uruguay's decision to authorize construction and 
operation of two pulp mills on the margins of the Uruguay River sparked an international 
conflict that disturbed the once placid relations between Argentina and Uruguay. The 
conflict has been sharply brought to the public's attention by local activists who protested 
Uruguay's initiative by blocking important international routes connecting the two 
countries. 76 Commercial transportation and tourism was significantly impacted and the 
conflict quickly escalated, with governments on each margin hurling accusations and 
threats at each other. Though Uruguay and the private investors, the Finnish Botnia 
.. Corporation and Spain's ENCE, swore by their environmental impact assessments and 
environmentally sound technology, local residents and environmental organizations 
argued that the water quality and the general environment would be severely impacted by 
the planned industrial development posing a threat to health and life in the area. In tum, 
the government of Argentina denounced Uruguay for failing to abide by the terms of a 
1975 bilateral treaty concerning shared management of the Uruguay River. 77 
Argentine protesters have the support of several local communities and environmental activists in 
Drago, "ARGENTINA-URUGUAY: Pulp Mill Conflict Takes on International Dimension" Interpress 
Service Agency, <ipsnews.netlnews.asp?idnews=32277>. See also the Preliminary Proceedings 
the IC], <www.icj-cij.orgJicjwww/idocketiiauliauframe.htm>. 
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The 1975 Uruguay River Statute (the Statute), Articles 7-12, impose a duty on any 
country planning to undertake any works that might impact on navigation, the river's 
flow or water quality, to communicate its plans to ajoint administrative commission: 
"CARU.,,78 The Commission is charged with assessing if the proposed project could have 
a determinable (from the original in Spanish "sensible") impact on the other country. In 
that case, or if the Commission does not reach a determination within the time specified 
in the Statute, further notification to the potentially impacted country is required. Any 
objections and issues that cannot be dealt with through CARU, or by direct negotiation 
between the countries, can be put before the International Court of Justice for a 
decision.79 The other set of applicable rules, Uruguay's regulations on environmental 
impact assessment and approval, provide administrators only scant general guidelines and 
make no reference to transboundary issues. 8o 
There is no evidence on record of notification and of any opportunity to comment on the 
proposal provided to Argentina or CARU before approval.8) The steps prescribed by the 
international Statute were only undertaken after Uruguay had approved the private 
. undertakings and its plans had hit the radar of public opinion. By that time, the issue had 
become politicized and there was very little room for good faith negotiations as 
78 
See: <caru.org.uy/publicaciones/publicacionesPDFs/The-River-Uruguay-executive-commission-
.. ~ruguay-Paysandu. pdt>. 
Arg., Ley 21413, Estatuto del Rio Uruguay, available at: 
~WWw. frep lata. orgl documentos/archivoslDocumentos _ Freplata!in ventario/Inventario%2 0 Frep lata! AR _sec 
~lon%201I.2/A.II.2.L.5.pdt>. 
According to one commentator, the general nature of the regulations allowed administrators to defer 
authorization to the operations phase rather than construction. G. Honty, "Papeleras: la dificultad de 
. la incertidumbre" 
.uruguayambiental.com/articuloslHontyPapelerasManejarIncertidumbre.html>. 
The process is documented in the website of Uruguay's Environmental Authority, 
.dinama.gub.uy>. 
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. prescribed by the equitable and reasonable use principle of international law. The 
involvement of the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's private 
lending arm, with a rather questionable environmental track record, and the finding by 
the institution's Ombudsman that the IFC had failed to apply due diligence in connection 
with the environmental and social impacts of the project,82 did not help. Predictably, the 
negotiations prompted by the public outcry and the ensuing international sparring contest 
failed. The case is now before the ICJ.83 
The case was brought to the ICJ by Argentina in May of 2006. In the first place, the 
country asked for provisional measures ordering Uruguay to: 1) suspend the 
construction's authorizations and halt building work pending a final decision by the 
Court; 2) to co-operate with Argentina to protect and preserve the aquatic environment of 
the river; 3) to refrain from taking any further unilateral action with respect to the 
construction of the paper mills; and, 4) to refrain from any other action which might 
. aggravate the dispute or render its settlement more difficult. 
The ICJ did not find sufficient evidence to justify an injunction on the authorization or 
the actual construction of the mills. It also relied upon Uruguay's promise to abide by the 
.. Statute and to cooperate to deny the rest of the measures requested. In doing so, the Court 
82 Report on the Activities of the IFC/MIGA Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), June 2005 - May 
2006, available at: <www.cao-ombudsman.orglhtml-
englishidocumentslCODEReportontheActivitiesoftheCA02005-2006_9May06-FINAL.pdt>. See also: 
Fundaci6n Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, "Caso Papeleras a La Haya: Se Profundiza la 
. "available at: <www.cedha.org.ar/es/comunicados_de-prensalgo.php?id=69>. 
"Proceedings instituted by Argentina (Argentina v. Uruguay), May 4,2006, <www.icj-
cIJ.orglicjwww/idocketiiauliauframe.htm>. Other petitioners presented the case before the Organization of 
American States and the OECD. See: J.D. Taillant, "Using human rights tribunal to force Bank compliance: 
paper mill," available at: <www.brettonwoodsproject.orglarticle.shtml?cmd[126]=x-126-
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. reaffirmed "the importance of the need to ensure environmental protection of shared 
natural resources while allowingfor sustainable economic development, and ... the need 
to safeguard the continued conservation of the river environment and of the rights of 
economic development of the riparian States.,,84 The Court further urged the parties to 
fulfil their obligations under international law and highlighted the importance and 
usefulness of the "progressive" management regime set up under the 1975 Statute for 
achieving that balance, requiring the parties to implement in good faith the consultation 
and co-operation procedures provided for therein. 
The Court makes it clear, however, that, in proceeding with the 
authorization and construction of the mills, Uruguay necessarily bears all 
risks relating to any finding on the merits that the Court might later make. 
It points out that their construction at the current site cannot be deemed to 
create a fait accompli because, as the Court has had occasion to 
emphasize, "if it is established that the construction of works involves an 
infringement of a legal right, the possibility cannot and should not be 
excluded a priori of a judicial finding that such works must not be 
continued or must be modified or dismantled".85 
Although what the IC] decides about the substance of this case is yet to be seen, given the 
case's history of failed attempts at reconciling Uruguay's and Argentina's positions, it 
by the joint management body or for negotiation between the two countries. Failing any 
. last minute solution, the power to decide on the management of the Uruguay River in this 
, case is placed squarely on the ICJ. Ultimately, the Court will have to decide if Uruguay's 
proposal qualifies as equitable and reasonable use of the Uruguay River. While at it, it 
Will have to weigh in intergenerational equity issues as well as the country's obligation to 
84 
PUlp Mills on the River Uruguay, (Argentina v. Uruguay), Request for the indication of provisional 
~easures, Summary of the Order of 13 July 2006, <www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketliauliauframe.htm>. 
,. Id. 
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abstain from causing harm to its neighbour. The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities will have little to do with the dispute. 
Further stressing the fact that the final decision on the management of the Uruguay River 
is no longer in the hands of either state, most attention is now placed on the World 
Bank's decision on funding, now tied to the findings of the institution's new impact 
assessment and to Uruguay's receptiveness to the changes and requirements proposed 
therein. 86 Also contributing to the countries' powerlessness is the unprecedented level of 
activism surrounding the case that has galvanized communities and NGOs on both sides 
of the border against the mills.87 In fact, giving in to public pressure, one of the private 
investors, ENCE, has already announced its decision to change the placement of the mill 
to another location. 88 Thus, the case's impact may stretch beyond the resource in 
question, spilling over to the country's land use planning and management. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Though treaty making implies a voluntary renunciation of sovereign power in 
exchange for some good derived from common compliance, at times, its consequences 
86 
Arg., La Nad6n, "Levantaron el corte en GualeguaychU" Oct. 16,2006, 
<WWw.lanacion.com.ar/849768>; Halifax Initiative, "Bank funding on hold as pulp mills spark conflict 
Argentina and Uruguay," available at: <www.haIifaxinitiative.org/index.phplIssue_UpdateI768>; 
atch, "Uruguay: New Report May Show Way Ahead in Paper Mill Dispute," available at: 
.corpwatch.org/article.php?id= 13485>. 
Corp Watch, "Uruguay: Pulp Factions: Environmentalists v. Big Paper," available at: 
.corpwatch.org/article.php?id= 13111 >. 
R.euters Foundation, AlertNet, "Spanish firm says to move Uruguay paper factory" (21 Sept. 2006), 
at: <www.alertnet.orgithenews/newsdeskIN21396510.htm>. 
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can stretch far beyond what state negotiators intended. On the other hand, the reach of 
international environmental law stretches beyond treaty law to customs and principles 
with strong implications for municipal natural resource management. In addition, like in 
the case of the CDM mechanism, developing countries' weak environmental and general 
planning capabilities combined with their chronic need of investment often open the door 
to strong global players which can take over important resource management functions. 
Whether the result of deliberate state action or not, current international environmental 
law is an increasingly important source of limitations to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.89 In addition, the level of environmental awareness under the current 
conditions of globalization is such that any limitations placed by the law are reinforced in 
practice by local and global activism. 
89 
Unfortunately, it is also one where the historical domination of the South by the North stilI plays out. 
This conclusion would support the argument that environmental protection is elitist. According to this 
argument, the elite already got what it wants at the environment's expense and forces protection on what is 
left at the expense of the less advantaged. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion: A Balancing Act 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"Our post-war institutions were built for an inter-national world, but we now live 
in a global world. " 
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General' 
Throughout the case studies reviewed in the previous chapters we have seen 
international norms and practices come in direct contact with local realities. Although the 
cases differ substantially, they all illustrate the leverage of international forces over 
domestic resource management to the point where one can conclude that permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources is dramatically affected. 
The chapters also provided good evidence of the difficulties encountered by local 
authorities when faced with international requirements and expectations in areas like 
trade, foreign investment, human rights and environmental protection. They also shine 
some light on the contradictions that surface when attempting to decipher and implement 
the mandate of the international community. International law and institutions send out a 
mixed message. Their discourse is often conflictive. While human rights and 
environmental law and practice strive to impose a balance amongst economic, social and 
~--------------------
Quoted in J.H. Jackson, "Sovereignty-Modem: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept" (October 
2003) 97 Am. J. Int'J L. 782 at 787. 
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environmental factors, trade and investment law and practice, throw that message out the 
window of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes under the 
watchful eye of the WTO. Indeed, on the one hand, some institutions and their rules are 
unequivocal in saying that development cannot proceed at a pace and in a manner that 
trumps human rights and environmental balance. On the other hand, those institutions 
concerned with trade and foreign investment see in economic development a cure to all 
global ills regardless of some "temporary" imbalances. The faster development takes 
place, the sooner that human rights, including environmental balance, will be realized.2 
Globalization's mixed message is exacerbated in the makings and work of international 
tribunals, with WTO and ICSID at the top of the list of most powerful global 
adjudicators, while the ICl, the Inter American System's bodies and the rest remain at a 
considerable, powerless distance.3 Individual states and their constituents are caught 
somewhere in between. 
2. STATES AT THE CROSSROADS 
South American resource managers are supplied with a good arsenal of local 
.. policy, law and regulatory tools to respond to the increasing demands of the globalized 
scenario upon which they are required to perform. However, frequently molded by 
2 
D.A. Kysar, "Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance" (June 2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 
2109 3 • 
D. Barnhizer, "Waking from SustainabiIity's 'Impossible Dream': The Decisionmaking Realities of 
ess and Government" (Summer 2006) 18 Geo. Int'I Envtl. L. Rev. 595. 
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international players and hailed as the last cry in normative development, these 
guidelines, norms and practices have failed to conform and adapt to local realities or 
simply and typically have not produced the desired results in terms of delivering well 
being. 
A survey of the laws and regulations of South American countries reveals that all have 
adopted some form of environmental and social impact assessment tool for managing 
natural resources development. Quantity, quality and technical pollution standards are 
also common, as are economic mechanisms to deal with impacts of varied sorts. 
Stakeholder participation and access to information laws and regulations are a more 
recent addition to the legal landscape of South American resources' management; some 
countries are even experimenting with benefit distribution legislation.4 Though with 
varying degrees of (in)effectiveness, in all cases the combined operation of these tools is 
quite far from delivering the widespread well being that could be expected in resource-
rich countries.s 
Most authors point at weak enforcement as the source of this failure. 6 Though it is true 
. that enforcement is wanting, it is doubtful that it can be made entirely responsible for the 
4 As part of a previous research project, the author conducted a full survey and comparative analysis of 
environmental and natural resources statutes of26 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Research 
results may be found in: L. Barrera-Hernandez and A Lucas, eds., Energy and Environmental Law in Latin 
Jfm'eri{~n and the Caribbean: Legislative inventory and Analysis (Quito, Ecuador: OLADE, June 2000). 
World Bank, "World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development" (Sept. 2006), available at: 
<econ.worldbank.org/WBSITEIEXTERNALlEXTDECIEXTRESEARCHlEXTWDRSIEXTWDR200610"c 
~ntentMDK:205 86898-pagePK:64167689-piPK:64167673-theSitePK:4 77642,00.html>. 
L.K. Barrera-Hernandez and AR. Lucas, Environmental Policy and Legislation/or the Energy Sector in 
Latin America & The Caribbean: Tool Kit (Quito: OLADE, June 2000); M. Paquin and C. Sbert, Unisfera 
. International Centre, "Towards Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Latin America 
. and the Caribbean" (November 2004), available at: 
<WWw.unisfera.org/IMG/pdflNew_approaches_to _ environmentatprotection_ vfinale3 _ ajout _. pdf>. 
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failure of local natural resources' development management to produce its share of well 
being. Those that point at governance issues as a whole,7 may be closer to providing an 
answer. But the governance issues that stand in the way of achieving widespread well 
being are not circumscribed to local matters. Rather, the fact that states are no longer the 
single rule-makers and drivers of domestic resource management and that the law has 
failed to keep up with this reality has a lot to do with it. 
After the irruption of transnational corporations (TNCs)8 as powerful global players with 
the ability to direct government decision-making, the classical divisions of the law into 
municipal and international, public and private, no longer reflect the type of interaction 
that is common in the world today.9 States' failure to deliver well being in connection 
with natural resources' management is as much a function of local governance issues and 
their supporting law and policy framework, as it is of international ones. Both local and 
international governance mechanisms and practices need to be revised, adapted and 
enhanced to respond to the challenges of globalization. 
What this study attempted to do was to shine some light onto the manner in which the 
transformation of the law and legal practice under the phenomenon of globalization 
7 Governance is defined as the traditions, institutions, and processes that determine how citizens are given a 
Voice and how decisions are made on issues of public concern. See e.g.: R. Dufresne, "The Opacity of Oil: pi! Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law" 36 N.Y.D.1.Int'1 L. & Pol. 331. 
TNCs are hereby defined quite broadly as a business enterprise where one unit has the ability to impact 
the operations and movement of another unit located abroad, whatever the legal form, and whether units are 
taI<en collectively or individually. 
In 1956 P. Jessup coined the term "transnational law" to designate an amalgam of principles of domestic 
and international law regulating actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Prof. S. Sucharitkul uses 
, the term "community law" to designate a system that is international as well as domestic. S. Sucharitkul, 
"I nternational Law and International Relations in a Pluriform World" Cleveringa Inaugural Lecture, 
,Rijksuniversiteit Te Leiden, Leiden 24 November 1989, at 25. See also: P. Schiff Berman, "From 
International Law to Law and Globalization" (2005)43 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 485; and, M.K. Addo, 
"B uman Rights Perspectives of Corporate Groups" 37 Conn. L. Rev. 667. 
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affects natural resources' management regardless of where those resources are placed: 
inside or outside traditional state boundaries or somewhere in between. The case studies 
have demonstrated how developing states are often tom between their legal duties to their 
constituents, their lenders, trade partners, investors and the international community. At 
the end of the day, the states' inability to respond to these conflicting duties send them 
into recurring crisis pushing them further away from any gains in well being. 10 
A. Private Property Protection as Dominant Paradigm 
Under the current, Western style world order the rule of law privileges property 
rights to the detriment of the peoples' well being. 11 It is a logical consequence of a 
governance system whose traditions, institutions and processes are rooted in the 
protection of private property. This is sharply brought into view by the phenomenon of 
globalization: those with the most economic power have the last word in deciding what 
the law is and how it is implemented . 
.. Though international bodies and tribunals eventually pick up the flag of human rights and 
environmental protection, they face tough competition in the form of international trade 
and investment adjudicators with real and substantive enforcement power. On the other 
hand, while TNes are able to sue and stake millionaire claims against states, they cannot 
be held accountable on the same terms and conditions for their participation or 
Contribution to human rights violations, environmental deterioration and related abuses. 12 
10 
M. McFarland Sanchez-Moreno and T. Higgins, "No Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the 
.u.e,,·T\·, '" of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Bolivia" 27 Fordham Int'I L.J. 1663. 
D. Barnhizer, supra, note 3. 
M. McFarland Sanchez-Moreno and T. Higgins, supra, note 10. 
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Much in the same way, rich-country dominated IFls dictate the contents of law and 
policy reform in developing countries but do not own up to their failures even though 
they continue to demand regular loan payments and interest. At the end ofthe day, ''pure 
power prevails;" 13 resource-rich developing states and their populations lose. 
Humanity has managed to supplant the law of the jungle with the law of supply and 
demand. It is high time that powerful economic stakeholders start taking up the 
responsibilities that come with the benefits of calling the shots in developing countries. 
Law and legal scholars can make a significant contribution. 
Below, the author advances some ideas on legal tools that may serve to tip the balance of 
what is today a much eschewed playing field, and help to achieve a more equitable 
outcome in the development and management of natural resources. 
3. OLD AND NEW TOOLS 
When devising or recasting legal tools to counter the loss of sovereign power over 
natural resources and a state's inability to advance the well being of its general populace, 
Qne should ask: 1) where the lost power is now located, and, 2) how best to address the 
resulting imbalance. Regarding the first question, despite the important surge in public 
activism, now, as ever, it is quite clear that power is where the money is. The difference 
introduced by globalization is that home states are no longer in full control ofTNCs. 
----------------------)3 
J.R Jackson, supra, note 1, at 801. 
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"The notion of citizenship for a corporation is jluid,,,14 allowing it to accumulate power 
while escaping accountability. Corporate power is now unfettered power. Corporate 
transnational entities, with the assistance of their home states and IFI backers, have been 
instrumental in shaping the current legal scenario. 
In what concerns the second question posed, i.e. how best to address the resulting 
imbalance, it would be old school to propose that power should devolve back to the state 
and its organs. However, for a variety of reasons that range from local corruption to 
international extortion, developing states, particularly South American states, have 
demonstrated their inability to cope with the challenges posed by globalization in 
fulfilling their mandate of procuring widespread well being within their borders. 
Could one turn to the international arena for help? Unfortunately, the solution does not 
seem to reside there. As illustrated by the case studies of the previous chapters, 
international institutions working in the human rights and environmental protection field 
are no match for their corporate-dominated counterparts in the trade and investment area, 
far better equipped legally and factually to force and enforce their will. The result is the 
prioritization of economic interests and gains over a balanced approach that is truly 
development oriented as understood in this study. 
In attempting to implement a more balanced playing field, perhaps one should turn 
towards those that have the power in the first place and to those that want change the 
. 14 
T. O'Neill, "Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its Implications for Democracy and 
I-Iuman Rights in the Developing World" (Spring 2006) 17 Colo. 1. Int'! Envtl. L. & Pol'y 357 at 376. 
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most: TNCs and the public. Some national and global approaches to shifting the balance 
of power are advanced below. The task, however, is not easy and exposes global 
leadership's powerlessness to rein in corporate greed as evidenced by over a decade of 
paying lip-service to "corporate social responsibility" as explained below. 
A. Decentred Regulation: Codes of Conduct and International Voluntary 
Standards for Non-State Actors 
It is a broadly shared view among corporate social responsibility advocates and 
business leaders that given the power of transnational corporations vis a vis developing 
(and also developed) countries and their administrations,15 businesses should fill in the 
gap left by governments through the consistent application of best practices and standards 
to minimize and mitigate the negative impacts of their activities while enhancing 
corporate accountability. 16 Supporters of this view also argue that even in those 
developing countries that have achieved a certain level of administrative sophistication 
and enforcement capability, governments will be inclined to favour investors, their home 
Countries, and their IFI backers as a means to attract more business and to stay in the 
IFIs' good books. 17 Governments may also have a vested interest in lowering costs to 
IS 
In a paper written in 2002 D. Shelton reported that "the assets of the three wealthiest individuals in the 
World is more than the combined gross national product of all least developed countries, while the annual 
. sales of one transnational corporation exceeds the combined gross domestic product of Chile, Costa Rica, 
and Ecuador. D. Shelton, "Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World" (Spring 2002) 25 B.C. Int'l & 
Compo L. Rev. 273 at 279. Similar data can be found on the website of the International Finance 
~Orporation, <www.ifc.org>. 
D. Kinley and J. Tadaki, "From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for 
Corporations at International Law" (Summer 2004) 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 931; M. McFarland Sanchez-Moreno 
T. Higgins, supra, note 10; D. Shelton, id. 
D. Shelton, supra, note 15; R. Dufresne, supra, note 7. The same reasons are given to shift responsibility 
achieving minimum standards to IFIs and to justify IFI safeguard policies. 
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businesses as a means of maximizing revenues from taxes or from their own participation 
in economic activities. Also, it is argued, businesses know best how and where they can 
improve their performance while remaining competitive and contributing to a "healthy 
economy." Indeed, any industry-based efforts in the direction of filling the regulatory and 
enforcement gap created by cash-strapped, powerless, unwilling, or incapable 
administrators, and particularly those efforts that focus on the social and environmental 
impacts of industrial activities, could have a significant beneficial impact on general well 
being. The resulting attempts at achieving corporate restraint through business' 
cooperation have come to be known as decentred regulation and include voluntary 
measures and self regulation. 18 Unfortunately, as will be seen below, experience shows 
that TNCs are hardly moved by moral or ethical arguments. 
Reacting to industry'S arguments and prompted by a desire to transform TNCs worldwide 
into law abiding global citizens, once again, the international community responded by 
offering a menu of codes of conduct and voluntary sets of rules to guide businesses in the 
pursuit of their exploits. Some industries and sectors have also come up with their own 
decentred schemes for natural resources production and management,19 contributing their 
own two cents to the growing number of voluntary norms and codes. Among them, those 
schemes that are meant to work across the globe may stand a better chance of success 
. than local ones. Because corporations are wary about being undercut by their 
18 
See: B. Barton, "The Theoretical Context of Regulation" in B. Barton et ai, eds., Regulating Energy and 
~atural Resources (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2006) 11. 
The Canadian Chemicals Producers Association, was among the first business associations to adopt 
guidelines. For further information, see, CCPA, Responsible Care Program, available at: 
.ccpa.calResponsibleCarel>. The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers followed suit. See: 
<WWw.capp.caldefault.asp?V_DOC_ID=5>. 
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competitors, they are more likely to spend money in compliance if the chances that the 
competition will take similar steps are considerable.2o However, even in those cases, the 
results have generally been disappointing. 
One of the first international initiatives of this kind resulted in the 1997-2000 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (GECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. 2I The OECD Guidelines are a set of voluntary, non-binding 
rules to guide corporations in defining their own codes of practice and procedures with 
regards to a variety of issues. They are quite general in nature and aim to strengthen 
relationships between governments, TNCs and the societies in which they operate. The 
foreword to the 2000 revised version condenses the often cited arguments in favour of 
global standards. It is also quite remarkable in that it strongly implies that global 
standards should be modeled around those that have the approval of the 33 OECD 
nations, i.e.: capital-exporting countries' government-backed standards. The foreword 
reads: 
The revised Guidelines will be an important instrument for shaping 
globalisation. They provide a government-backed standard of good 
corporate conduct that will help to level the playing field between 
competitors in the international market place. They will also be a standard 
that corporations themselves can use to demonstrate that they are indeed 
important agents of positive change throughout the developing as well as 
the developed world. 22 
. 20 
. The internationalization doctrine calls for the universal incorporation into local laws of all established 
Wdustry norms and practices that could be considered part of international economic law. 
22 Available at: <www.oecd.orgldataoecdl56/36/1922428.pdf>. 
h The whole document is strikingly revealing of this neo-colonial attitude. Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
ave already expressed their adherence; <www.oecd.orgldataoecdl56/36/1922428.pdf>. 
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As far as their specific impact on natural resources management is concerned, the 
Guidelines stipulate rules for proper environmental management, including adoption of 
the precautionary principle, and stress efficiency in the use of natural resources. They 
also encourage respect for human rights, information disclosure and sustainable 
development. However, the Guidelines may be too general to have any significant impact 
on a TNCs' performance and general well being. That is also the case of the much 
criticized Global Compact sponsored by the United Nations. 
The Global Compact, launched by the UN in 2000, is a call to businesses to embrace a 
set of ten principles regarding human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. 
The principles are general statements of value and provide no guidance as to 
implementation. Their adoption is voluntary and no enforcement mechanism is provided. 
Businesses that adhere to the Compact have a right to use the Compact's logo identifying 
them as participants. The ability to display the UN's "seal of approval" and the fact that 
the compact's principles are so undeniably basic that blatant non-compliance would 
constitute an aberration, have led many to say that the Compact represents a sell-off of 
the UN to business.23 
A stronger step in the same direction was the adoption by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights of Norms on the responsibilities o/transnational corporations and other business 
. enterprises with regard to human rights in August of 2003.24 Despite their general nature, 
23 
For a collection of essays that illustrates this view, see: Public Policy Forum, available at: 
~WWw.globalpolicy.orgireform/indxbiz.htm>; and, Corp Watch, available at: <www.corpwatch.org>. 
E/CNAISub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003. 
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and the fact that they are not yet binding,25 it is important to highlight that the Norms 
subject TNCs to the direct application of international law. However, the Norms are 
criticized by some that see in their enunciation a relaxation of what are already 
international duties binding on TNCs.26 Notwithstanding their flaws, the Norms represent 
a significant step towards recognizing that the states are not the only medium for 
internalizing important legal mandates reflecting basic ethical principles. Further 
reinforcing their value is the fact that despite their draft status and controversial nature, 
the UN has already taken action towards defining international standards and best 
practices under the Norms. 27 
Finally, recurring to international standards issued by an authoritative and independent 
standard-setting body is also a popular decentred alternative to the point that some such 
standards have been incorporated, by reference, into domestic regulations.28 Whether 
standardized rules have an impact on natural resources management and the resulting 
well being or not, depends on the set of rules and how they are implemented by TNCs. 
The more detailed the rules, the higher the probability of having any real impact. 
, 25 The Commission, in its decision 2004/1 16 of20 April 2004, expressed the view that while the Norms 
~ontained "useful elements and ideas" for its consideration, as a draft the proposal had no legal standing. 
6 B. Stephens, "The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights" (2002) 20 
~erkeley J. Int'l L. 45. 
E/CNAI2005/L.87, 15 April 2005. The Norms could interfere and curtail a state's range of action in 
Illanaging its natural resources anytime those actions conflict with the relevant intemationallaw as applied 
by TNCs. Conf.: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the responsibilities 
of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights. E/CNA12005/91, 
JsS February 2005. 
In that way, states are farming out tasks that they are under a legal duty to perform. 
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Although there are a myriad of standardized rules,29 perhaps the most widely used ones 
are those sanctioned by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
ISO is a worldwide non-governmental association of standards' institutes, currently 
comprising 157 members, on the basis of one institute per country.30 Membership is 
voluntary and each institute/country has one vote m the process of developing a 
standard.3l Unless adopted by law or by contract, as all other voluntary codes, ISO 
standards are not legally enforceable. Their effectiveness depends on the good will of 
In sum, though the jury may still be out on the effectiveness of self-regulation, results so 
far have not been very dramatic.33 Several reasons have been given for their lack of 
effectiveness. For some, "[c]odes of conduct produced by the muscle of the market are 
often subject to distortions.,,34 Vagueness and lack of objective standards are often cited 
to support the argument that decentred regulation, particularly self-regulation, is nothing 
more than an empty promise devised to enhance a company's public image with no 
29 Standards can be developed by local or international bodies. This section is concerned with the latter. 
Other examples of international standards' organizations are the International Commission on Illumination 
(eIE), the International Electrotechnical Commission (lEC), and the International Telecommunication 
Union (lTU). For links to those institutions, see the World Standard Services Network website at: 
<WWw.wssn.netlWSSN/> . 
30 The institutions that represent each country are not required to be part of the country's administration. 
3) F . l" • 
or more 1ll.ormatIOn see: <WWW.lso.org>. 
32 Though regulatory delegation is common administrative practice, it is worth noting that in the case of 
ISO, and most other cases of international standardization bodies, delegation is to an international private 
entity outside the confines and reach of the state. Whether applied as a result of regulatory delegation or 
voluntary practice, a single vote, which mayor may not come from a state-run standardization body, links 
the standards to the sovereign and its resources. ISO has adopted an Action Plan for developing countries to 
enhance developing country participation in, and benefits from, the standard development process. For 
further information see ISO's website, available at <www.iso.org/iso/eniaboutiso>. 
\ 33 
See generally: B. Barton et ai, eds., Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
34 D. Kinley and 1. Tadaki, supra, note 16. 
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intention to follow through. For those that see decentred regulation as a true tool to guide 
corporate practices, its main weakness lies in the lack of transparency, enforcement and 
adjudication mechanisms. Its strength would rest on the long term potential to influence 
corporate and state behaviour to the point that repeated practice turns soft law into hard 
law.35 In the short term, decentred regulation may work where it is embedded in a system 
that triggers enforcement and sanctions whenever the primary system fails. 36 Usually, 
that system is the legal apparatus of the state. A logical consequence of this is that the end 
result is subject to the same challenges and problems that common regulatory compliance 
is faced with. Even in the case of the UN Norms, corporate offenders cannot be brought 
to an international court. A bolder approach is required for any real change to come 
about. 
B. Confronting the Ugly Truth 
"Business has become, in this last half century, the most powerful institution on 
the planet. The dominant institution in any society needs to take responsibility for 
the whole. ,,37 
For decades, legal and economic scholars have engaged in an endless discussion 
concerning the role of corporations in society.38 While one side argues for profit 
35 
D. Kinley and J. Tadaki, id. For S.R. Ratner self regulation represents a first step towards international 
corporate responsibility. S.R. Ratner, "Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility" 
1pecember 2001) III Yale L.J. 443. 
D.V.J. Bell, "The Role of Government in Advancing Corporate Sustainability" (27 March 2002), 
~vailable at: <www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/2002Ibelll1062002.pdf> . 
. D. Goulet, "Changing Development Debates Under Globalization: The Evolving Nature of Development 
.. 111 the Light of Globalization" (Fall 2004) 6 J.L. & Soc. Challenges I at 17. 
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maximization, the other sees in corporations a legitimate vehicle for implementing public 
welfare policy. The first position, championed by the Chicago School of Economics, can 
only conceive of welfare as the result of the individual's freedom to choose translated 
into his/her market power. The more profit the corporation generates, the more that goes 
in the individual's pocket and the freer he/she is. Wealth trickles down from the 
corporation to the individual through the operation of the free market. Their view -now 
labeled neo-liberal- is reflected in the principles of the Washington Consensus and, 
generally, in present day, Western-style domestic and international law and practice. 
Though it may be true that in a perfect world a corporation's goals should be that of 
maximizing wealth rather than redistributing it,39 that is not the world in which we live. 
Corporations are run by individuals with their virtues and flaws. Their success is 
measured by a single metric: their contribution to the bottom line, i.e. the corporate 
profit-making mission. Perhaps when the connection between a corporation, its 
representatives and managers, and its activities was more or less in plain view, the 
Chicago way of achieving widespread welfare could have been attainable. That is not the 
implement changes that can keep them flying under the radar of any legal system devised 
to keep them in check and to guarantee their contribution to the economy. We are faced 
38 W.T. Allen, "Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation" (November 1992) 14 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 261; A.A. Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for 
~chieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability" (Summer 2006) 43 Am. Bus. LJ. 365. 
Arguably, beyond exceeding their profit-driven mandate, corporate officers are no better allocators of 
Welfare spending than the shareholders whose money they would be spending. Ifnot through shareholder 
Spending, a corporation's contribution to welfare under this view is said to be limited to tax payments with 
the government deciding on allocation. 
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with "multinationality that transforms into statelessness.,,4o Neo-liberal economics fails 
to account for this disconnection and to factor in the unleashing of personal greed and 
destruction that is fuelled by unaccountability.41 
Current lack of corporate accountability is as real and mind-boggling as it is devastating. 
Recent experience has shown that individual ambition when shielded from plain view by 
numerous layers of legalities can shed even the most basic shreds of propriety and make 
monsters of would-be law abiding people.42 How else can one explain, Union Carbide's 
refusal to disclose information even after the Bophal tragedy killed thousands of people, 43 
or the decisions (-on record in the case's transcript-) of Uno cal's officers and directors to 
ignore the use of forced labour and other illegal practices connected to the company's 
activities in Myanmar?44 Neo-liberal economic theory fails to take into account human 
nature. For the most part, the law has followed suit. 
40 B. Stephens, supra, note 26 at 59. 
41 In the 1933 words of Justice L. Brandeis of the US Supreme Court: "Through size, corporations, once 
merely an efficient tool employed by individuals in the conduct of private business, have become an 
institution-an institution which has brought such concentration of economic power that so-calJed private 
corporations are sometimes able to dominate the state. The typical business corporation of the last century, 
Owned by a smalJ group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in size by their personal 
wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of 
employees and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are subjected, through the 
corporate mechanism, to the control of a few men. Ownership has been separated from control; and this 
separation has removed many of the checks which formerly operated to curb the misuse of wealth and 
.J POwer. And as ownership of the shares is becoming continualJy more dispersed, the power which formerly 
accompanied ownership is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. The changes thereby 
wrought in the lives of the workers, of the owners and of the general public, are so fundamental and far-
reaching as to lead these scholars to compare the evolving "corporate system" with the feudal system; and 
to lead other men of insight and experience to assert that this "master institution of civilized life" is 
committing it to the rule ofa plutocracy." Cited in: Third World Traveler, R. Benson, "ChalJenging 
Corporate Rule Petition to Revoke Unocal's Charter as a Guide to Citizen Action" (1999) 
~WWw.thirdworldtraveler.comIControlJing_Corporations/ChalJengeCorpRule_UNOCAL.html> . 
43 Kenneth Lay, the person at the centre of the Enron scandal was but one example. 
44 Reported in: D. Weissbrodt, "Business and Human Rights" (FalJ 2005) 74 U. Cin L. Rev. 55. 
Doe Iv. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932,161 Oil & Gas Rep. 599, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 10,336,02 Cal. 
Daily Op. Servo 9585,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,794, 9th Cir.(Cal.), Sep 18,2002 (NO. 00-56603, 00-
57195, 00-57197, 00-56628). 
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On the other hand, even though modem TNCs can often have a devastating impact on 
individuals and their communities, one cannot ignore the driving force behind TNCs, i.e. 
consumers. Consumers demand, and businesses deliver; the businesses that can deliver at 
the best prices are the ones that reap the most profits and the ones that can claim success. 
Ultimately, consumers in the developed world end up virtually dictating the development 
policies of the developing countries while lenders and investors implement it. 
Competition between developing countries ensures low prices and equally low standards. 
To be effective and coherent, any attempts at curtailing the negative consequences of 
unbridled corporate power should address consumer power as well. 
C. Global Approaches 
What better way to combat corporate impunity than to open the legal playing 
field? The current system of compartmentalized law upholds the fiction of states as the 
i only entities capable of causing good or evil on a large scale and falls short of bringing 
,~ 
about well being and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, "[dJecisions and actions of 
corporations have social consequences largely indistinguishable from those created by 
public regulators, but ... corporate decisionmaking [is J largely insulated from public 
participation, engagement, or scrutiny.,,45 
; Two approaches can be advanced to deal with these issues. First would be opening all 
courts to all actors. All legal barriers should be lifted to allow TNCs, which can already 
45 
D. Danielsen, "How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational 
Regulation and Governance" (Summer 2005) 46 Harv. Int'l LJ. 411. 
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contract with states and sue them in international fora, to be brought before supranational 
or "global" tribunals to respond for their criminal or tortiuous acts.46 Moreover, corporate 
employees should not be able to shield themselves behind the corporation in cases of 
human rights, environmental or any kind of abuse just because their activities were not 
abhorrent enough to trigger the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 
Second, the law should ensure maximum accountability and transparency in all aspects of 
natural resource development and management. Access to and disclosure of information 
rights and duties should reach all players whose activities can impact the public interest 
in resource development, including IFIs.47 Broad public participation should also be the 
rule. 
The issues, however, are as controversial as they are bogged down in theory. 
I. Legal Personality ofTNCs - Standing to Sue and Be Sued for Criminal 
and Tortiuos Acts 
All that has been written about TNCs and their legal personas cannot hide the fact 
that they are a creature of the law and as such can, and should, be tampered with to reflect 
new and changing circumstances. After all, "the debate about the inherent nature a/the 
46 By the same token, affected individuals should not be barred from bringing suit against TNes before a 
?Iobal adjudicator. Truly universal jurisdiction could also be an option in such a manner as to allow injured 
!ndividuals to choose between bringing suit in any domestic court or before a global court. 
7 D. Danielsen, supra, note 45. 
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corporation is essentially no different than a debate about what rights and obligations 
society will choose to impose upon it.,,48 
IfTNCs claim the power to regulate their own activities, a traditional state function, why 
should they not respond for all of their actions before international tribunals the way that 
states do? However, while states are being vacated of their powers and attributes, 
responsibility is not equally transferred or shared. Given that their power often surpasses 
that of states, particularly developing states, TNCs should be governed by similar 
duties.49 This is consequent with the idea that the state no longer represents the greatest 
danger to the individual, a position that the contemporary state now shares with TNCs 
and other institutional actors. 
From a substantive point of view, no person, legal or fictitious, is above the law. 50 
Moreover, fictitious personality is not meant to grant immunity for criminal or civil 
wrongdoings under internationallaw. 51 If anything, international law teaches that not 
even the all powerful state, itself a creature of the law, is exempt. Just as states are, TNCs 
and all fictitious persons are substantially bound by the basic rights and duties owed to all 
persons in and outside their home states whether they can be brought before a tribunal or 
48 B. Stephenson, supra, note 26 at 61. 
49 C. Baez et ai, "Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights" (1999-2000) 8 U. Miami Int'l & Compo L. 
Rev. 183; S.R. Ratner, supra, note 49. 
so The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to: "every individual and every organ 
· of society" as bound by the duties and rights spelled therein. General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948, available at: <www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>. Similar assertions can be found in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 5, and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 5; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966; available at: 
· <WWw.unhchr.chlhtmVmenu3/>. 
51 U. Paust provides a summary of municipal cases and jurisdictions that have upheld international law 
obligations ofTNCs and other organizations. J.J. Paust, "Sanctions Against Non-State Actors for 
· Violations ofInternational Law" (Spring 2002) 8 ILSA 1. Int'l & compo L. 417. 
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not. This is so regardless of their lack of express consent to be bound. Arguing that TNCs 
and other fictitious persons are not bound by international norms due to their lack of 
direct consent is equivalent to saying that individuals in a state are not bound by the 
mandates of domestic laws because they did not participate directly in their formulation. 
Besides, corporations are not opposed to being bound by international norms 
safeguarding their property rights such as those in IITs and other international agreements 
like the Washington Convention creating ICSID. On the contrary, they've been quite 
eager to assert their rights under any international instrument or source as long as it is 
found to be advantageous to their profit seeking motives. 52 The problem is clearly 
procedural and may only become one of substantial law wherever substantial universal 
rights and duties are not clearly defined. 53 
Standing and jurisdiction rules should be revised to allow all types of claims against 
TNCs to be made before the tribunal(s) with the best chances of becoming an effective 
deterrent of abuse. Limiting standing rules in international law to allow a right of action 
only against states is a fiction that is not in keeping with current times. Already, 
individuals can both sue and be sued before international tribunals for human rights 
violations.54 Also, if corporations can (and do) bring suits and complaints before 
t international tribunals to protect the rights that matter to them, namely: property rights, 
52 Some authors see in environmental agreements such as the Basel Convention, and the agreements on 
civil liability for oil and radioactive pollution, a system of direct foreign liability that by-passes the state by 
channeling international liability directly to TNCs. However, regulation and enforcement remains a 
responsibility of the state. H. Ward, "Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability through National 
Courts: Implications and Policy Options" (Spring 2001) 24 Hastings Int'I & Compo L. Rev. 451; B. 
Stephens, supra, note 26; A.E. Boyle, "Global ising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and 
International Law" (2005) 17 J. Envtl. L. 3. 
53 C. Baez et ai, supra, note 49. 
54 
B. Stephens, supra, note 26. See also: Rome Statute o/the International Criminal Court, available at: 
<WWw.icc-cpi.intilibrary/aboutiofficialjournaIlRome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf>. 
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why can't they be placed at the receiving end when non-property rights are at stake? Why 
is property more deserving of protection than any other human right like life, health and 
freedom? Just as property, the rights to life, health, water, shelter, freedom and a score 
others include erga omnes negative obligations as well as positive duties. Why then, if 
there is a general duty not to interfere with life for example, does protecting life become 
relevant in this context only when dealing with states or individual persons, and, in the 
latter case, only ifit can be called genocide or given a similarly heinous label? How 
about the perpetrators and the other rights? After all, a violation is a violation, is a 
. I' 55 VIO atlOn. 
The uneven treatment of perpetrators and rights cannot be blamed on the indeterminacy 
of non-property rights. There is nothing indeterminate in the taking of life and health 
through contamination (Bhopal; Aguinda), freedom through forced labour (Unocal), 
shelter and food through forced displacement (Awas Tingni; Pangue-Ralco), and so on. 
Incredibly, ordinary wrongdoers go to jailor face stiff penalties -and justly so- for the 
same or milder violations that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) get bonuses. The law 
needs to step in to correct the unbalance by removing all obstacles and granting standing 
to allow individuals and persons to bring suits against TNCs and other organizations for 
human rights and related violations before global tribunals. Once the playing field has 
been leveled so, the problem becomes one of finding the best suitable forum. 
SS Stephens finds a precedent for corporate liability in intemationallaw in the work of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the subsequent activities of the US Military Tribunal. B. Stephens, id. 
177 
In all cases where individual persons cannot be brought before a global tribunal, civil 
liability of individuals acting for a corporation that is found liable by a global tribunal 
should be automatic and directly actionable before the courts of the country where the 
individual is domiciled or holds assets. 
II. Global Litigation: Weighing the Options 
Local courts, particularly in developing countries, are no match for TNCs or IFIs. 
The power and political influence wielded by them could directly or indirectly paralyze 
even the most honest adjudicators.56 
Though expanding the scope of universal jurisdiction to allow all human rights and 
related abuses to be litigated in domestic courts regardless of where the abuse takes place 
and regardless of the nature of the human rights violations,57 could be a good way to curb 
illegal TNC behaviour, it may not be feasible or practical. While the technical difficulties 
inherent in determining when a TNCs' presence in a country is enough to trigger 
universal jurisdiction could be overcome by asserting jurisdiction regardless of physical 
connection, Belgium's unsuccessful experience with universal jurisdiction, opening 
Belgian courts to all victims of violations of the law of nations worldwide, demonstrated 
the dangers of trying to cast too wide a net. 58 On the other hand, even if the local 
connection with the state that asserts jurisdiction is well established, in the end, the piece 
56 D. Kinley and J. Tadaki, supra, note 16. 
57 Presently only a limited list of crimes catalogued under the customary law of nations qualify, generally, 
for application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
8 D. Kinley and 1. Tadaki, id; Social Science Research Council, L. Walleyn, "The Shabra & Shatila 
Massacre and the Belgian Universal Jurisdiction" available at: <www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/publications>; 
Buman Rights Watch, "Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art: VI. Belgium" available at: 
.' <hrw. org/reports/2006/ ij 0606/6 .htm> . 
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of the TNCs that can best respond to the outcome of the suit upon sentencing may be 
beyond the court's reach. In any event, universal jurisdiction is vulnerable to political 
pressure and may eventually have to cede to arguments of political comity. 59 Along the 
same lines, some attempts by states to enact legislation holding domestic corporations to 
human rights standards in their overseas operations have already died on the drafting 
table.6o The global community needs to step in to provide adequate supranational fora 
equipped with enough powers to rein in unacceptable behaviour. 
Existing international courts have limited capabilities. Assuming that the International 
Court of Justice could hear cases against TNCs, their officers and employees and other 
organizations, its enforcement powers are limited. The Inter American System's organs 
face similar limitations. The International Criminal Court (ICC), on the other hand, is 
already in a position to prosecute the officers and employees of offending TNCs and 
other organizations, but on a limited number of crimes that can hardly be interpreted to 
encompass the kind of behaviour that TNCs most routinely engage in. Thus, even if the 
ICC's personal jurisdiction could be interpreted to apply to corporations as some authors 
. suggest,61 very little could be accomplished vis a vis TNCs unless its statute were 
amended to cover all human rights and related violations. The history of the ICC's 
creation lends little hope to any attempts to broaden its material jurisdiction for the time 
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The WTO could offer an interesting avenue for action considering that, after all, what 
TNCs obtain through their unlawful and unethical behaviour is an unfair trade advantage 
that could qualify as illegal under international trade rules. Standing rules, however, 
would need to be expanded to allow direct action against TNCs by countries as well as 
individuals. 
It is a proven fact that the social, cultural and environmental impacts of natural resources 
development cannot be divorced from the economic activities that they entail. Only the 
law and legal institutions maintain that fiction by having separate tribunals deal with the 
different aspects of the same activities. Although the WTOs' disposition towards 
becoming an arbiter of human rights and related abuses is -at best- dubious, the WTO is 
the best choice among existing international tribunals to take on TNCs. On top of 
broadening standing provisions, however, additional changes would need to be made in 
order to ensure transparency and accountability.63 
Private arbitral tribunals like ICSID, on the other hand, should not be barred from hearing 
and considering arguments based on human rights and other violations, particularly if 
their availability is the result of state treaty-making as in the case of ICSID. 
63 Even if this were accomplished, unfortunately, oil-one of the natural resources with the worst records of 
TNc abuse-, does not trade under WTO rules. Such a radical change as the one proposed could make it 
eVen more difficult for it to ever be traded under the WTO regime. However, it is probably better to start 
with an established tribunal that has already been looking at the issues at stake and with real global power 
than to try to begin building a new. 
180 
III. Some Practical Considerations on the Approaches Proposed 
Opening the floodgates of broad international responsibility for TNCs and other 
organizations and their officers could have negative repercussions on developing and 
other economies if the new procedural tools are used as a means to harass or hurt 
powerful economic interests. Therefore, any procedural vehicles devised to make TNCs 
and others accountable should be crafted in such a way as to minimize the risk of 
frivolous claims. Some ideas could include: 
• notification of the intention to initiate an action to the TNCs' home country andlor 
the defendant or organization under investigation; 
• requirement that a negotiated resolution be attempted; and, 
• the victim's state may reserve the right to be represented in, or replace the private 
petitioner or plaintiff in the action. 
The fundamental weakness of any proposal to subject TNCs to the authority of global 
tribunals for all human rights and related violations, including the creation of an 
individual right of action, is that such a system needs to be brought about with the help of 
states. Developed states, and even developing ones, tend to shy away from punishing 
corporations which they see as funding their own welfare and futures. As a result, the 
answer may come from the bottom up, i.e. empowering the public to mobilize to punish 
TNCs and other delinquent organizations directly. Flexing its consumer power is one way 
of doing that. There may be others as suggested below. 
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IV. Special Considerations on IFIs 
Political and procedural issues make it harder to put IFIs on trial in the same way 
and venues as TNCs. However, there is much room for improvement on the status quo. 
IFIs, on the one hand, could be part of the solution. They could contribute to well being 
and to curbing TNC power by embracing their social mandate fully. That would mean 
setting strict governance standards at the country level and enhancing monitoring duties 
within the IFIs. To do so, they need not micro-manage individual projects away from 
elected government officials. Requesting minimum accountability and transparency 
standards as pre-condition to lending, such as requiring that broad disclosure and access 
to information, and access to participation and to justice provisions be in place, would be 
a start. 
Most importantly, for IFIs, embracing their social mandate would imply taking an active 
role in deterring bad corporate behaviour. One way to do this would be to black-list 
TNCs that have engaged in human rights, environmental or related abuses. The TNCs so 
listed, including subsidiaries and affiliates, would be ineligible to work in IFI funded 
. projects or to receive direct funding from their private-arm institutions. A procedure and 
. criteria for listing and de-listing TNCs would have to be set. To further solidify these 
procedures, IFIs themselves would need to be subject to strict accountability standards. 
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Rather than the toothless in-house monitoring systems currently in place, IFIs should be 
subject to an independent oversight body dedicated to overseeing their performance on 
human rights and related abuses, i.e. an IFI Ombudsman. Currently, for example, the 
World Bank's Inspection Panel and the Inter-American Development Bank's 
Independent Investigation Mechanism are internal review mechanisms with limited 
power to issue recommendations.64 There are also no procedures to investigate and take 
disciplinary action against employees who fail to enforce IFI standards in the projects 
under their responsibility or control. Contrary to this, the proposed IFI Ombudsman 
would have broad powers to investigate violations per se or at the request of the public 
and to demand corrective action, as well as to evaluate the IFIs' overall performance and 
make recommendations for improvement on a periodic basis. 65 To ensure that its 
demands and recommendations don't fall on deaf ears, the Ombudsman would have the 
power to leverage fines from IFIs, as well as to suspend employee privileges and 
recommend further disciplinary action. The fines collected from IFIs could help fund the 
Ombudsman's activities. In addition to the independent Ombudsman, ensuring IFIs' 
accountability will require that they be subject to broad disclosure and access to 
information requirements. Of course, the Ombudsman would be subject to the same 
transparency requirements. 
64 See: WB, The Inspection Panel, available at: 
<web. worldbank. orglWB SITE/EXTERN ALlEXTINSPECTI ONP ANELlO "menuPK:6413 2057 ~pagePK: 6 
4l30364~piPK:64l32056~theSitePK:380794,00.html>; and, IDB, About the IADB, Independent 
Investigation Mechanism, available at: 
~Www.iadb.orgiaboutus/iii/independent_invest!independent_invest.cfm?language=English>. 
These powers could be modeled around those of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development of Canada's federal government. For information see: Canada, Office of the Auditor General, 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, available at: <www.oag-
bVg.gc.caldomino/cesd _ cedd.nsf/htmllmenu8 _ e.html>. 
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D. Involving the Public - Domestic Approaches 
One way in which the public could make a difference is in suing for revocation of 
the corporate charter of rogue TNCs. Clearly, corporations cannot deviate from their 
stated objective in their activities; the commission of illegal acts can hardly be considered 
incidental to the pursuit of a TNCs' objective. As an instrument of society created by law 
and administrative authority, those TNCs that contravene the law should be dissolved. 
This has already been done in the US in the case of Ohio's Standard Oil Co. and others. 66 
It was also recently attempted in connection to one of the cases mentioned in this studl7 
in a petition to California's Attorney General (AG) to revoke the charter of Uno cal Co. 
for the abuses committed in Burma (Myanmar). Although the petition was unsuccessful, 
no explanation was given for the AG's refusal, leading one to believe that the legal basis 
on which it was grounded remain valid and applicable. 68 Avenues for petitioning 
corporate charter revocation should be available to individuals anywhere and anytime 
that a corporation acts outside the law, violating the social contract upon which all 
Corporations are erected. Standing to request revocation should be broad and open to any 
person with an interest in upholding the rule of law. 
66 Third World Traveler, L.R. Grossman and F. T. Adams, "Taking Care of Business. Citizenship and the 
Charter of Incorporation" (1993) <www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Corporations/TakingCareBusiness.html>. 
As recently as 2005, the US FTC shut down three consumer debt companies. For more examples, see: 
<www.corporatepolicy.org/issues/crime.htm> and <www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/020ct-
nov/oct-nov02corp l.html>. 
67 
68 See Ch. IV, Universal Jurisdiction. 
R. Mokhiber, CorpWatch, "The Death Penalty for Corporations Comes of Age" (1 Nov. 1998) 
<www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=181O>. In fact, the AG invited the petitioners to request permission to 
SUe for revocation directly. The petitioners turned the invitation down due to lack of resources and went on 
to campaign for a law requiring automatic charter revocation upon the perpetration of3 major offences. For 
a copy of the bill introduced to the California Legislature in 2003 see: <www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-
041Ibill/sen/sb 0301-0350/sb 335 bill 20030602 amended sen.html>. 
- - - - - -
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Another way in which any person can influence TNCs is through his/her purchase power. 
This could be done directly through individual decisions to boycott certain products69 or 
indirectly through the purchase and sale of shares in corporations.7o Socially responsible 
investment can have a powerful impact on corporations, to the point that numerous funds 
have been instituted to take advantage of that power. Once constituted, not only do they 
buy and sell shares, but they also intervene in TNCs decision-making by exercising their 
share-holder voting rights and bringing about change from within the TNCS.71 
Enhancing public and stakeholder rights is key to bringing about changes in TNCs' 
behaviour and to making progress on achieving general well being. 
I. Enhanced Public Rights 
If the media are unable to report on abusive behaviour, there will be no public 
relations consequence of corporate acts. If government leaders share in the 
inflated profits generated by abusive behaviour, they will have no incentive to 
enforce even the most basic norms.72 
69 Perhaps the best example of this kind of action was the boycott ofNike products as a protest against the 
Company's human rights record in Asia. 
70 This approach is particularly effective in those cases of companies that do not market their products 
under easily recognizable brands. 
71 See e.g.: Social Investment Forum, "2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United 
States" (Dec. 2003), available at: 
~www.socialinvest.orglareas/research/trends/sri_ trends Jeport_ 2003. pdf>. 
B. Stephens, supra, note 26 at 63. 
185 
The quote from B. Stephens, above, is a strong reminder of the power of public 
action. For that action to be possible and effective, however, some minimum conditions 
need to be met. Those conditions include: 
• Wide disclosure and access to information; 
• Opportunities for participation; and, 
• Access to justice. 
Though the enabler is per force the state through regulation, as mentioned above, states 
can be prodded to issue and perfect the necessary legal and regulatory rules by the IFIs, 
which can also add some technical assistance to their leverage power. 
a. Disclosure and Access to Information 
i. Information Disclosure 
In order to maximize the effectiveness of public and stakeholder participation in 
natural resources management, the availability of relevant quality information is key. 
There are three types of information that are essential to any participation activities: base 
line, interpretative and performance information. 
Baseline information is typically provided by the government and includes background 
data concerning the resource and its environment. It typically includes data on the 
location, type and value of the resource, land use, relevant socio-economic information 
and similar comparative data. This type of information is essential to assessing the 
viability and convenience of an undertaking and for sound natural resources' 
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development policy and strategy formulation. It is therefore natural that the initial 
investment in collecting baseline information be borne by the state. 73 
Generally, and particularly for participation purposes, the public must be able to 
understand, compare and assess the meaning of the available data in terms of impacts and 
benefits. In other words, interpretative information is required. There is a wealth of 
interpretative and educational material and information constantly being produced and 
volunteered by highly qualified institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) that is relatively easy to access. Cash-strapped governments could harness the 
power ofNGOs in reaching out and educating the public. The media is also a valuable 
resource to disseminate interpretative and background data. 
Performance information relates to product and process inputs and outputs and includes 
data on actual environmental, social, economic and cultural impacts, both positive and 
negative. Although it is available to administrators through their inspection and 
investigation powers, it is most immediately, easily and cheaply available to the 
producer. Collecting performance information requires a consistent monitoring effort 
which the regulated individual is forced to undertake in order to ensure it is in 
compliance. From an economic perspective, and taking into account that both 
administrators and industries need to collect performance data to verify compliance with 
regulatory and contractual obligations, the fact that obtaining it may be less costly for 
73 
Some of this infonnation is routinely collected as a requirement of important intemationallaw 
instruments of widespread ratification in SA such as the Biodiversity Convention and the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Both Conventions contain a requirement to file periodical "National 
Communications." 
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industry due to its immediateness and familiarity with the regulated activities may suffice 
to determine that industry should bear the bulk of the burden of collecting the information 
while the government plays a more limited role, collecting, organizing and storing it. It is 
cost effective and efficient. 74 However, even if regular self-compliance checks are made 
and the information is readily available, the producer may not be motivated to disclose it. 
Self-reporting may be induced either through regulation or by offering special 
. • 75 IncentIves. 
In comparative law, regulatory self-reporting of infringements is generally limited to 
accidents and spills or to cases of risk of imminent and significant harm to people or the 
natural environment. Issues concerning the right to avoid self incrimination and the 
protection generally due to privileged information have often been raised against 
compulsory reporting of violations.76 However, self-reporting of data concerning 
ordinary business activities and circumstances proves to be a significant source of 
background information for public participation activities. Disclosure requirements in 
74 T. Tietenberg, "Private Enforcement of Environmental Regulations in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
An Effective Instrument for Environmental Management?" (May 1996) Inter-American Development Bank 
Working Paper Series No. ENV-lOl, Washington, D.C. With regards to environmental and related 
information, environmental law principles, particularly the polluter pays principle, would support this 
conclusion insofar as the cost of data collecting and reporting can be considered to be necessarily 
associated with the polluting, profit-generating activities. 
75 T' b 'd leten erg, I • 
76Audit privilege was at the centre of a long-standing dispute between the federal and the states' 
environmental authorities in the USA. There, as a result of a growing trend towards enacting 
environmental audit privilege legislation which seriously curtails the public's access to companies' 
information, federal authorities decided to boost self-reporting of violations by issuing a policy statement in 
January 22, 1996, which promised leniency to those companies which reported violations; 
<www.garynull.comlDocuments/erflright_to_know_nothing.htm>; 
<http://www.enviroweb.orglgnp/corporat.htm>; <http://www.enviroweb.orglgnp/fulldisclosurefeb.htm>. 
For a complete review of confidentiality issues see: L. Barrera-Hernandez, lriformationfor Sustainability 
(1996), Master of Laws Thesis submitted to The University of Calgary, Faculty of Law [on file with The 
University of Calgary and the author]. See also: Anchorage Daily News, March 24, 1989 
<http://www.adn.comlevos/stories/EV62.html>; McCutchen, Issue Brief, available at: 
<www.mccutchen.com/ergltitle.htm> . 
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community right-to-know legislation77 are valuable tools even if the information 
disclosed as a result is, for the most part, based on estimates and does not directly reveal 
violations.78 The information obtained may serve as a "pointer" sounding the alarm on 
potential problem "hot spots." 
ii. Access to Information 
While collecting information is of the outmost importance for effective 
management, transparency and accountability will only be achieved if the information 
disclosed and collected is readily available to the public. Providing direct public access 
to information empowers the public and promotes compliance through enhanced 
visibility of the activities of TNCs and the authorities. It also assists in planning for 
development through opening decision-making to public scrutiny and input. 
Ideally, the principle governing access to information in general should be that, with a 
few clearly defined exceptions, access to all government-held information, including 
third party information, should be directly and unconditionally available to the public. In 
addition, the public's participation in natural resources management requires access to all 
that information which may reasonably be deemed necessary to assess the soundness and 
77Since 1986, when the U.S.A. passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § II 00 I, right-to-know legislation has proliferated and expanded throughout the 
developed world seeking to empower workers, consumers and the community at large by giving them the 
ability to access information on environmental issues relevant to them. For detailed information on EPCRA 
see: Chemicals in Your Community: A Guide to the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act, EPA document EPA 550-K-93-003, <http://www.epa.gov/epahome/citizen.htm>. 
78 Right-to-know legislation has encountered some opposition from the private sector. Industry 
stakeholders are generally concerned about reporting burden and business confidentiality issues. See: USA, 
Business Roundtable Position Paper, available at: <www.brtable.orgldocument.cfm/47>; Canada, Willms 
and Shier Environmental Law Newsletter (Winter 1998), available at: 
.. WWw.willmsshier.comlnewsltrs/9801.htm#feds 2>. 
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convenience of a proposal, a decision or action that is subject to participation and public 
scrutiny. Accordingly, the available information should not be limited to the information 
in the hands of a specific decision-maker but may require accessing files of other 
authorities or agencies. It could also imply access to third party documents, including 
those held by TNCs, which mayor may not be on file with the government. In the latter 
case, procedures and conditions for requesting and accessing third party information 
should be regulated. For example, the information to be accessed may include: a 
developer's financial information as may be necessary for reviewing the soundness of 
environmental investment and community development plans and other onerous 
commitments included in a proposal; information on process and product design to 
determine probable impacts on consumers and communities; information on inputs and 
outputs; etc. 
Access to information may be available as a substantive right or provided for on a case by 
case basis (procedural right). The right is most useful if it is defined broadly to 
encompass all those with a simple, unqualified interest in the information. In all cases, it 
must be guaranteed through adequate regulation. Constitutional rights or statutory rights 
to access information are important but may lend very little assistance if they are not 
translated into regulations and into everyday rules of practice. 79 Regulated access may 
take place under various statutes which should be considered and organized carefully in 
order to provide wide access while taking care not to unduly burden the administration 
79The groups seeking access are generally the ones with fewer means to bring legal action for failure to 
provide access. Thus, the right to access information and participate, though recognized, may have very 
limited application. 
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and to prevent duplication of efforts (and the consequent waste of resources) or an 
unnecessary atomization of the information, particularly in federal countries.8o 
b. Tackling Public Participation 
The term "public participation" when referred to development activities and 
decisions relates to the opportunities and rights given to individuals or groups to have an 
impact in the development process, to ensure that their needs and concerns are 
appropriately taken into account, that benefits are distributed on an equitable basis, and 
that no single group or individual bears a disproportionate share of the negative impacts 
of development. The public's participation in development decisions and activities is 
increasingly being recognized as of vital importance for achieving development and well 
being at the local, regional and international level. Responsible, informed and effective 
participation contributes to fair, transparent and accountable management and 
development. 
Participation should be differentiated from information disclosure and access, where 
people are notified of what has already been decided or done. The actual degree of 
public involvement in participation may vary from consultation, where the public's input 
is sought but there is no obligation to take into account its input, to active involvement of 
8°The advantage of an expanded rights package that includes access-to-information provisions is reduced 
discretion regarding disclosure, and fewer exemptions to transparency. See: 
<www2.ec.gc.calcepaliplO/e 1 0_03 .htrnl>. 
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the public at early stages of a project and throughout its implementation to ensure 
accomplishment of project goals.8) 
Most South American countries legislate public participation in relation to project 
approval processes in connection with environmental and social impacts. However, there 
is no theoretical impediment for extending participation to other decision making 
processes or tools, even if participation is not a recognized substantive right but is 
included as a specific procedural opportunity. Participation can also be informal, through 
non-established channels. Examples of informal participation are boycotting a certain 
product or a project as in the case of the Argentine peoples' protests against Uruguay's 
pulp mills. 
Providing for the public's participation through formal channels will generally add to a 
decision's sustainability through contributing to its transparency and also because it may 
anticipate and prevent conflict by putting TNCs face to face with the public in advance of 
development activities. It also serves to enhance the quality of decision-making through 
the introduction of relevant new variables or information and by building consensus.82 
Public participation can help to ensure a fair distribution of impacts and benefits.83 
810verseas Development Institute, Briefing Paper, "Mainstreaming Public Participation in Economic 
Infrastructure Projects" 1998 (3) July, <http://www.oneworld.orglodilbriefingl3_98.html>. 
82Canada, It's about our Health! Towards Pollution Prevention, Report of the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, June 1995; see also: N. Schwartz et ai, 
"Consulta comunitaria, desarrollo sostenible y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Un marco 
conceptual" (Washington, D.C.: Inter American Development Bank, 03/99) at 14. The study states that 
consultation generally enhances economic return indexes. 
83N. Schwartz, id. 
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The public's input may be put to use throughout the wide range of natural resources-
related decision-making opportunities through different mechanisms. Thus, while natural 
resources development policy makers can canvass public opinion through opening the 
process to written comments from the public, individual project approval requires more 
in depth involvement by the public that can be called upon to help decide on acceptable 
uses of natural resources in their area.84 In addition, public participation in development 
projects does not have to be limited to the approval process, and can be extended to 
participation in the development of protection and management plans, as well as in their 
implementation. Other opportunities for public participation include commenting on 
proposed statutes, regulations, guidelines, codes of practice, permits, agreements, etc. 
By creating the conditions for effective, timely and meaningful participation, regulatory 
requirements can procure that the public gets a fair and reasonable opportunity to 
influence decision-making by making it accountable and context relevant, and that well 
being is ultimately achieved. The following may help clarify what those requirements 
should be: 
• Whether participation is a substantive or procedural right, the rules on standing 
should be clear. Accountability and substantive fairness considerations may 
advise taking a broad approach towards legal standing for participation in 
resource-related matters. 
• Depending on the kind of decision to be made (i.e. on permits, regulations, etc.) 
84See E. Hughes et ai, eds, Environmental Law and Policy, Preliminary Edition (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1992). 
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participation should be sought before a decision is taken and as early as possible 
in the process, before any mayor commitments are made and/or resources spent; 
• The right to participate must be upheld by a parallel right to access information; 
i.e. provisions on standing to access information should at least mirror 
legitimating rules for participation. 85 
• The accessible information must be complete, timely and readily available. 86 
• Effective notice provisions must be in place. Provisions on notice should be 
flexible enough to allow for best efforts in ensuring that notice of the opportunity 
to participate reaches its target audience. Means and language of communications 
have to be considered, especially when the target audience is located in remote or 
rural areas and may include distinct sectors of the population such as indigenous 
and tribal peoples. 
• Funding for intervenors to level the playing field may also be necessary. 
Regulatory provisions on participation, whether in project approval or development 
planning, need to be clearly inserted in the decision-making or management process in 
order to be incorporated to and reflected in the outcome. This is not to say that the 
public's input will be the one single binding and decisive factor to be taken into account 
in the outcome. Given that the appropriate formalities to ensure transparency and fairness 
are kept, including the provision of a reasoned written decision that is publicly accessible, 
it does guarantee, however, that the public's input will be taken into account in the 
outcome. 
85 A typical example where the rules on access limit the possibility of participating can be found in those 
kinds of rules that limit the right to request information to specific types or categories of data. 
86See section on access to information above. 
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c. Social Licence to Operate and Impact Benefit Agreements 
Although, the general theory and practice on public participation in resource 
development treats the public's input regarding the viability of a specific development 
project as non-binding, recent experience in SA points in a different direction. 
In similar cases in Tambogrande and Quilish, Peru,87 and another in Esquel, Argentina,88 
the public's opposition to gold mining projects determined that the resource remained 
undeveloped. On all occasions, the private developer was driven away by the local 
community which, unconvinced that they would accrue any benefits and fearing the 
negative toll that the resulting environmental degradation and pollution would take on 
their health and livelihood, took practical and legal action to impede development. 89 As a 
result, the term "social license to operate," or "social licence" was coined to refer to the 
need to obtain host communities' favour to enter and operate in a certain area. Although 
the "requirement" has yet to be explicitly incorporated to the regulatory landscape of SA, 
it is already part of the IFIs' jargon. It will be interesting to trace its evolution as a tool to 
assist the public, particularly potentially affected communities, in contributing to natural 
resources development. There is a danger, however, in allowing one section of the 
87 For information on Tambogrande see, e.g.: Oxfam America, "A Proposed Mine in Tambogrande, Peru: 
An Alternative Look" (September 2001), available at: 
<www.oxfamamerica.orginewsandpublications/publications/researchJeports/art615.html> , and 
"Tambogrande Wins Prestigious Human Rights Award", available at: 
<www.oxfamamerica.orglnewsandpublications/news _ updates/archive2002/art3929.html>. On Quilish see: 
Oxfam America, "Tangled Strands in Fight Over Peru Gold Mine" (25 October 2005), available at: 
<www.oxfamamerica.orglnewsandpublications/news _updates/news _ update.2005-11-03 .6933209585>. See 
also: Oxfam America, "Peru Searches for Solutions to Mining Conflicts" (31 August 2005), available at: 
<WWw.oxfamamerica.orginewsandpublications/news _updates/news _ update.2005-08-3 1.3642638674>. 
:8 For information on Esquel, see: <www.nodirtygold.orglesquel_argentina.cfm>. 
9 In Tambogrande and Esquel, protesters set up referendum procedures in the communities. In both cases 
Voters overwhelmingly rejected the development. 
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general public to gain disproportionate weight in deciding the course of natural resources' 
development in a given country and stifle sectoral or economic development. In order to 
overcome that danger and ensure that natural resource development can be beneficial to 
affected communities as well as the general public, law makers and administrators in 
Canada, for example, are increasingly resorting to Impact-Benefit Agreements (IBAs).9o 
In their simplest form, IBAs are agreements between a resource developer and the 
community affected by the project. The agreements seek certainty and stability in 
community-developer relations through the negotiation of mutual benefits and the 
establishment of formal channels of communication. 91 While the developer seeks 
undisturbed access to the resource and the development area, the community seeks to 
minimize negative impacts and maximize benefits. The agreements typically include 
provisions on: community education, training and employment opportunities; workplace 
conditions; economic development and business opportunities; social, cultural and 
community support; environmental management and monitoring; and, financial 
arrangements on revenue sharing. IBAs' usefulness is maximized when their negotiation 
is inserted as a step or precondition in the permitting process and their fulfilment is 
eventually incorporated as a condition in the licence or contract between the government 
and the developer, becoming legally binding and enforceable.92 In that case, if the TNC 
90 Focus, "Negotiations with Aboriginal Groups: the Canadian experience" (March 2002) 
<www.aar.com.auJpubs/pdflnatifontmar02.pdt>. For a list of existing IBAs in Canada, see: 
<www.impactandbenefit.com/News.html>; see also: Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
Thirteenth Annual Report, Mechanisms for Aboriginal Community Benefits, < http://www.ainc-
inac. gc. ca/ps/nap/abo/abo 13/7 abo 13 _ e.html>. 
9} T. Isaac and A. Knox, McCarthy Tetrault, "Canadian Aboriginal Law: Creating Certainty in Resource 
Development" (2004), available at: <www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/Resource_development.pdt>. 
92 The government would review and approve the IBA thusly incorporated. A. Lucas, "Canadian 
Participatory Rights in Mining and Energy Resource Development: The Bridges to Empowerment?" in 
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in question fails to hold its side of the bargain, the licence can be suspended or 
terminated. In addition, subjecting the agreement to the government's approval can 
ensure that a balance is maintained between the interests of the immediate stakeholders 
and the public at large. Though IBAs are commonly used for projects in indigenous areas, 
their application could be made extensible to other communities similarly located in 
development areas, whether they belong to an indigenous group or not.93 Some 
conditions regarding the target community(ies), their rights and representatives, however, 
will have to be met and not all natural resource development projects may warrant the 
negotiation of an IBA. 94 
d. Access to Justice 
Another avenue through which the public may contribute to ensure that natural 
resource development contributes to well being, is through its involvement in compliance 
and enforcement activities (private compliance and enforcement action). Private action 
may enhance deterrence by filling those gaps left by public compliance and enforcement 
efforts. It also lends transparency to the workings of the administration through oversight. 
Even in countries with effective and efficient compliance and enforcement 
administrations, some misdeeds will go undetected. It is those gaps that private activity 
Human Rights in Natural Resource Development, D. Zillman et aI, eds., (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 305. In the Canadian Territory ofNunavut, they are required by law. 
93 S. Matiation, "Impact and Benefits Agreements Between Mining Companies and Aboriginal 
Communities in Canada: A Model for Natural Resource Developments Affecting Indigenous Groups in 
Latin America?" (Fall 2002) 7 Great Plains Nat. Resources]. 204. 
94 For more information see: Public Policy Forum, "Sharing in the Benefits of Resource Developments: A 
Study of First Nations-Industry Impact Benefits Agreement" (March 2006), available at: 
<www.ppforum.ca/common/assets/pub I ications/en/report_ impact_ benefits-english. pdt>. 
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is called in to fill. Of course, it is most important where government corruption or TNC 
extortion are present. 
In addition to the traditional menu of rights of action available to the public, including -
preferably- citizen suits, this study leads one to conclude that it is of the outmost 
importance to allow members of the public to go outside their local jurisdictions to sue 
TNCs directly for human rights and associated violations. Exhaustion of local remedies 
may be a requisite before accessing global courts. However, given the limitations and 
obstacles that individual plaintiffs and states face when confronted with TNCs, this study 
advocates for direct access to global courts by individuals and anyone with an interest in 
enforcing the law. 
4. EPILOGUE 
As I was finishing this dissertation, Milton Friedman, the father of the Chicago 
School of Economics,95 died quietly in a US hospital. Author of "The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits," economist Milton Friedman argued 
that "there is one and only one social responsibility of business--to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception and 
fraud." Corporate social responsibility, he wrote, would be a "'fundamentally subversive 
95 For more information on M. Friedman see: <www.econJib.org/Jibrary/Enclbios/Friedman.html>. 
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doctrine' in a free society,,96 Over two decades later, profit-maximizing TNes of the 
"free world" are unabashedly resorting to forced labour and other abhorrent behaviours in 
the developing world. We should either redefine "free society" or "corporation." What 
will it be? 
96 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Sep. 13, 1970, reprinted in: <www.colorado.edulstudentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-
business.html> . 
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